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The issue of managerialism versus shareholder wealth is, yet, an 
unsettled issue. On the one extreme the neo-classical theory of the 
firm posits shareholder wealth maximizationas the sole goal of the 
organization. On the other extreme managerial models of the firm assert 
that managers run firms for their own benefit (e.g., Baumol's [6] sales 
maximization model, Marris' [56] growth maximization model and William-
son's [93] expense preferency theory). 
Actually, the neo-classical and the managerial models are special 
cases of the general behavioral model of the firm which assert that the 
activities of the firm are carried out by different interest groups, each 
of which maximizes its own benefits subject to the constraints set by 
the other groups (18) (19). The neo-classical model may be interpreted 
as viewing the firm from the perspective of only one interest group, 
i.e., shareholders; while the managerial model as viewing the firm from 
the perspective of another interest group, i.e., managers. 
However, no operational version of the general behavioral model has 
yet been presented in the literature. Operational models are restricted 
to the two special cases of shareholder wealth maximization and manager 
utility maximization. One of the objectives of this study is to approx-
imate such a general model. 
l 
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Actually,. if firms operate in a world where: (1) individuals have 
homogeneous expectations, (2) assets are infinitely divisible, (3) there 
~re no taxes, and (4) markets function perfectly, the managerial model 
should produce the same results as the neo-classical model (26). Any 
deviation from the shareholder wealth maximization, on the part of 
manager, would result in his replacement. In such a world all firms 
have to follow the optimal path prescribed in the neo-classical model 
of shareholder wealth maximization. There would be no room for the 
managers to deviate from the principle. 
There is also a second case where the managerial model and the 
neo-classical model obtain the same results. This is when the managers 
are also the owners of the firm. 
In either case management policies, especially financial policies, 
should respond in similar fashion to the same objective of shareholder 
wealth maximization. For example, the optimal capital structure of the 
firm would be set at that debt and equity combination which minimizes 
the cost of capital. The investment policy will be designed to accept 
all projects yielding more than the marginal cost of capital. There 
will be no active dividend policy. Dividends are residuals (26) {32) 
(63). 
The above assumptions are, of course, violated in the real world. 
Taxes are an important factor which influence the decisions of investors • 
. Assets are not infinitely divisible. Individuals have heterogeneous 
expectations, and market imperfections are present. 
Proponents of the managerial model maintain that these violations 
of assumptions are "material" enough to give the non-owner managers room 
to deviate from the optimum path and follow a "satisficing" path instead. 
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This satisficing behavior will result in: 
1. A non-optimal capital structure where the level of debt is 
determined by some common-practice norm. (This can be ref erred 
to as a market satisficing behavior.) 
2. A relatively stable and active dividend policy. (This can be 
referred to as a shareholder satisficing behavior, which is 
exhibited as a result of informational content of dividends 
[74].) 
3. A residual investment policy, i.e. , the capital budget being 
determined after the payment of dividends, with no particular 
cut-off rate except where take-over becomes a threat because of 
a very low rate of return (27) (56) (57). 
4. Earnings smoothing through accounting manipulation (18) (33). 
(This can be referred to as market-shareholder satisficing 
behavior.) 
While it is true that the assumptions needed for the neo-classical model 
to hold are probably violated, the model cannot be rejected on this 
basis. Quoting Friedman (28) 
• • • the only relevant test of the validity of a hypothesis 
is comparison of its predictions with experience. The hypoth-
esis is rejected if its predictions are contradicted ['fre-
quently' or more often than predictions from an alternative 
hypothesis]; it is accepted if its predictions are not contra-
dicted; great confidence is attached to it if it has survived 
many opportunities for contradiction (p. 8). 
Therefore, the validity of the hypotheses should be accepted or rejected 
only after empirical tests on these hypotheses. The tests that readily 
suggest themselves would be those on the interaction of policies and 
goals. This is so because, as we have seen, the two competing hypoth-
eses concerning goals imply very different financial policies. 
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Numerous empirical studies (e.g., [5] [11] [24] [30] [37] [39] [41] 
[48] [53] [93]) have tested the neo-classical and the managerial model 
hypotheses, and the predictions of the neo-classical hypothesis have 
been contradicted more often than the predictions of the managerial 
models hypotheses. However, the studies have not been thorough in their 
analyses. For example, they have shown that management has goals other 
than shareholder wealth maximization. But, from their analysis we cannot 
make any statement as to whether shareholders' economic well being is of 
principal concern to the management, or of a secondary importance subject 
to the achievement of other goal(s). Also, we do not know which finan-
cial policies have· been utilized to achieve firms' goals, and what their 
order of priority is. We also do not know the effect of separation of 
ownership and control, if any, on the priority scheme of firms' goals 
and policies. 
Scope of the Study 
It is the purpose of this study to do much needed comparative study 
of goal preference and policy preference of owner controlled and manage-
ment controlled firms to find: 
1. the priority scheme of firm goals, 
2. the priority scheme of firm financial policies in achievement 
of goals, 
3. the extent of activeness and effectiveness of financial 
policies, and 
4. the effect of separation of ownership and control on 1, 2 and 
3 above. 
The study is a major contribution to the area of study for the 
following reasons: 
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1. Most of the existing studies in finance and economics, that 
concern the interaction of goals and policies, are mainly 
partial analysis studies. They are concerned with either the 
effects of one policy on one goal, the effect of exogenous 
variables on one goal, or how financial policies respond to one 
goal. This study will construct a general dynamic model of the 
financial management process. The model will enable a more 
complete analysis of the interaction of firm goals with the 
firm's financial policies. 
2. The study will examine an area not covered by previous 
researchers. It considers the firm's objective function with 
multiple goals. The weight or relative importance of each goal 
will be determined empirically. This will shed some light on 
the controversial issue of firm goals and theory of the firm. 
3. The study will also attempt to generate a priority ranking of 
financial policies utilized in achieving firm goals as a 
further check on the implications of theory of the firm for 
financial management. 
4. The study will generate empirical evidence as to the effect of 
separation of ownership and management on firm goals pursued, 
and financial policies utilized. 
CHAPTER II 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE 
From a review of existing literature, relevant to this work, it can 
be concluded that: 
1. The neo-classical theory of profit maximization is no longer a 
theory applicable to large, modern firms. Maximization of 
sales and/or growth, subject to a minimum profit constraint, 
seems to give a much-closer-to-reality explanation of the 
behavior of these firms. 
2. There is an active (although imperfect) market for corporate 
control and as a result the differences between owner con-
trolled and management controlled firms are of a degree and 
not of a kind. Management controlled firms have a greater 
desire for sales and/or growth maximization, but profits are of 
prime importance to management and owner controlled firms alike. 
3. Policies the firm pursues will depend on the form of its objec-
tive function. Under the assumption of shareholder wealth 
maximization, the capital structure is optimized at the point 
where the average cost of capital is minimized; there would be 
no active dividend policy, and investment policy would be the 
most important policy. Alternative assumptions of sales 
maximization, growth maximization, or multiple goals will yield 
different implications for financial policies of the firm. 
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Empirical evidence lends itself to the fact that contrary to 
the implications of shareholder wealth maximization assumption, 
dividend policy is an active policy and firms operate with a 
concept of target leverage ratio. 
Firm Goal(s) 
According to the neo-classical theory of a firm, the goal of a 
business firm is prof it maximization. It is the only goal to pursue and 
the assumption of perfect competition insures that, over the long-run, 
only those firms which pursue this goal will be able to survive. If 
firms did not maximize profit, or deviated far from profit maximization, 
someone would attempt to take them over, change the course of action of 
the firm, and make a windfall profit. 
In the last three decades, however, dissatisfaction with profit 
maximization theory has been widely expressed. This dissatisfaction has 
been one of two types. Either it has been argued that profit maximiza-
tion is a nonoperational concept and hence a difference analytical 
framework is required, or the exclusive attention to the profit goal is 
disputed. The "marginalist controversy" of the late 1940's was concerned 
with the first type but did not provide a useful substitute. rhe second 
type of discontent was initiated by Simon (80) who expressed the need 
for replacing profit maximization by an adaptive behavior model. Cyert 
and March's (19) behavioral theory of the firm was offered in response 
to this need. They chose the decision process of the firm as the crit-
ical unit for analysis and concluded that under intended, but bounded 
rationality, adaptive behavior rather than maximizing behavior charac-
terizes the firm's behavior. 
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Baumol (6) observed that profits do not constitute the prime objec-
tive of the modern business firm. He argued that the businessman can be 
vie~ed as a calculating individual, but one whose calculations take 
account of profits in a manner which differs somewhat from the standard 
view. Different in the sense that the size of the firm's operations 
becomes a goal in itself, sharing with profits the role of prime objec-
tive. So far. ·there is no necessary clash between Baumol' s argument and 
the "orthodox" analysis. Businessman's desire to increase his profit 
lends itself to translation into a desire to expand his firm. But he 
takes a next step and hypothesizes that once a minimum profit level is 
achieved sales revenue, rather than profits, becomes the overriding 
goal. Thus, rendering the profit maximization goal obsolete. 
Cohen and Cyert (16), examining the firm in a managerial-economics 
framework, offered a theory of the firm with five dominant goals--a 
production goal, an inventory goal, a sales goal, a market-share goal, 
and a profit goal--each representing demands of intra-organization 
groups, without specifying any order of importance. They notice that 
their model, and behavioral models in general, can be viewed as supple-
menting the conventional theory of the firm. While the conventional 
theory is designed to answer questions about resource allocation within 
the economy, the behavioral theory is designed to answer questions about 
resource allocation within the firm. 
In 1967, Machlup (51) reviewed theories of the firm, and the out-
come of the marginalist controversy, and concluded that 
• • • the choice of theory has to depend on the problem we 
have to solve •••• The simple marginal formula based on 
profit maximization is suitable where (1) large groups of 
firms are involved and nothing has .. to be predicted about 
particular firms, (2) the effects of a specified change in 
conditions upon prices, ihputs and outputs are to be explained 
or predicted rather than the values of these magnitudes before 
or after the change, and nothing has to be said about the 
'total situation' or general developments, and (3) only qual-
itative answers, that is, answers about directions of change, 
are sought rather than precise numerical results. Managerial 
marginalism is more suitable to problems concerning partic-
ular firms and calling for numerical answers. And, I am sure, 
there are also some problems to which behavioral theory may 
be the most helpful approach. My impression is that it will 
be entirely concerned with particular firms and perhaps 
designed to give answers of a normative, that is advisory 
nature (p. 31). 
The conclusion is in line with that of Cohen and Cyer~ (16), and Baumol 
and Stewart as cited by Marris (57). 
Marris (56) (57) suggested that firms maximize the rate of growth 
subject to some constraint on minimum profitability. His hypothesis 
identifies more closely with the neo-classical tqeory and Baumol's (6) 
sales maximization hypothesis than with the behavioral theory. Solow 
as cited by Marris (57), however, cannot be easily identified with 
either theory. , He argues that there is unlikely ever to be a simple 
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answer to the question: What does a firm maximize? In the first place, 
a firm may be unable to maximize anything. In the second place, even if 
a firm does have a utility function, it may be content with approximate 
solutions and rules of thumb. Finally, if the firm does actually 
maximize something, the thing that it maximizes is likely to be a very 
complicated quantity, depending on the relative strengths of many 
interests and persons, and on the character of the market in which it 
operates. However, he argues, it is useful to think of a typical firm 
as maximizing something. He, then, shows that growth-oriented and 
profit-oriented firms would respond in qualitatively similar ways to 
such stimuli as changes in factor prices, discount rate, and excise and 
profit taxes. Thus, we would find it hard to distinguish one kind of 
firm from the other. 
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In 1972, Cyert and Hedrick (18, p. 408) observed the growing uneasi-
ness with the neo-classical approach; but, in their own words, they "see 
no evidence at this time for a substantial change despite the restricted 
progress being made by current approaches, The real world still escapes 
our models; our explanations remain at an aggregate level." 
Wong (95), using a neo-classical model, made an ateempt to reconcile 
profit maximization theory and other theories of the firm (except the 
behavioral theory). He shows that behavior consists of two phases: (1) 
grow,th maximization phase during which the firm maximizes sales, and 
(2) golden stage or quasi profit maximization phase during which all 
operating income is paid out and investment is limited to replacement 
capital. It is in the second stage that the firm behaves like neo-
classical profit maximizers. 
Albin and Alcaly's (1) paper is also a reconciliation attempt. They 
show that the economy may have two disjoint equilibrium zones: one cor-
responding to low growth, market exploitation and profit maximization; 
the other corresponding to high growth and growth maximization. Thus, 
one firm may be growth oriented at one time and profit oriented at 
another time. 
The review thus far has been centered around the arguments pre-
sented mostly by managerial-economists, and not researchers specifically 
identified with the discipline of finance. The reason, however, is that 
the discipline has been skeptical in addressing the question. Researchers 
in the field have often taken it for granted that the only goal should be 
the orthodox goal prescribed by neo-classicals. Hirschleifer, Gordon and 
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Vickers, among others, have shown that shareholder wealth maximization 
cart be derived by adding shareholders, risk, and time to the neo-
t'!lt:tdsical competitive model of profit maximization (26). And, optimum 
financial policies to be followed are all derived from the assumption 
of phareholder wealth (value) maximization. 
Value maximization was not challenged until very recently when 
Grossman and Stiglitz (31) argued that there are fundamental diff icul-
ties with justifying value maximization on the basis of takeover bids. 
In the conventional static models the desirability of value maximization 
is obvious. When all prices are known and the technology is known there 
is unanimity about what course of action leads to value maximization. 
This result also extends to dynamic situations with uncertainty and a 
complete set of markets. Where there is not a complete set of markets 
• it has been shown that unanimity obtains if there is no 
trade and if any production plan of the firm can be written 
as a linear combination of production plans of other firms, 
i.e. , there is what has come to be called spanning (31, p. 
390). 
Grossman and Stiglitz (31, p. 401) then argue that: (1) in any market 
there is trade and spanning does not imply unanimity, 1 (2) if there is 
unanimity for a traded firm due to the assumption of competitivity, 2 the 
firm must maximize value, "but closed-end mutual funds do not maximize 
value and these companies are the ones we would most expect to do so," 
thus, spanning is an unsatisfactory assumption. 
Empirical Studies 
To test Baumol's sales maximization hypothesis, Mabry and Siders 
(50) examined the correlation between sales and profits for a sample of 
120 firms over the period 1952-1963. Trend adjusted time series data 
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revealed significant positive correlation between sales and profits for 
the majority of the sample. They. argue. that al though correlation values 
greater than, less than, or equal to zero, between sales and profits, 
are possible under the goals of either sales or prof it maximization, 
Baumol's (6) hypothesis implies that negative correlation can be expected 
as a central tendency. A finding that sales and profits do correlate 
positively, therefore, would weaken our confidence in Baumol's hypoth-
esis. Baumol (6), in justifying his sales maximization hypothesis, made 
the assertion that size tends to result in high rates of profit. In his 
own words 
increased money capital will not only increase the total 
profits of the firm, but because it puts the firm in a higher 
echelon of imperfectly competing capital groups it may very 
well also increase its earnings per dollar df investment (p. 
33). 
Hall and Weiss (33) examined the relationship between firm size and 
profitability and found that size does tend to result in higher profit 
rates, thus giving some support to Baumol's hypothesis. 
Sharpe and Sossin (79) present the evidence that clsosed-end mutual 
funds sell at a substantial discount, i.e., the market value of the 
mutual funds portfolio is higher than the market value of mutual funds 
own shares. If value maximization is a universal goal applicable to all 
firms, and the neo-classical theory asserts it is, then we would expect 
closed-end funds' portfolios to be sold off and the cash distributed to 
shareholders. But since closed-end funds have been in existence for 
some time, and still are, one's strong suspicions arise as to the opera-
tionality of the neo-classical theory. 
Beedles (8) presents evidence supporting the premise that firms 
may be more accurately characterized as having several objectives. He 
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compares the descriptive power of a triple-goal (profits, stock price, 
sales) model of firm behavior to that of a single-goal model, applied to 
three different firms. Results indicate that the triple-goal model per-
forms better. Inferior performance of the single-goal model indicates 
that prof it maximization (value maximization) does not ad~quately explain 
the behavior of business firms. 
'Finally, Ang, Chua and Chastain (3) find share price maximization 
as the dominant firm goal. Sales growth maximization was found to be 
of a secondary importance, but in a competing position with share price 
maximization. They include two other goals in their tests, i.e., earn-
ings growth smoothing and solvency, but they were found to have very 
lpw implied weights. 
Effect of Separation of Ownership and 
Control on Goals 
The belief that managerial discretion has an important influence on 
the resource allocation process within the business firm has a long and 
recurrent history among economists. Support for this view is traced 
back to J. R. Hicks, J. M. Keynes, Alfred Marshall and Adam Smith by 
Williamson (93). 
Gordon (29), in his 1954 study of business leadership, observed 
that the management considers not only the stockholder's interests but 
also the interests of its own. In the preface to the second edition of 
his. study in 1961, he stressed the need for a theory of the firm which 
takes into account behavioral factors. He states that 
the maintenance of satisfactory profits is a more 
accurate statement of the profit's objective than is complete 
profit maximization. Perhaps it is not inaccurate to say 
that profits are viewed as the basic constraint subject to 
which other goals can be follows (p. xii). 
This was exactly the position Baumol (6) had taken in 1959. He 
hypothesized that managers have a desire to expand operations of the 
firm, and once a minimum profit level is achieved, sales revenues, 
rather than profits, become the overriding goal. Kaysen (40) found 
14 
that a large segment of manufacturing industry and most of the regulated 
sector of the economy are effectively isolated from such compeition, 
which opens up a wide range of discretionary choice to their manage-
ments. Consequently, he argues, stockholders' objectives become only 
one of a number of competing influences that the management attends to 
in running the firm. 
Mason (58, p. 10), in his 1958 work, analyzed the managerial 
revolution and its implications for the functioning of the firm and 
concluded that "just how much difference this shift in the locus of 
control makes to the functioning of the company depends largely on the 
competitive position of big firms in the market in which they operate." 
Williamson's (93) (94) elaborate work is a classical work. He 
observed, through field studies and principle firm tests, that 
••. managerial objectives have a systematic influence on the 
operations of the firm, and that conditions of competition in 
the product market play a critical role in determining the 
extent to which discretionary behavior is quantitatively 
important (93, p. 167). 
And so the expense-preference theory was initiated, which states that 
managers attach positive values to some types of expenses, namely level 
of staff expenditures, amount of management slack absorbed as cost, and 
the amount of discretionary spending available for investment. He 
hypothesized that managers maximize a utility index which is a function 
of staff or general administrative and selling expense, managerial 
emoluments, and discretionary profit (the amount by which earnings 
exceed a minimum profit constraint), which was supported by his 
empirical results. 
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Monsen and Downs (65) observe that the behavior of large firms 
deviates from the profit maximization of the neo-classical theory. The 
reason, they argue, is that managers are economic men who desire to 
maximize their' lifetime incomes, and owners, being remote, cannot push 
for profit maximization. Manne (55), however, suggests that significant 
deviations from profit maximization on the part of management would 
cause the company's stock to be undervalued and make the corporation a 
tempting target for a takeover. Williamson (92, p. 335) argues, regard-
ing Manne's hypothesis, that the market for corporate control would 
appear to be imperfect, and the capital market "is too ill-formed, too 
restricted to non-marginal solutions and too costly to employ as a 
displacement technique to be reliably considered as means by which 
closely·to enforce profit-maximization selection." 
Marris (56) (57) acknowledges the existence of the market for cor-
porate control. To him this market is imperfect yet active. This can 
be deduced from his hypothesis that managements display a definite 
preference for growth, or size as such, subject to competing desires to 
satisfy stockholders or to maintain their own security of employment. 
He believes that the utility of managers are associated with a variety 
of satisfactions such as salary, bonus, power, prestige, and role, which 
are in turn associated with measures of size and/or rate of change of 
size. Thus, management maximizes growth, per se, subject to a minimum 
acceptable ratio of stock price to book value (in order to thwart take-
overs). 
In a receht work, Jensen and Meckling (38) assert: 
While the literature of economics is replete with references 
to the 'theory of the firm 1 , the material generally subsumed 
under that heading is not a theory of the firm but actually 
a theory of markets in which firms are important actors. The 
firm is a 'black box' operated so as to meet the relevant 
marginal conditions with respect to inputs and outputs, 
thereby maximizing profits, or more accurately, present value. 
Except for a few recent and tentative steps, however, we have 
no theory which explains how the conflicting objectives of the 
individual participants are brought into equilibrium, so as to 
yield this result (p. 306). 
With this beli~f they set out to tackle the issue of agency costs in a 
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theory of the firm framework--an important issue which has not received 
proper attention by researchers. In their analysis, Jensen and Meckling 
retain the notion of maximizing behavior on the part of all individuals. 
The difference, however, is that in this model individuals maximize 
utility, as opposed to maximization of profits in the neo-classical 
model. An individual owner-manager will choose the combination of "firm 
value'' and "expenditures on non-pecuniary benefits" which maximizes his 
utility by consulting his utility function. Denote this firm value by 
V*. If the owner sells a fraction (1 - a) of the firm to an outsider, 
he, as manager, will no longer bear the full cost of any non-pecuniary 
benefits he consumes. The cost to the owner-manager of consuming $1.00 
of non-pecuniary benefits in the firm will no longer be $1.00. Instead, 
it will be a x $LOO. Thus, his welfare will be maximized by increasing 
his non-pecuniary benefits with a resulting decrease in the value of the 
firm to v0 , where v0 < v*. Although it is possible to monitor a 
manager's actions to ensure that he will make optimal decisions (result-
ing in firm value v*), it is generally impossible to do this at zero 
cost. The effect of separation of ownership and control is, thus, a 
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decrease in firm value and an increase in expenditures on manager's 
non-pecuniary benefits. 
Empirical Studies 
Empirical studies dealing with the effect of separation of owner-
ship and control on firm goals can be roughly divided into two groups--
those which conclude that the effect is either nonexistent, or at best 
very minor, e.g., (24) (36) (37) (38) (39) (42) (45) (46) (47) (48); and 
those which conclude that separation affects goals in one way or another, 
e.g., (5) (11) (17) (22) (41) (53) (59) (62) (66) (70) (71) (75) (81). 
Separation Effect Nonexistent or Very Minor. Larner (43), studying 
the pattern of control in the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations, con-
eluded that the mangerial revolution observed by Berle and Means (10), 
3 30 years before his study, was close to complete. In a later work, 
Larner (42, p.t 66) observes that "Although control is separate from 
ownership in most of America's largest corporations, the effect on the 
profit orientation of firms and on stockholder's welfare has been 
minor." Kamerschen (39), using Larner's (43) sample of the 200 largest 
nonfinancial firms, found no.significant difference in profitability 
between manager and owner controlled firms. 
Lewellen (45) found that firm's profits are a better predictor of 
·its senior officers' rewards than are either its assets, its sales or 
the market value of its common stock. Later, Lewellen (46) reported 
that although a separation of ownership and management clearly exists, 
a significant separation of their pecuniary interests does not. In a 
study co-authored with Huntsman (48, p. 718), they found that "Reported 
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prof its and equity market values are substantially more important in 
determination of the executive comparison than are sales--indeed sales 
St!etn to be quite irrelevant." Finally, in his Ownership Income of 
Martagement, Lewellen {47, p. 150) found that "Annual income of executives 
depends very heavily, very directly and very persistently on the div-
idends received and capital gains experienced" by them. As such,. it is 
an evidence of a broad~based link between managerial welfare and share-
holder returns. 
Elliot {24), too, found no difference in, earnings or profitability 
between owner-managed and non-owner-managed firms in the United States. 
The same result was obtained by Holl {37) when examining United Kingdom 
firms. Holl concludes that separation of ownership from control does .. ,_,~ 
no~ have any behavorial implications for the theory of the firm. In a 
later study, Holl (36) introduces the' market for corporate control into 
his analysis, and concludes that while separation is important, its 
., 
influence is less general than has been thought. 
McKean andKania (54) considered four measures of performance: 
return on equity, operating net income to total assets minus cash, net 
sales to total assets, and net income to net sales. They defined sample 
industries at the four-digit SIC level. , Testing each industry sep-
arately, they used an analysis of variance model to test for a systematic 
effect of control type on performance, and they found no strong inter-
industry patterns relating profit performance to control type. 
Separation's Effects Detected. In arriving at his sales maximiza-
. ti.on hypothesis, Baumol (6, p. 46) asserts that "executive salaries 
appear to be far more closely correlated with the scale of operations of 
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the firm than with its profitability." McGuire, Chiu and Elbing (53) 
set out to investigate, empirically, the relation. They found that sales 
alid 'l!:itecutive income are highly correlated, not profits and executive 
income. Their r.esults strengthened the confidence in Baumol's· (6) 
hypot;hesis. 
Baker (5), using a log-linear model, found t.hat both profits and 
sales are significant in determining executive compensations. Using a 
linear model and a log model, however, he found that profits were not 
significant. He preferred a semi-log model as a resultof comparing 
correlation coefficients and Durbin-Watson statistics (obtained by rank-
4 ing.firms by compensation) • 
. Masson (59) found that firms with executives whose rewards are tied 
to the stock's performance, performed better (had a higher stock return) 
than others. Cox and Shauger (17) found executive compensation to be 
sigtiificantly :i;elated to both sales and profitability. 5 This result was 
also obtained by Smyth, Boyes and Peseau (81), using a large sample of 
557 companies. Smyth, Boyes and Peseau's study is unique in the sense 
that it is an attempt to explain conflicting results of earlier studies, 
and at the same time obtain further empirical evidence, avoiding 
econometric problems present in earlier studies. They found that 
• • • profitability measured by profit/equity are negatively 
·. and highly significantly related to size measured by equity, 
where.as profits/assets are positively and usually signif-
icantly related to equity. In the United Kingdom both 
profits/assets and profits/equity are negatively and signif-
icantly related to size measured ·by sale.s, assets and employ-
ment. In the United States when size is measured by sales, 
' assets or employment, there is a tendency for a negative 
relationship when profits/assets is the profitability measure; 
there are no significant relationships with t.hese size var-
iables when profits/equity is the profitability measure. 
There is no evidence that industry concentration influences 
profitability in either the United Kingdom or the United 
States (p. 59}. 
Also of interest is their finding of 
• • • no difference in the behaviour of profit variability 
for firms of different size in the group of 500 largest 
United States and United Kingdom industrial companies 
studied. In addition, in further analysis for the United 
States, we find no connection between the variability of 
profits arid concentration and no trade-off between prof it-
ability and profit variability (p. 70). 
As to the goals of the firm, they conclude that the firm has a utility 
function that includes both sales and profits. 
Koshal, Pradsad and Jain (41), in a recent work, found that remu-
neration of executives depends both on sales and profits, rejecting 
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McGuire, Chiu and Elbing's (53) results, and Lewellen and Huntsman's (48) 
results because of presence of multicolinearity in their models. 
Monsen, Chiu and Cooley (66) studied the effect of separation of 
ownership and control on the performance of large firms and found that 
owner controlled groups of firms out-performed the management controlled 
firms by a conl?iderable margin, a quite different result than that of 
Larner (4.2). Radice (75), studying the effect of control type on profit-
ability and growth of large firms, found higher profit rates and growth 
rates for owner-controlled relative to management-controlled firms. He 
concludes that the managerial theories of the firm are basically theories 
of large modern firms. The same kind of results and conclusions were 
arrived at by ~oudreaux (11) and Palmer (70) (71). Boudreaux (11) and 
Palmer (70) further report that diffused-ownership firms report more 
variable (riskier) profit rates than concentrated-ownership firms. 
Finally, Mingo (62), in a study of the perforinance of holding 
company banks,. found that profits are a constraint and not an objective, 6 
a result which is in line with Williamson's (93) hypothesis. Edwards 
(22) also tests the expense-preference theory for the banking industry 
and finds that wage and salary expenditures in banking industry with 
monopoly power which indicates that an expense-preference model may be 
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liL mare useful framework for describing and predicting bank behavior than 
the traditional profit maximization model. 
Firm Goals and Financial Policies 
Under the assumption of profit maximization, or alternatively share-
holder wealth maximization, firms' optimum financial policies are rather 
straightforward: 
1. The capital structure is optimized at the point where the 
average cost of capital is minimized (67) • 
2. Dividends are treated as a residual, implying that there will 
be no active dividend policy. Dividends will be paid out only 
after all profitable investment opportunities are being under-
taken. Hence, dividends would be erratic, inversely related to 
the profitability of available investment opportunities, and 
would never be paid out in the year of a new stock issue (26) 
(32) (61). 
3. Investment policy is the most important policy of the firm. It 
will be designed to accept all projects yielding more than the 
marginal cost of capital (26) (32) (63). 
Different solutions will be obtained under alternative assumptions 
of sales maximization, growth maximization, or multiple goals. William-
son (91) shows that the policies the firm pursues will depend on the 
form of its objective function, except where profitability is at best 
the minimum sum necessary to prevent takeover. Profit, growth and sales 
maximizers will act differently. Specifically: 
1. A pro£it and growth maximizer would reach the same output 
decision, but a sales maximizer would produce more (except in 
the limiting case). 
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2. A profit maximizer would distribute more of its profits than a 
growth maximizer (except in the limiting case). 
3. The growth rate of the firm cannot be increased by resort to 
additional equity finance. 
4. A profit or growth maximizer will grow at a positive rate if 
it is'a profitable firm, a sales maximizer need not. 
5. Growth is never limited by lack of finance as such, as pos-
tulated by Baumol (6), but by fear of takeover, as postulated 
by Marris (56). 
Williamson (91, p. 16) concludes his study by stating that "one may con-
clude that there is substantial empirical evidence favoring abandonment 
of the time-honoured profit maximization assumption." 
Lintner, cited by Marris and Wood (57), analyzed the effect of dif-
ferent assumptions regarding firm goals or policies under uncertainty 
and concluded that: 
1. Firms maximizing equity values never maximize their rate of 
growth. Equity maximizers stop short their rate of growth at 
the point where marginal gain no longer exceeds the marginal 
cost as determined by the riskless rate in the market. Growth 
maximizers would act is if there were no cost to growth, and 
would push to the point where MR= 0 (not where MR= MC). 
2. Firms may "buy" more expected growth by either undertaking 
policy mixes involving more risk, or increasing their retention 
ratio; both of which are subject to diminishing returns. 
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3. A gro~th-oriented but risk-averse management, responsible to 
no one else and owning no stock in the firm, would determine 
the maximum growth rate by consulting its ~ utility function 
ordering different attainable combinations of expected growth 
and risks of growth. But it would be sheer coincidence if its 
trade-offs were the same as those relevant to equity-value 
maximizers. 
Marris (57) argues that a manager's pecuniary and non-pecuniary com-
pensation is more clearly tied to firm size than profitability. Con-. 
sequently, managers will push investment programs to a point where their 
marginal rate of return is below the level which would maximize share-
holder welfare. Findlay and Whitmore (26) contrasted the implications 
of shareholder wealth maximization and "manager welfare maximization" 
models for positive finance and argued that the popular assumption of 
shareholder wealth maximization lacks empirical validity. 
Jensen and Meckling (38) assume that the management maximizes a two-
argument utility function, the two arguments being non-pecuniary benefits 
and firm value. If the manager owns 100 percent of the firm, investment 
is carried to the value maximization point, at which the next addition 
to the value of the firm is just offset by the additional investment. 
But, however, if the manager sells a share of the firm (1 - a) and 
retains for himself a share (a), investment is carried to the point at 
which the change in the market value of the firm is off set by the addi-
tional investment minus the dollar value to the manager of the incre-
mental non-pecuniary benefits (which is equal to manager's fraction of 
ownership, a, times the incremental non-pecuniary benefits) he consumes. 
Jensen and Meckling, then, introduce agency costs into their 
analysis. Agency costs consist of monitoring expenses incurred by the 
cNtters to control the performance of a manger, bonding costs incurred 
by the manager to guarantee a level of performance satisfactory to the 
owners, and a residual loss which results from the divergence between 
those decisions which would maximize owners' wealth and those which 
would maximize· the welfare of the manager. If the cost functions 
involved in monitoring and bonding are such that some positive levels 
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of the activities are desirable (i.e., yield benefits greater than their 
cost) then the expansion path will lie between the expansion path with 
100 percent ownership by manager and the expansion path with fractional 
managerial ownership but no monitoring or bonding activities. The final 
solution will be at that point where the new expansion curve is tangent 
to the highest indifference curve. The difference between the value of 
the firm obtained with 100 percent ownership by the manager, and the 
value obtained given positive monitoring and bonding costs, are the 
total agency costs. This reduction in firm value is because of manager's 
consumption of non-pecuniary benefits. 
Use of debt would also engender agency costs. The agency costs 
associated with debt consist of: 
1. the opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact of debt on the 
investment decisions of the firm, 
2. the monitoring and bonding expenditures by the bondholders and 
the owner-manager (i.e., the firm), and 
3. the bankruptcy and reorganization costs. 
Jensen and Meckling (38) argue that the owner-manager bears the 
entire wealth effects of the agency costs of debt and outside equity. I . . 
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From their point of view the optimal proportion of outside funds to be 
obtained is that proportion which minimizes total agency costs (agency 
costs involved in both debt and outside equity financing). In present-
ing the theory of ownership structure, Jensen and Meckling argue that 
for each fraction of outside funds in the capital structure, as the 
fraction changes from 0 to 100 percent, there would be a point at which 
agency costs are minimized. The locus of such points determines the 
optimal proportion of equity and debt to be used in obtaining outside 
funds. In the final analysis the optimal amount of outside financing 
is determined by the interaction of marginal agency costs and marginal 
value of increased diversification which the manager can obtain by 
reducing his ownership claims and optimally constructing a diversified 
portfolio. 
Empirical Studies 
Turnovsky (89), examining the allocation of corporate profits 
between dividends and retained earnings, found that contrary to the 
implications of profit-maximization, dividend commitments are more 
urgent than investment, funds for investments are not strong in deter-
mining the amount of retained earnings, and retained earnings are 
determined residually. Baumol et al. (7) found an implied marginal 
rate of return on retained earnings of 3 to 4.6 percent compared to a 
return of 4.2 to 14 percent on funds obtained from new debt and 14.5 
to 20.8 percent on new equity, a behavior inconsistent with the implica-
tions of shareholder wealth maximization and in line with the implica-
tions of managerial models. 5 This ranking was also supported by 
Whittington's (90) study with British data. 
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Grabowski and Mueller (30) tested Marris' (56) hypothesis for firm's 
investment policy and found Marris' model superior to pure stockholder 
welfQre maximization. They also found that payouts are kept low if earn-
ings are growing but are raised if they are unstable (i.e., prices might 
decline enough to induce a takeover bid without the larger dividend 
yield). 
··Scott (78) found that various industries, subject to various degrees 
of business risk, have developed characteristically different financial 
structures. If financial structures were irrelevant in the valuation of 
the firm (and shareholder wealth maximization implies it is), then a 
wide variety of equity ratios should be found within each industry. But 
Scott's findings indicate a definite tendency to cluster, as a matter of 
practical business policy. Ang (2) also found that firms operate with a 
concept of target leverage ratio, He also found some weak evidence of 
the presence of unused debt capacity for his sample. 
McEachern (52) argues, both theoretically and empirically, that an 
owner-manager has more incentive and opportunity to take risk than a 
hired manager; also a hired manager under the control of a dominant 
stockholder has less opportunity and less incentive to take risk than 
managers in firms without a dominant stockholder interest. Elliott (24) 
found that non-;owner-managed firms are more liquid than their owner-
managed counterparts, an indication of a greater degree of risk aversion 
on the part of hired managers. Finally, Ang, Chua and Chastain (3) 
found investment policy to be the policy with the greatest weight 
attached. Dividend policy, working capital policy and financing policy 
were found to be of lesser importance in a descending order. 
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Conclusion 
What has been reviewed in this chapter is by no means ait exhausting 
artd complete survey of studies dealing with the theory of firms. The 
main purpose has been to cite only those studies that have direct 
relevance to the present study, i.e., those dealing with firm goals 
and/or implications of firm behavior for financial policies. 
As a result, it is concluded that, based on the available evidence, 
the neo-classical theory of prof it maximization is no longer a theory 
applicable to today's large, modern corporations. Managerial theories 
of the firm provide a better frame of analysis for these economic 
entities, regardless of the type of control. It is found that profits 
and sales are the two most important goals of these economic agents, and 
the people who run the firm. Whether owner-controlled or manager-
controlled firms place the same priority ranking on these goals or not 
is an empirical question the researcher intends to answer in this study. 
On the issue of implications for financial policies of the firm, 
too, managerial models are better predictors of firm behavior. 
FOOTNOTES 
1They examine two situations where trade is likely to be generated 
continuously: (1) trade is generated by the arrival of new information 
and {2) trade is generated by life cycle considerations. 
2rf firms behave as perfect competitors in the composite commodities 
which form a basis for the spanned space, then we have competitivity. 
3chevalier (15) obtained results somewhat divergent from Larner's 
(43). He found that American corporations are entering a stage of 
control by fiduciary institutions through which dispersed stockholders, 
once more, become concentrated, i.e., the fourth stage predicted by 
Berle (9). 
4 Such a comparison is illegitimate so that Baker's choice of the 
regressions yielding both profits and sales significant cannot be sup-
ported. The reason is that in the linear and semi-log models the 
correlation coefficients relate to compensation whereas in the linear 
in log model they relate to the logarithm of compensation. Thus, the.,. 
fact that the correlation coefficient for the semi-log model is higher 
than a log model does not mean that it explains a higher proportion of 
the variance of either compensation or the logarithm of compensation. 
Al,.so, the Durbin-Watson statistics cannot be compared because the 
residuals are for compensation in one case and for the logarithm of 
compensation in the other. For a more thorough discussion see Smyth, 
Boyes and Peseau (81) and Thiel (88). 
5rhey used a logarithmic model and found that the relative explan-
atory influence of profitability increases as the measure of executive 
pay used become,s more inclusive. 
6He also found that:· (1) holding company banks (HC's) leverage 
more than independent banks, (2) HC's hold greater proportion of higher 
yielding (riskier) assets, (3) HC's are less risk-averse, and (4) HC's 




Based upon the available evidence, reviewed in Chapter II, the 
researcher intends to test a number of hypotheses. In setting the 
hypotheses, the reseracher will follow the methodology prescribed by 
Friedman (28) for constructing hypotheses, i.e., the hypotheses are con-
sistent with the existing evidence and they are capable of generating 
new facts about the class of phenomena they are d~signed to explain. 
The hypotheses are designed to explain the behavior of large firms in 
the United States. 
Hypotheses I, II and III 
Based on the available evidence, the neo-classical theory of profit 
maximization is no longer a theory applicable to today's large, modern 
corporations. On the other hand, support is found for managerial 
theories of the firm which hypothesize that firms maximize sales (6) or 
growth (56) subject to a minimum profits constraint. It is, thus, 
hypothesized that large United States' firms have two important compet-
ing goals of profit maximization, and sales maximization, with profit 
maximization being the dominant goal. 
The majority of studies dealing with the effect of separation of 
ownership and control on firm's profitability are unable to detect any 
significant effect. Consequently, the above hypotheses are generalized 
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. to all firms regardless of the type of control. But, ho~ever, in a 
third hypothesis it is hypothesized that the relative preference for 
sales maximization goal is greater for management controlled firms than 
for owner controlled firms. The hypothesis is in agreement with manage-
rial hypotheses that managers have positive preference for the scale of 
operations of the firm (6) (56) (57). Therefore, Hypotheses I, II and 
III are: 
HI:. Large United States' firms have two important competing 
goals of profit maximizationand sales maximization. 
HII: Regardless of the type of control, profit maximization is 
the dominant goal. 
HIII: The relative preference for sales maximization.is greater 
for large management controlled firms than for large owner 
controlled firms. 
Hypotheses IV and V 
The nee-classical theory of profit maximization regards investment 
policy as the most important financial policy of the firm; maximization 
of shareholder wealth is attained through investment policy. Having 
hypothesized profit maximization as the dominant goal of the firm, it is 
accordingly hypothesized that investment policy is.the most effective 
financial policy of the firm. It is further hypothesized that firms, 
regardless of type of control, are aware of the effectiveness of invest-
ment policy, and utilize investment policy as the most preferred policy. 
Therefore, Hypotheses IV and V are: 
HIV: Investment policy is the most effective policy of the firm. 
HV: Investment policy is the most preferred policy of the firm. 
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Hypotheses VI Through XI 
Miller and Modigliani (61) hypothesize that dividend policy does 
' not affect the value of the firm. Being ineffective, a firm which 
maximizes the wealth of its shareholders, does not utilize dividend 
policy in any systematic way. Having hypothesized profit maximization 
as the dominant goal, it is subsequently hypothesized that dividend 
policy is ineffective, i.e., it does not affect attainment of goals. 
But, however, due to the presence of informational content of dividends 
(25), it is hypothesized that dividend policy is active, i.e., it 
responds to goals of the firm. 
Further, having hypothesized less preference for profit maximiza-
tion goal by management controlled firms compared' to owner controlled 
firms (with profit maximization being still the dominant goal), it is 
hypothesized that dividend policy (while still being ineffective) is 
more active in management controlled firms compared to owner controlled 
·firms. 
Additionally, Modigliani and Miller's (64) hypothesis on the irrel-
evance of financing policy will be employed to hypothesize ineffective-
ness of financ~ng policy. But, however, due to the presence of evidence 
on the importance of. structure (2) (78), it is hypothesized that financ-
ing policy is active; it responds to goals of the firm. Following the 
same line of reasoning offered, for dividend policy above, it is hypoth-
esized that·financing policy is more active in management controlled 
firms compared to owner controlled firms. Therefore, Hypotheses VI 
through XI are: 
HVI: Dividend policy is an ineffective policy in attainment of 
goals. 
HVII: Dividend policy is an active policy. 
HVIII: Dividend policy is more active in management controlled 
firms than in owner controlled firms. 
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HIX: Financing policy is an ineffective policy in attainment of 
goals. 
HX: Financing policy is an active policy. 
HXI: Financing policy is more active in management controlled 
firms than in owner controlled firms. 
CHAPTER IV 
A DYNAMIC MODEL OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
The dynamic process of financial management of the firm, as with 
all decision processes, entails: 
1. selection of the goal(s), 
2. determination of the effect of financial policies (controllable 
variables) and exogenous factors (uncontrollable variables) on 
firm goal(s), and 
3. finding a policy or a combination of policies which enhance the 
goal(s) and minimize the unfavorable effect of exogenous fac-
tors. 
Within such a framework, the financial management of a firm may be 







where G~ = [glt' gZt' •.• , git] represents the vector of goals with the 
corresponding vector of weights W~ = [wlt' w2t, •.. , wit]. The weights 
indicate relative preference among goals. 
Each goal is determined by the interactions of exogenous factors 
z~ = [zlt' z2t' 
pnt], i.e., 




In the dynamic case lagged variables Z' j' P' k and G' L due to t- t- t-
"costs of adjustment, revision of expectations or adaptive behavior, will 
also affect the current goal values,. Therefoi;-e, a more dynamic version 
of (2) may be written as: 
(3) 
where j, k ~ o and L > o. 
Equation (3) basically describes the environment the firm functions 
in; showing how autonomous factors, policy variables (both contempora-
neous and lagged), and lagged goal variables affect the attainment of 
goals. More importantly, it shows the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
of utilizing the policy variables to enhance the goals. 
Conceptually, the optimization problem described may be solved by 
mathematical progrannning techniques. In the mathematical programming 
framework, equation (1) forms the objective function to be maximized. 
Equation (3) forms the constraints on the management process. 
By substituting equation (3) into (1) and maximizing the expected 
utility, U, with respect to policy variables, Pt, the rules for respond-
ing to the changes in the exogenous factors are obtained. In symbols 
35 
they are: 
* = (Z' P' G' ) pnt pn t-j' t-k' t-L (4) 
where j ~ o, and k, L > o. 
The rules so obtained will tell the management what the appropriate 
levels of pt's (P~) should be when Zt-j' Pt-k and Gt-Lare known. 
Although, analytically, there may be a unique representation of equation 
(4) depending on the type of relatiorships in equation (3), the combina-
tion of policies to achieve the objective of the management process is 
non-unique. Therefore, managers may have preference concerning which 
policy variables are used. 
It should be emphasized here, that in this study, being.a positive 
study, the intent is to determine how firms have (not should have) 
responded when Zt-j' Pt-k and Gt-L (j ~ o and k, L > o) were known. 
Thus, the model needs to be extended so that such an investigation is 
possible. 
By substituting equation (3) into (1), expected utility can be 
expressed as: 
u = U(G~-L' z~-j' p~-kla'' S'' Q') (5) 
where j, k ~ o and L > o, where a= [at-l' at_2 , ••• ] is the vector of 
lagged goal value weights, a' = [St' at-l' .•• ] is the vector of con-
temporaneous and lagged exogenous factor weights, and S'l' = [Qt' Qt-l' 
••• ] is the vector of contemporaneous and lagged policy variable 
. h 1 weig ts. Equation (5) shows the effect of lagged goals, exogenous 
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factors and policy variables (both lagged and contemporaneous) on firm's 
over~ll performance. Since (1) and (5) are equivalent we have 
U(G' lw') = U(G' Z' P' a' ot Q') t t t-L' t-j , t-k ' µ , (6) 
where j, k ~ o and L > o. 
Equation (6) expresses the relationship between contemporaneous 
goals, on the one hand, and lagged goals, exogenous factors and policy 
variables (both lagged and contemporaneous), on the other hand. It 
basically describes the interaction of firm goals and financial policies 
in a dynamic manner. 
The development suggests that a complete positive analysis of 
financial management involves the analysis of four different problems. 
First is the determination of the firm's relative preference for dif-
ferent goals. Empirically this is the determination of the vector of 
weights, W', in equation (1). 
The second problem is the structure problem, i.e., measurement of 
the effect of exogenous and policy variables on goal variables. Empir-
ically, this involves estimation of equation (3). 
Third, the rules that the firm follows to respond to changes in 
relevant exogenous factors must be determined. This is the reaction 
problem and empirically it involves estimation of equation (4). 
Fourth is the determination of the firm's relative preference for 
different financial policies. This is the policy preference problem. 
Empirically, this involves the estimation of Qin equation (5). 
However, both equations (1) and (5) are expressed in (6) which 
reduces the two problems of goal preference and policy preference to a 
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single preference problem, and the subsequent reduction of the number of 
problems to be analyzed to three problems. 
Figure 1 is a graphical view of the general model presented above. 
An Illustration 
To illustrate the model, consider a newly established hypothetical 
·· firm·.with the single goal of profit maximization, U = U(II). Further, 
assume that (1) the firm's customers buy only on credit, (2) the firm 
can buy and sell unlimited quantities of its product, and (3) the only 
controllable variables at the financial manager's discretion are the 
elements of credit policy--terms of credit and credit limit. Expressing 
net profits (II) as a function of sales (S) and exJ?ected bad debt losses 
(L) we have: 
II = M x S - L 
where·M = proff't is the profit margin. 
sales 
Both sales and bad debt losses are functions of exogenous variables 
{e.g., the level of economic activity, etc.) and the controllable 
elements of credit policy (terms of credit, credit limit): 
s = s (Z'' p I) 
L = L(Z I' P') 
where Z' = [z1 , z2 , ••• ] is the vector of exogenous factors, and 
P' = [pl' p2] is the vector of elements of credit policy. Substitut-
ing for S and L in the net profit equation we obtain net profits, for 

















Figure 1. The Dynamic Model of Financial Management 
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Substituting for II in the utility function and maximizing with respect 
to P we obtain 
p~t = pl(Z~, M) 
p~t = p2 (z~, M) 
Although Pft and p~t may be unique, the combinations of elements 
of credit policy which achieve the same level of profits are non-unique 
(e.g., different credit limits for each customer vs. different terms of 
payment). The financial manager will determine these alternative 
actions by consulting his policy preference equation. Having determined 
the preferred policy, the level of Pt and Zt will determine the level of 
profits through the structure equation. 
Next period (time t + 1), the firm's past performance, as well as 
last period's exogenous factors enter the structure and reaction equa-
tions through the feedback process. The resulting policy level (which 
is affected by last period as well as this period's factors, last 
period's policy and last period's profits) and this period's exogenous 
factors will determine this period's profits through the structure 
2 equation. This circular flow is repeated each period thereafter, with 
some new variables entering the flow, and some old variables leaving 
the flow after their informational content is exhausted. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Notice that each t' t and t is a row vector, and the number of 
elements in each of these row vectors is equal to the relevant number of 
variables, i.e., 
2 
When lagged values of exogenous factors, policy variables and goal 
variables enter the process (i.e., from the second period afterwards), 
the structure, reaction and preference equations take the general forms 




Variables of the Model 
Based on the available evidence the following variables were chosen 
to be included in the model. The goals chosen for testing were: (1) 
maximization of shareholders' wealth, (2) sales growth maximization, 
(3) sustaining a smooth earnings per .share growth (earnings smoothing), 
and (4) maintaining adequate liquidity. Financial policies chosen for 
inclusion in the model were: (1) investment policy, (2) working capital 
policy, (3) dividend policy, and (4) financing policy. Initially 
attempts were made to incorporate additional variables such as market-
ing goals, research and development goals, and employee and management 
incentive policies, into the model. However, inclusion of these var-
iables would have limited the sample size to only ~ive firms due to 
the unavailability of the required data. Thus, it was decided to limit 
the goal and policy variables of the model to the aforementioned. 
Exogenous variables initially chosen to be included were: (1) the 
Index of Industrial Production, (2) the level of interest rates, (3) 
level of the stock market, and (4) investment tax credit. The Index of 
Industrial Production will likely be an important explainer of sales. 
Both the level of interest rates and the level of stock market are 
likely to be explainers of the return to the stockholders as well as 
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financing and investment policies. Investment tax credit will most 
likely be an important explainer of the investment policy. Later, in 
the estimation phase of the study, the researcher was faced with a 
severe multicollinearity problem. Separate regression analyses on 
exogenous factors proved that the Index of Industrial.Production and the 
level of the stock market were both perfect linear combinations of the 
other two exogenous factors: the level of interest rates and the 
investment tax credit over the sample period. It was, therefore, 
decided to retain the latter two factors in the model and delete the 
former two. 
Proxies for the Variables 
1. Maximization of shareholders' wealth was proxied by the risk-
adjusted-rate-of-return (RAR) on the connnon stock on an annual basis. 
Adjustment for risk was carried out both for total risk, as measured by 
the variance of return, and the systematic risk, as measured by the 
beta. Thus, two alternative measures of RAR were calculated for further 
testing. 
Monthly rates of return were used to calculate the betas according 
to the following model: 
pjT - Pj,T-1 + DT 
= - -- is the monthly rate of return on firm j's 
Pj,T-1 
common stock, 
PjT = price of common shares at the end of month T, 
DjT dividends to common in month T, 
aj = the intercept of the regression line, 
Bj = beta of the firm, regression estimate of the slope of the 
line, 
rmT = monthly return on the market portfolio, as proxied by the 
University of Chicago's CRSP Tape market index, and 
ejT = residual error. 
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Beta-adjusted return (BAR) was then defined as the annual rate of return 




is the rate of return on the stock for year t, and all other symbols 
defined as before. The alternate measure of RAR was obtained by adjust-
ing the annual rate of return by the variance of annual rates of return 
during the period covered by the study. Thus, variance-adjusted-return 





where a2 is the variance of the annual rates of return. 
One shortcoming associated with using the variance of annual rate 
of return, however, is the limited number of observations. To alleviate 
the problem the researcher could use monthly rates of return to cal-
culate the variance and then adjust the annual rates of return by the 
variance so obtained. Therefore, a third measure of RAR is defined as 




where V is the variance of the monthly rate of return. 
2. The goal of sales growth maximization was proxied by the annual 






where st is sales in year t. 
3. The goal of sustaining a smooth earnings per share growth was 
proxied by deviations from the historical earnings per share (EPS) 
growth regression line. EPS figures, for the period in study, were 
regressed agairtst time to obtain the EPS growth lirte 
EPSt = a+ ht, 
where a and b are regression coefficients. Deviations from this line 
were calculated as the absolute difference between the actual EPS and 
the calculated EPS from the regression line 
EPSDt = IEPSActual - EPSCalculatedl' 
where EPSD stands for absolute deviations from the historical EPS 
growth line. Arguments can be forwarded that by taking absolute devia-
tions from the line, deviations above and below the line are treated 
equally, whereas management tries to minimize only downward deviations. 
To exhaust the alternatives, an alternate proxy was defined which treats 
the above line deviations as though they were nonexistent, and takes into 
account only downward deviations: 
, 
EPSDDt = O if EPSActual > EPSCalculated' 
EPSDDt = EPSActual - EPSCalculated otherwise, 
where EPSDD stands for downward deviations from the historical EPS growth 
line. 
4. The goal of maintaining adequate liquidity was proxied by the 
change in the coverage ratio from one period to the next 
CICGRt = CGRt - CGRt-l' 
where CICGR stands for the change in the coverage ratio defined as the 




5. Investment policy was measured by the rate of growth in net 
fixed assets 
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where GRFA stands for the growth rate of net fixed assets and NFA stands 
for net fixed assets. 
6. Working capital policy was measured by the percentage change in 
current ratio 
PCICTRt = 
CTRt - CTRt-l 
CTR l t-
where PCICTR stands for percentage change in the current ratio, and CTR 
stands for current ratio defined as the ratio of current assets to cur-
rent liabilities. 
7. Dividend policy is measured by the precentage change in 
dividends per share adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends 
PCIDPSt = 
DPS - DPS l 
t t-
DPS l t-
where PCIDPS stands for percentage change in dividends per share and 
DPS stands for dividends per share adjusted for stock dividends and 
1 splits. 
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8. Financing policy was measured by the percentage change in debt 
ratio 
PClDTRt = 
DTR - DTR l 
t t-
where PCIDTR stands for percentage change in debt ratio and DTR stands 
for debt ratio defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
9. Yield'on new issues of high-grade corporate bonds (34) was used 
as a proxy for the level of interest rates. Consistent with other var-
iables, percentage change in the level of interest rates (PCILIR) was 
used in the model. 2 
Investment tax credit (ITC) was in effect during some of the years 
and lifted during the other years covered by the study (82). A value of 
zero was assigned to ITC if there was no change from one year to the 
next. Whenever investment tax credit was lifted from one year to the 
next, a value of -7.0 percent was assigned to ITC. The variable was 
assigned of +7.0 percent whenever investment tax credit was again put 
into effect. 
The Sample 
The process of selecting the sample was carried out in three con-
secutive stages. In the first stage, Standard and Poor's PDE Tape was 
screened for availability of price data required for calculating monthly 
and annual rates of return. The second stage consisted of screening 
Standard and Poor's Compustat Tape for availability of other data used 
as proxies for other goal and policy variables. This simultaneous 
screening was carried out for varying sample periods between 5 and 20 
years. The 10 year period (1966 to 1975) provided a sample of 749 
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companies for which the data were available on both PDE and Compustat 
tapes. Since increasing the sample period beyond 10 years would have 
drastically reduced the sample size, the researcher chose to limit the 
period of study to the period of 1966 to 1975 and still have a relatively 
large sample to work with. However, since variables of the model are 
stated in percentage change, the actual sample period is a nine-year 
period between 1967 and 1975. Finally, in the third stage, Value Line 
Instrument Surveys were consulted to obtain ownership data. Of the 
749 companies, 225 were not surveyed by Value Line and were, thus, 
deleted from the sample. This reduced the sample size to 524 firms. 
Classification of Firms as Owner-Controlled 
and Management-Controlled 
Following Palmer (71), each firm was assigned to one of the follow-
ing three classes according to its type of ownership as reported by Value 
Line: 
1. Strong owner control--one party owned 30 percent or more of the 
·outstanding common stock of the corporation. 
2. Weak owner control--one party owned between 10 and 29 percent 
of the outstanding common stock of the corporation. 
3. Management control--no single party owned 10 percent or more of 
the outstanding common stock of the corporation. 
Following this criteria, 85 companies in the sample were assigned to the 
first group, strong owner; 113 companies were assigned to the second 
group, weak owner control; and 326 companies were assigned to the third 
group, management control. A listing of the firms in each group is 
provided in Appendix D. 
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Estimation 
The model of the study, as described in Chapter IV, is a dynamic 
model and includes lagged as well as contemporaneous variables. One of 
the questions which confronted the researcher in the early stages of 
the study was the number of lag periods to be included in the model. 
The researcher had an actual sample period of nine years. Excluding 
lagged variables would have left nine years of data with which to work. 
However, the dynamic nature of the model would have been overlooked. 
On the other hand, the researcher could have used eight lag periods and 
have done a cross-sectional study for the second and third group, but 
would have been unable to do so for the first group due to lack of a 
sufficient number of observations. Additionally, it is doubtful that 
events so many years back would have any effect on contemporaneous goal 
or policy variables. Although there was no concrete evidence to back 
this decision, it was felt that a two-period lag w.ould be sufficient for 
the purpose of this study. 
Pooling the resulting seven-year time series and cross-sectional 
data the researcher used ordinary least squares technique to estimate 
the structure and reaction equations. The multivariate technique of 
canonical correlation was used to estimate the. preference equation. 
Testing of Hypotheses 
HI: Large United States firms have two important competing goals 
of shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization. This 
hypothesis will be tested by observing the correlation coefficients 
49 
between each goal variable and canonical variates of all goal variables 
3 in the preference equation. 
HII: Regardless of type of control, shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is the dominant goal. HIIL: The relative preference goal for 
sales maximization is greater for management controlled firms than for 
owner controlled firms. These hypotheses will be tested by observing 
the correlatiori coefficients between each goal variable and canonical 
variates of all goal variables in the preference equations for the 
three control groups. 
HIV: Investment policy is the most effective policy of the firm. 
This hypothesis will be tested by observing the number of goal variables 
which are significantly affected by contemporaneous and lagged values 
of investment policy in the estimated structure equations, and comparing 
it to the number of goal variables which are significantly affected by 
4 each one of th~ other policy variables. 
HV: Investment policy is the most preferred policy of the firm. 
This hypothesis will be tested by observing the correlation coefficients 
between each policy variable and canonical variates of the right hand 
side variables in the preference equation. 
HVI: Dividend policy is an ineffective policy in attainment of 
goals. HIX: Financing policy is an ineffective policy in attainment 
of goals. These hypotheses will be tested by observing the number of 
goal variables which are significantly affected by the relevant policy 
variable in the estimated structure equations. 
HVII: Dividend policy is an active policy. HX: Financing policy 
is an active policy. These hypotheses will be tested by observing how 
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frequently the relevant policy variable responds significantly to lagged 
goal variables in the estimated structure equations. 
HVIII: Dividend policy is more active in management controlled 
firms than in owner controlled firms. IDCI: Financing policy is more 
active in management controlled firms than in owner controlled firms. 
These hypotheses will be tested by observing how frequently the relevant 
pol~cy variable responds significantly to lagged variables in the esti-
mated raction equations and comparing them across samples. 
FOOTNOTES 
1In calculating the percentage change in dividends per share the 
researcher encountered the problem of no dividends one period and some 
dividends a period later for some of the firms in the sample. This 
phenomenon would result in a meaningless PCIDPS according to the 
formula. To get rid of the problem an arbitrary rule was devised for 
such cases. According to the rule, in such cases, the deciding factor 
will be the dividend yield. If dividend yield is less than or equal 
to two percent, the researcher assigned an arbitrary 50 percent to 
PCIDPS. If dividend yield is between two percent and four percent then 
PCIDPS would be set equal to 100 percent. Finally, if dividend yield 
is greater than four percent then PCIDPS would be set equal to 150 
percent. 
2stating the variables in percentage change eliminates measurement 
sensitivity problems due to both firm size and time period. Additionally 
it greatly reduces the econometric problems of collinear regressors and 
heterosceastic and autocorrelated errors. 
3see Stewart and Love (84) and Tatham and Dornoff (87). 




ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
As expalined in Chapter V, three different proxies were defined for 
the risk-adjusted return: beta-adjusted return (BAR), annual-variance-
adjusted return (VAR), and monthly-variance-adjusted return (MVAR). 
Additionally, two different proxies were defined for earnings smoothing 
goal: absolute deviations from the historical EPS line (EPSD), and down-
ward deviations from the historical EPS growth line (EPSDD). As shown 
in Table I, this multiple proxy definition gives rise to six possible 
model specifications. All possible specifications were estimated for 
the three control groups as well as the whole sample. Appendix A 
presents the empirical results for the structure and the reaction equa-
tions. Results for the preference equations are presented in Appendix B. 
A detailed analysis of the results follows. 
The Entire Sample 
BAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. According to this specification the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous investment and dividend policies. It is also significantly 
affected by: (1) two-period lagged values of wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goals, (2) lagged values of dividend policy, and (3) 
contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
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TABLE I 
ALTERNATE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
Model. Goal Variables Polic! Variables 
Specification Gl G2 G3 G4 Pl 
--
BAR-ESPD BAR GRS EPSD CIC GR GRFA 
BAR-EPSDD BAR GRS EPSDD CICGR GRFA 
MVAR-'EPSD MVAR GRS EPSD CICGR CRFA 
MVAR-EPSDD MVAR GRS EPSDD CIC GR GRFA 
VAR-EPSD VAR GRS EPSD CIC GR GRFA 
VAR-EPSDD VAR GRS EPSDD CICGR GRFA 
Key: BAR = beta-adjusted-return. 
CICGR = change in the coverage ratio. 
EPSD = absolute deviation from the historical EPS line. 
EPSDD = downward deviation from the historical EPS line. 
GRFA = growth rate of fixed assets. 
GRS = growth rate of sales. 
ITC = investment tax credit. 
MVAR = monthly-variance-adjusted-return. 
PCICTR = percentage change in current ratio. 
PCIDPS = percentage change in dividends per share. 
PCIDTR = percentage change in debt ratio. 
P2 
PC I CTR 
PC I CTR 
PC I CTR 
PC I CTR 
PCICTR 
PC I CTR 
PCILIR = percentage change in the level of interest rates. 
VAR = annual-variance-adjusted-return. 
P3 
















PC IL IR ITC 
PC IL IR ITC 
PC IL IR ITC 






The goal of policy maximization is significantly affected by 
contemporaneous investment, dividend, and financing policies. It is 
also significantly affected by: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth 
i 
goal, (2) lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, (3) orte-period 
lagged values of all policy variables, and (4) contemporaneous and two-
period lagged values of the level of interest rates. 
The goal of earnings smoothing is significantly affected by contem-
poraneous investment, working capital, and financing policies. It is 
also significantly affected by: (1) lagged values of itself, (2) two-
period lagged values of investment policy, and (3) lagged values of 
working capital policy. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only 
by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization arid 
sales maximization, as well as its own one-period lagged value. It 
responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged values of 
earnings smoothing goal and lagged values of financing policy. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to: (1) its own lagged values, (2) one-
period lagged value of dividend policy, and (3) all contemporaneous and 
lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth maximization, one-period lagged value of 
sales maximization, two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal, and one-period lagged value of itself., It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to: (1) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal, (2) two-period lagged values of liquidity goal and investment 
policy, (3) lagged values of itself and financing policy, and (4) all 
contemporaneous and lagged exogenous factors. 
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Financing policy responds positively and significantly to lagged 
values of investment and working capital policies and all contemporaneous 
and lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds significantly, but • 
negatively, to lagged values of itself and sales maximization goal. 
Preference Equation. The goal of shareholder wealth maximization 
has the highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of 
all goal variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity 
goals have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Working capital policy, 
financing policy, and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Conclusion on BAR-EPSD Specification. According to the results 
obtained: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are the 
two most important goals, with the former being the dominant 
one (HI not rejected). 
2. Investment policy affects goal variables, significantly more 
than any other policy variable, and is thus the most effective 
policy (HIV not rejected). 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (RV not 
rejected). 
4. Dividend policy affects shareholder wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goals significantly (HVI rejected). 
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5. Financing policy affects sales maximization and earnings smooth-
ing goals significantly (HIX rejected). 
6. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all 
goal variables and is, thus, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
7 •. Financing policy responds significantly to lagged values of 
sales maximization goal and is, thus, an active policy (HX not 
rejected. 
BAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. According to this specification the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous investment, working capital, and dividend policies. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) two-period lagged values of itself and 
sales maximization goal, (2) lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, 
(3) lagged values of dividend policy, and (4) contemporaneous and lagged 
values of exogenous variables. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
investment, dividend, and financing policies. It is also significantly 
affected by: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and 
earnings smoothing power, (2) one-period lagged values of all policies, 
(3) contemporaneous level of interest rate, and (4) two-period lagged 
values of both exogenous factors. 
The goal of earnings smoothing is significantly affected by contem-
poraneous investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also 
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significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of itself and 
shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) two-period lagged values of 
sales goal and working capital policy, (3) lagged values of investment 
policy, and (4) two-period lagged value of the level of interest rates. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values of 
itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goals, and one-period lagged value of itself. It 
responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged values of financing 
policy. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal. It 
responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged values of itself and 
all values of exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) 
lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) one-period 
lagged values of sales maximization and earnings smoothing goals, and 
(3) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to all values of exogenous factors, two-period lagged 
values of itself, earnings smoothing goal, liquidity goal, and invest-
ment policy, and lagged values of financing policy. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to all 
values of exogenous factors, and all lagged values of investment and 
working capital policies. It responds significantly, but negatively, 
to all lagged values of itself and sales maximization goal. 
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Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coeff:t.cient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables~ Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Conclusions on BAR-EPSDD Specification. According to results 
obtained: 
1. · Shareholder wealth maximization and sale's maximization are the 
two most important goals, with the former being the dominant 
one (RI not rejected). 
' 2. Investment policy and dividend policy are equally effective in 
the sense that they affect, significantly, attainment of all 
goal variables except liquidity goal (HIV and HVI rejected). 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (HV not 
rejected). 
4. Financing policy affects sales maximization and earnings smooth-
ing goals and is, therefore, effective (HIX rejected). 
S. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all 
goal variables and is, thus, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
6. Financing policy responds significantly to lagged values of 




Structure Equations. According to this specification, the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous and one-period lagged value of dividend policy. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged value of itself, (2) 
two-period lagged value of sales goal, and (3) all values of exogenous 
factors. 
Sales goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous values of 
investment, dividend and financing policies, as well as one-period 
lagged values of all policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization goal, 
(2) lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, (3)1contemporaneous values 
of exogenous variables, and (4) one-period lagged value of investment 
tax credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous values of investment and _financing policies, as well as two-period 
lagged value of investment policy and lagged values of working capital 
policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values of 
itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goals as well as one-period lagged value of itself. 
It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value 
of earnings smoothing goal and lagged value of financing policy; 
Working capital policy responds significantly and negatively to 
one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization and lagged 
values of itself. It also responds significantly and negatively to: 
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(1) contemporaneous and two-period lagged values of the level of interest 
rates and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of investment tax credit. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) 
lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) one-period 
lagged value of sales goal, (3) two-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal, and (4) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of sales 
and liquidity goals, (2) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal, (3) two-period lagged value of inves·tment policy, (4) two-period 
lagged value of itself, (5) lagged values of financing policy, and (6) 
all values of exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to lagged 
values of investment and working capital policies and all contempora-
neous and lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to two-period lagged value of sales goal and lagged 
values of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
·right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Conclusions on MVAR-EPSD Specification. According to results 
obtained: 
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1. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are the 
two most important goals, with the former being the dominant 
one (HI not rejected). 
2. Investment and financing policies significantly affect attain-
ment of sales and earning smoothing goals. Dividend policy 
significantly affects attainment of shareholder wealth and 
sales goals. Therefore, it can be concluded that all three 
policies are effective (HIV, HVI and HIX rejected). 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (HV not 
rejected). 
4. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all· 
goal variables and is, therefore, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
5. Financing policy responds significantly to two-period lagged 
values of sales maximization goal and is, therefore, an active 
policy (HX not rejected). 
MVAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. According to this specification, the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by: (1) lagged 
values of earnings smoothing goal, (2) one-period lagged value of itself, 
(3) two-period lagged value of sales goal, (4) one-period lagged value 
of dividend policy, and (5) contemporaneous and lagged values of 
e~ugenous factors. 
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The goal of sales maximization is significantly affected by contem-
PQf~neous investment, dividend, and financing policies. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged value of shareholder 
wealth goal, (2) two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, 
(3) one-period lagged values of all policy variables, (4) contemporaneous 
exogenous variables, and (5) one-period lagged value of investment tax 
credit. 
, Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous investment and financing policies. It is also significantly 
affected by: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization 
goal, (2) two-period lagged value of sales goal, (3) one-period lagged 
value of itself, (4) lagged values of investment policy, and (5) two-
period lagged values of working capital policy and the level of interest 
rates. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goals, one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal, and one-period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to lagged values of financing policy. 
Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization goal and 
lagged values of itself. It also responds significantly, but negatively, 
• 
to: (1) contemporaneous and two-period lagged values of the level of 
interest rates and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of investment 
tax credit. 
63 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth maximization goal and one-period lagged 
values of sales goal, earnings smoothing goal, and itself. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of 
earnings smoothing and liquidity goals, (2) one-period lagged value of 
investment policy, (3) lagged values of financing policy, (4) two-
period lagged value of itself, and (5) contemporaneous and lagged values 
of exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged 
values of sales goal and itself. It responds significantly and pos-
itively to: (1) lagged values of investment and working capital 
policies and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors • 
. Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correla:tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical value of all variables on the right 
hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Conclusions on MVAR-EPSDD Specification. According to the results 
obtained: 
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1. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are the 
two most important goals with the. former being the dominant 
one (HI not rejected). 
2. Investment policy, dividend policy, and financing policy are 
all effective in the sense that they significantly affect 
attainment of goals (HIV, HVI and HIX rejected). 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (RV not 
rejected). 
4. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all 
goal variables and is, therefore, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
5. Financing policy responds to lagged valu~s of sales maximiza-
tion goal and is, therefore, an active policy (HX not rejected). 
VAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equation. According to this specification, the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous dividend and working capital policies. It is also significantly 
affected by: (1) one-period lagged value of dividend policy, (2) two-
period lagged value of sales goal, (3) lagged values of itself, and (4) 
contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous variables. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous investment, divident, and financing policies. It is also signif-
icantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of all policy 
variables, (2) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, (3) 
lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, (4) contemporaneous level of 
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interest rates, and (5) contemporaneous and lagged values of investment 
tax credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
investment, working capital, and financing policies. It is also signif-
icantly affected by: (1) two-period lagged value of investment policy, 
(2) lagged values of working capital policy, and (3) lagged values of 
itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and sales 
maximization goals, as well as to one-period lagged value of itself. 
It responds significantly, but negatively, to one~period lagged value 
of earnings smoothing· goal, and lagged values of financing policy. 
Working capital policy respopds significantly, but negatively, to 
one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization goal. It 
also responds in the same manner to: (1) one-period lagged value of 
dividend policy, (2) lagged values of itself, and (3) contemporaneous 
and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) one-period 
lagged value of sales goal, (3) two-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal, and (4) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds 
significantly, put negatively, to: (1) one-period lagged value of 
earnings smoothing goal, (2) two-period lagged value of liquidity goal, 
(3) two-period lagged value of investment policy, (4) two-period lagged 
value of itself, (5) lagged values of financing policy, (6) two-period 
lagged value of the level of interest rates, and (7) contemporaneous 
and two-period lagged values of investment tax credit. 
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Financing policy responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged 
values of sales goal and itself. It responds significantly and pos-
itively to: (1) lagged values of investment and working capital policies 
and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Conclusions on VAR-EPSD Specification. According to the results 
obtained: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are the 
two most important goals with the former being the dominant 
one (HI not rejected). 
2. Investment policy, dividend policy, and financing policy are 
all effective in the sense that they significantly affect 
attainment of goals (HIV, HVI and HIX rejected). 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (HV not 
rejected). 
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4. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all 
goal variables and is, therefore, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
5. Financing policy responds to lagged values of sales maximiza-
tion goal and is, therefore, an active policy (HX not rejected). 
VAR-EPSDD Specification 
StructureEquations. According to this specification, the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by working 
capital and dividend policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of itself, (2) two-period lagged value of sales 
maximization goal, (3) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal and (4) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Goal of sales maximization is significantly affected by investment, 
dividend, and ~inancing policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization goal, 
(2) two-period, lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (3) one-period 
lagged values of all policy variables, (4) contemporaneous values of 
both exogenous factors, and (5) one-period lagged value of investment 
tax credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by investment, 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) two-
period lagged value of sales goal, (3) one-period lagged value of 
itself, (4) lagged values of investment policy, and (5) two-period 
lagged value of working capital policy. Liquidity goal is significantly 
affected only by lagged values of itself. 
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Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization and 
sales maximization goal. It also responds significantly and positively 
to one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal and one-period 
lagged value of itself. 
Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth maximization goal. It 
responds in the same manner to lagged values of itself and contempora-
neous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (2) one-period 
lagged values of sales and earnings smoothing goals and (3) one-period 
lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: 
(1) two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing and liquidity goals, 
(2) two-period lagged values of investment policy and itself, (3) lagged 
values of financing policy, (4) contemporaneous value of investment tax 
credit, and (5) two-period lagged values of both exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged 
values of sales maximization goal and lagged values of itself. It 
responds significantly and positively to lagged values of investment 
policy, lagged values of working capital policy, and contemporaneous and 
lagged values of exogenous variables. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correaltion coefficients in a descending order. 
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Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
tight hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descend1ng order. 
Conclusions on VAR-EPSDD Specification. According to the results 
obtained: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are the 
two most important goals with the former being the dominant one 
(HI not rejected). 
2. Dividend policy significantly affects shareholder wealth 
maximization goal, sales maximization goal and earnings smooth-
ing goal. Investment and financing policies affect sales 
maximization and earnings smoothing goals •. Therefore, dividend 
policy is as effective as, if not more effective than, invest-
ment policy (HIV and HXI rejected). 
3. Financing policy is an effective policy (HIX rejected). 
4. Investment policy is the most preferred policy (RV not 
rejected). 
S. Dividend policy responds significantly to lagged values of all 
goal variables and is, therefore, an active policy (HVII not 
rejected). 
6. Financing policy responds significantly to lagged values of 
sales,goal and is, therefore, an active policy (HX not 
rejected). 
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Summary--The Entire Sample 
Structure, reaction and preference equations were estimated for six 
dif£~rent specifications. The results obtained indicate that regardless 
of proxies used: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant goal for the 
firms in the sample. 
2. Sales maximization is the second most important goal. 
3. Earnings smoothing and liquidity goals rank third and fourth. 
4. Investment policy is the most preferred policy. 
5. Liquidity goal is not significantly affected by any of the 
policy variables. 
6. Earnings smoothing goal is not significantly affected by contem-
poraneous exogenous factors. 
7. Liquidity goal is not significantly affected by exogenous fac-
tors, either contemporaneous or lagged. 
8. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization goals 
are significantly affected by contemporaneous and lagged values 
of exogenous variables. 
9. Working capital, dividend and financing policies respond to 
contemporaneous and/or lagged exogenous factors. 
10. Investment policy does not respond to exogenous variables, 
either contemporaneous or lagged. 
11. All policy variables are both effective and active. 
12. Investment policy and dividend policy are the two most effec-
tive policies. According to four of the six specifications 
(BAR-EPSDD, MVAR-EPSD, MVAR-EPSDD and VAR-EPSD), investment 
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and dividend policies are equally effective. According to one 
specification (BAR-EPSD), investment policy is more effective 
than dividend policy; while according to a final specification 
(MVAR-EPSDD), dividend pglicy is more effective than investment 
policy. Thus, it can be said that, overall, investment and 
dividend policies are equally effective. 
13. Working capital and financing policies are the two least effec-
tive policies. Between the two, however, financing is more 
effective than working capital policy. 
14. Dividend policy is the most active policy, followed by invest-
ment policy being the second most active policy. Since the two 
are equally effective, it can be concluded that dividend policy 
is more active than it is effective. Financing and working 
capital policies rank third and fourth with regard to active-
ness •.. 
Strong Owner Control Sample 
BAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. According to this specification, the goal of 
shareholder wealth maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous dividend policy and the two-period lagged value of itself. It is 
also significantly affected by contemporaneous and lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
Sales goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous values of 
investment and financing policies. It is also significantly affected 
by: (1) one-period lagged values investment and financing policies, 
(2) two-period lagged value of financing policy, (3) one-period lagged 
value of shareholder wealth maximization goal, (4) two-period lagged 
value of earnings smoothing goal, and (5) contemporaneous level of 
interest rates. 
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Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by 
lagged values of itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only 
by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to lagged values of shareholder wealth maximization goal, 
two-period lagged value of sales goal, and one-period lagged value of 
itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period 
lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and working capital policy. 
Working capital policy responds negatively, and significantly, to 
lagged values of itself. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, two-period lagged 
value of earnings smoothing goal, lagged values of working capital 
policy, and one-period lagged value of itself. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of sales and 
liquidity goals, (2) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, 
(3) contemporaneous and two-period lagged values of the level of interest 
rates, and (4) .contemporaneous and lagged values of investment tax 
credit. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to two-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth and e~rnings smoothing goals, one-
period lagged value of investment policy, and two-period lagged value of 
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working capital policy. It responds significantly, but negatively, to 
one-period lagged value of itself. 
Preference Equation. The goal of sales maximization has the high-
est correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Shareholder wealth maximization, liquidity and earnings 
smoothing goals have lower correlation·coefficients in a descending 
order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital poli.cy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
BAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. The goal of shareholder wealth maximization 
is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy, It is 
also significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal, (2) two-period lagged value of itself, and (3) contem-
poraneous and l?gged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
"' 
investment and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of investment policy, (2) lagged values of financing 
policies, (3) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (4) two-period 
lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (5) contemporaneous level of 
interest rate, and (6) one-period lagged value of investment tax credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment and financing policies. It is also significantly 
74 
affected by one-period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and 
itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and sig-
nificantly to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (2) two-
period lagged value of sales goal, (3) one-period lagged value of 
earnings smoothing goal, and (4) one-period lagged value of itself. 
It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value of 
working capital policy. 
Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
lagged values of itself. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth, sales, and earnings smooth-
ing goals, (2) lagged values of working capital policy, and (3) 
one-period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of sales, earning smooth-
ing and liquidity goals, (2) contemporaneous and two-period lagged 
values of level of interest rates, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged 
values of investment tax credit. 
Finan.cing policy responds positively and significantly to two-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and working capital 
policy. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period 
lagged value of itself. 
Preference Equation. The goal of sales maximization has the high-
est· correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Shareholder wealth maximization, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity goals have lower correlations in a descending order. 
75 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy; and dividend policy have lower correlations in a descend-
ing order. 
MVAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization is signif-
icantly affected only by exogenous factors, contemporaneous and lagged. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly 
affected by: (1) lagged values of financing policy, (2) one-period 
lagged value o~ investment policy, (3) one-period lagged values of share-
holder wealth and sales goals, (4) two-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal, (5) contemporaneous level of interest rates, and (6) 
contemporaneous and one-period lagged values of investment tax credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by 
lagged values of itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only 
by the lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (2) 
two-period lagged value of sales goal, and (3) one-period lagged value 
of itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period 
lagged values ;of earnings smoothing goal and working capital policy. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. It responds significantly, but 
neg!tively, to lagged values of itself. 
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Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) 
one-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, (2) two-
period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, (3) two-period lagged 
value of working capital policy, and (4) one-period lagged value of 
itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: (1) two-period 
lagged values of sales and liquidity goals, (2) one-period lagged value 
of earnings smoothing goal, and (3) two-period lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and earnings smoothing 
goals, (2) one-period lagged value of investment policy, (3) two-period 
lagged value of working capital policy, and (4) contemporaneous level 
of interest rates. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-
period lagged value of itself. 
Preference Equation. The goal of sales maximization has the high-
est correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Shareholder wealth maximization, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity goals have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy, and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
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MVAR~EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. The goal of shareholder wealth maximization 
is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is 
also significa~tly affected by: (1) one-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend, and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of investment and financing 
policies, (2) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, (3) 
two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (4) contemporaneous 
exogenous factors, and (5) one-period lagged valu~ of investment tax 
credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment and financing policies. It is also significantly 
affected by one-period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and 
itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by the lagged 
values of itself.· 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and sig-
nificantly to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (2) two-
period lagged value of saies goal, (3) one-period lagged value of 
earnings smoothing goal, and (4) one-period lagged: value of itself. It 
responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value of 
working capital_policy. 
· Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to lagged values of itself. 
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Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth, sales, and earnings smooth-
ing goals, (2) two-period lagged value of working capital policy, and 
(3) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to two-period lagged values of sales, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity goals. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth and working capital policy, 
and.(2) contemporaneous level of interest rates. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value of itself. 
Preference Equation. The goal of sales maximization has the highest 
correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal variables. 
Shareholder wealth maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, working 
capital policy, and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
VAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by two-period lagged value of itself. It is also 
significantly affected by contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
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Goal of sales maximization is significantly affected by contempora-
neous values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) lagged values of financing policy, (2) 
one-period lagged value of investment policy, (3) one-period lagged 
values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, (4) two-period lagged 
value of earning smoothing goal, (5) contemporaneous level of interest 
rates, and (6) contemporaneous and lagged values of investment tax 
credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by 
lagged values of itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only 
by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and 
significantly to: (1) two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth 
and sales goals, and (2) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged values of earnings 
smoothing goal and working capital policy. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to two-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal and 
lagged values of itself. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, (2) two-
period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and working capital 
policy, and (3) one-period lagged value of itself. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value of earnings smooth-
ing goal and two-period lagged values of sales and liquidity goals. 
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Financing policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and earnings smoothing 
goals, (2) one-period lagged value of investment policy, (3) two-period 
lagged value of working capital policy, and (4) contemporaneous level of 
interest rates. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-
period lagged value of itself. 
~ 
Preference Equation. Goal of.sales maximization has the highest 
correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal var-
iables. Shareholder wealth maximization, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity goals have lower correlations in a descending order. 
· Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, dividend 
policy, and working capital policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
VAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal and two-period lagged value of itself. It is also significantly 
affected by contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
levels of investment, dividend, and financing policies. It is also sig~ 
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of financing policy, (2) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and itself, (3) 
two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (4) one-period 
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lagged value of investment policy, (5) contemporaneous level of interest 
rates, and (6) contemporaneous and lagged values of investment tax ~ 
credit. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment and financing policies. It is also significantly 
affected by one-period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and 
itself. Liquidity goal is significantly affected only by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds positively and sig-
nificantly to: (1) two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and 
sales goals and (2) one-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal 
and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-period 
lagged value of working capital policy. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to two-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal and 
lagged values of itself. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) one-
period lagged values of earnings smoothing and sales goals, (2) one-
period lagged value of itself, and (3) two-period lagged value of working 
capital policy. It responds significantly, but negatively, to two-period 
lagged values of sales, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to: (1) two-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and working capital 
policy, (2) one-period lagged value of investment policy, and (3) contem-
poraneous level of interest rates. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to one-period lagged value of itself. 
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Preference Equation. Goal of sales maximization has the highest 
correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal var-
iables. Shareholder wealth maximization, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity goals have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Financing policy, dividend 
policy, and working capital policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Summary--Strong Owner Control Sample 
Structure, reaction, and preference equations were estimated for 
six different specifications. Results obtained indicate that regardless 
of proxies used: 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the firms in the 
sample. 
2. Shareholder wealth maximization is the second most important 
goal. 
3. Earnings smoothing and liquidity goals rank third and fourth. 
4. Investment policy is the most preferred policy. 
5. Liquidity goal is not significantly affected by any of the 
policy variables. 
6. Liquidity goal is not significantly affected by exogenous 
factors, either contemporaneous or lagged . 
7. ..; Earnings smoothing goal is not significantly affected by 
exogenous factors, either contemporaneous or lagged. 
8. Shareholder wealth maximization and sales maximization are 
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significantly affected by contemporaneous and/or lagged values 
of exogenous factors. 
9. Investment and working capital policies do not respond to 
exogenous variables, either contemporaneous or lagged. 
10. Working capital policy is an ineffective policy, i.e., it 
does not affect, significantly, any of the goal variables. 
11. Investment, dividend, and financing policies are all effective. 
Financing policy, however, consistently affects sales and earn-
ings smoothing goals. Lagged values of financing policy con-
sistently affect the sales goal. It can cautiously be 
concluded that financing policy is the most effective for this 
sample. Investment and dividend policies would rank second 
and third, respectively. 
12. Dividend policy is the most active policy, followed by invest-
ment policy being the second most active policy. Financing 
policy and working capital policy are almost equally active. 
In light of observations 10 and 11 above, it can be concluded 
that dividend and working capital policies are far more active 
than they are effective. 
Weak Owner Control Sample 
BAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous investment and dividend policies. 
It is also significantly affected by one-period lagged value of dividend 
policy and contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous variables. 
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Sales maxi.mization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
investment, working capital and financing policies. It is also signif-
icantly affected by one-period lagged values of investment policy, 
financing policy, shareholder wealth goal and itself. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by one-period 
lagged value of investment policy. It is also significantly affected 
by one-period lagged value of sales goal and lagged values of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by two-period lagged value 
of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equation. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal and 
two~period value of sales goal. 
Working capital policy responds positively and significantly to 
two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal and two-period lagged 
value of financing policy. It responds significantly, but negatively, 
to two-period lagged value of investment policy and one-period lagged 
value of itself. 
Dividend policy responds positively and significantly to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, sales, goal, working capital 
policy and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-
period lagged value of financing policy and two-period lagged values of 
itself and exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds positively aI).d significantly to one-
period lagged value of working capital policy. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing.and liquidity goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
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Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Working capital policy, 
financing policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Results of the estimated preference equation for the following four 
specifications (BAR-EPSDD, MVAR-EPSD, MVAR-EPSDD, and VAR-EPSD) are the 
same as those reported above and will not be repeated for those 
specifications. 
BAR~EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization is signif-
icantly affected by contemporaneous values of investment, working capital 
and dividend policies. It is also significantly affected by lagged 
values of earnings smoothing goal, and contemporaneous and lagged values 
of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, working capital and financing policies. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of investment 
and financing policies, (2) one-period lagged values of shareholder 
wealth goal and itself, and (3) two-period lagged value of earnings 
smoothing goal •.. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by one-period lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal and itself, and two-period lagged 
value of level of interest rates. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by two-period lagged 
value of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged 
values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal and 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. 
Working capital policy responds significantly and positively to 
two-period lagged values of sales goal and financing policy. It 
responds significantly, but negatively, to two-period lagged values of 
earnings smoothing goal and investment policy, and one-period lagged 
value of itself. 
86 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, sales goal, earnings smoothing 
goal, working capital policy and itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to one-period lagged value of financing policy and two-
period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, itself and exogenous 
factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged value of working capital policy. 
MVAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. ·Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of dividend 
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policy and itself and (2) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, working capital and financing policies. It is also 
significantly affected by one-period lagged values of investment policy, 
financing policy, and earnings smoothing goal. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by one-period 
lagged values of investment policy and sales goal. It is also signif-
icantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by two-period lagged value 
of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to two-period lagged value of sales goal. 
·Working capital policy responds significantly and positively to 
two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and financing policy. 
It responds significantly, but negatively, to two-period lagged value of 
investment policy and one-period lagged value of itself. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged values of sha.reholder wealth goal, sales goal, working capital 
policy and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-
period lagged value of financing policy and two-period lagged values of 
itself and exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged value of working capital policy. 
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MVAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous values of investment, working 
capital and dividend policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) one-period lagged value of itself, (2) lagged values of earnings 
smoothing goal, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
Sales goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous values of 
investment, working capital and financing policies. It is also signif-
icantly affected by one-period lagged values of investment and financing 
policies, and two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
value of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by one-
period lagged value of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by two-period lagged value 
of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to two-period lagged value of sales goal. 
Working capital policy responds significantly and positively to 
two-period lagged values of sales goal and financing policy. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to two-period lagged value of investment 
policy and one-period lagged value of itself. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, sales goal, earnings smoothing 
goal, investment policy and itself. It responds significantly, but 
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negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing 
goal and itself, (2) one-period lagged value of financing policy, and 
(3) two-period lagged values of exogenous factors •. 
Financing policy responds positively and significantly to one-
period lagged value of working capital policy. 
VAR-EPSD Specification 
/.-.; 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by values of 
investment, working capital and financing policies. It is also signif-
icantly affected by one-period lagged values of investment policy, 
financing policy and earnings smoothing goal. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by one-period 
lagged value of investment policy. It is also significantly affected by 
lagged values of itself and one-period lagged value of sales goal. 
Liquidity goal is s·ignificantly affected by two-period lagged value 
of dividend p.olicy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values 
of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to two-period lagged value of sales goal. 
Working capital policy responds significantly and positively to 
two-period lagged values of sales goal, earnings smoothing goal and 
financing policy. It responds significantly, but negatively, to 
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one-period lagged value of itself and two-period lagged value of invest-
ment policy. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, sales goal, working capital 
policy and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to one-
period lagged value of financing policy and two-period lagged values of 
itself and the level of interest rates. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged value of working capital policy. 
VAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is 
significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and 
contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximiza.tion goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, financing and working capital policies. It is also 
significantly affected by one-period lagged values of investment and 
financing policies and two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by one-period lagged 
values of itself and shareholder wealth goal. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by two-period lagged value 
of dividend policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values 
of itself. 
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Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and earnings 
smoothing goals. 
Working capital policy responds significantly and positively to 
two-period lagged values of sales goal and financing policy. It responds 
significantly, but negatively, to one-period lagged value of itself and 
two,.,.period lagged value of investment policy. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to one-period 
lagged values of shareholder wealth, sales and earnings smoothing goals 
and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: (1) two-
period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, itself, and the level 
of interest rates, and (2) one-period lagged value of financing policy. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to one-
period lagged value of working capital policy. 
Preference Equatiort. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, liquidity and earnings smoothing goals 
have lower correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, investment policy has the highest correla-
tion·coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Working capital policy, 
financing policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
Sunnnary--Weak Owner Control Sample 
Structure, reaction and preference equations were estimated for 
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six different specifications. Results obtained indicate that regardless 
of proxies used: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant goal for the 
firms in the sample. 
2. Sales maximization is the second most important goal. 
3. Earnings smoothing and liquidity goals rank third and fourth. 
4. Investment policy is the most preferred policy. 
5. Shareholder wealth maximization is the only goal which is con-
sistently and significantly affected by contemporaneous and 
lagged values of exogenous factors. Other.goal variables are 
not significantly affected by exogenous factors (contemporaneous 
or lagged). The only exception is in the BAR-EPSDD specifica-
tion, in which earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected 
by two-period lagged value of the level of interest rates. 
6, Dividend policy is the only policy variable which responds to 
exogenous factors--and it responds only to two-period lagged 
values of exogenous factors. Other policy variables do not 
respond to exogenous factors, contemporaneous or lagged. 
7. Investment policy and dividend policy are the two most effective 
policies and, overall, they are equally effective. 
8. Working capital policy and financing policy are the two least 
effective policies. Between the two, however, financing policy 
is more effective than working capital policy. 
9. Dividend policy is the most active policy, followed by invest-
ment policy as the second most active policy. Since the two 
are equally effective, it can be concluded that dividend policy 
is more active than it is effective. Financing and working 
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capital policies rank third and fourth with regard to active-
ness. 
Management Control Sample 
BAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous values of working capital, 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of investment policy and dividend policy, (2) lagged 
values of itself, (3) one-period lagged value of liquidity go~1, and 
(4) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by all contempora-
neous policy variables. It is also significantly affected by: (1) 
lagged values of investment and dividend policies, (2) one-period lagged 
values of working capital and financing policies, (3) lagged values of 
earnings smoothing goal, (4) one-period lagged values of shareholder 
wealth goal and itself, and (5) two-period lagged values of exogenous 
factors. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of investment policy, (2) 
two-period lagged values of working capital and financing policies, and 
(3) lagged values of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
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positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and two-period 
lagged values of sales goal and itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal and 
two-period lagged value of financing policy. 
Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
lagged values of itself, and contemporaneous and lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal and one-period lagged values of 
itself and sales goal. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: 
(1) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (2) two-period 
lagged value of investment policy, (3) lagged values of financing 
policy, and (4) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous var-
iables. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of shareholder wealth and earnings smoothing 
goals, (2) one-period lagged value of working capital policy, (3) two-
period lagged value of dividend policy, and (4) contemporaneous and 
lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to two-period lagged value of sales goal, and lagged values 
of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficients with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion with the canonical variate of all variables on the right hand side 
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of the preference equation. Investment policy, working capital policy 
and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients in a descending 
order. 
BAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous values of working capital, 
dividend and financing policies. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of investment policy, dividend policy, earnings 
smoothing goal, and itself, (2) one-period lagged value of liquidity 
goal, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by all contempora-
neous policy variables. It is also significantly affected by: (1) 
lagged values of investment policy, dividend policy, shareholder wealth 
goal and earnings smoothing goal, (2) one-period lagged values of work-
ing capital policy, financing policy and itself, and (3) two-period 
lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of investment policy, (2) one-
period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and itself, and (3) 
two-period lagged value of sales goal. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significnalty affected by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (2) one-
period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, and (3) two-period lagged 
values of sales goal and itself. It responds significantly, but neg-
atively, to two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and 
financing policy. 
Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
lagged values of itself and contemporaneous and lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
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Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal and one-period lagged values of sales 
goal and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and investment 
policy, (2) lagged values of financing policy, and (3) contemporaneous 
and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
two-·period lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and dividend policy, 
(2) one-period lagged value of working capital policy, and (3) contem-
poraneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to two-period lagged value of sales goal and 
one-period lagged value of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Investment policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
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MVAR-EPSD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of investment 
and dividend policies, (2) lagged values of sales goal, (3) one-period 
lagged value of itself, and (4) contemporaneous and lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous values of all policy variables. It is also significantly affected 
by: (1) one-period lagged values of working capital policy, financing 
policy and itself, (2) lagged values of dividend policy and earnings 
smoothing goal, (3) two-period lagged value of investment policy, and 
(4) contemporaneous level of interest rates. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also 
·Significantly affected by two-period lagged values of working capital 
policy and financing policy, and lagged values of investment policy and 
itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significantly affected by one-period lagged value of 
itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, and 
two-period lagged value of investment policy. It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal 
and two-period lagged value of financing policy. 
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Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to 
(1) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, (2) lagged values 
df itself, (3) contemporaneous and one-period lagged values of the level 
of interest rates, and (4) contemporaneous and lagged values of invest-
ment tax credit. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal, and one-period lagged values of sales 
goal and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: (1) 
one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (2) lagged values of 
financing policy, (3) two-period lagged value of investment policy, and 
(4) contemporaneous and two-period lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and dividend policy, 
(2) one-period lagged value of working capital policy, and (3) contem-
poraneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to lagged values of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation with the canonical variate of all goal variables. 
Sales maximization, liquidity and earnings smoothing goals have lower 
correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Investment policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients 
in a descending order. 
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MVAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nirie~ntly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) one-period lagged values of investment 
policy, earnings smoothing goal and itself, (2) lagged values of sales 
goal, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contempora-
neous values of all policy variables. It is also significantly affected 
by: (1) lagged values of investment and dividend policies, (2) one-
period lagged values of working capital and financing policies, (3) 
two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (4) one-period 
lagged values of itself and investment tax credit, and (5) contempora-
neous level of interest rates. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of investment policy, (2) 
lagged values of shareholder wealth goal, (3) two-period lagged value 
of sales goal, and (4) one-period lagged value of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy significantly and positively 
responds to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth and sales goals, 
(2) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, and (3) two-
period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but neg-
atively, to two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and 
financing policy. 
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Working capital policy responds significantly, but negatively, to: 
(1) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, (2) contempora-
neous and two-period lagged values of the level of interest rates, (3) 
contemporaneous and lagged values of investment tax credit, and (4) 
lagged values of itself. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
va],ues of shareholder wealth goal and one-period lagged values of sales 
goal, earnings smoothing goal and itself. It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to: (1) two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing 
goal and investment policy, (2) lagged values of financing policy, (3) 
two-period lagged values of exogenous factors, and (4) contemporaneous 
investment tax credit. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
one-period lagged value of working capital policy, (2) two-period 
lagged value of.dividend policy, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged 
values of exogenous factors. It responds significantly, but negatively, 
to lagged values of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maxi.mization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion with the canonical variate of all variables on the right hand side 
of the preference equation. Investment policy, working capital policy 




Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization is signif-
icantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) lagged values of itself, (2) two-period 
lagged values of working capital policy and sales goal, (3) one-period 
lagged value of dividend policy, and (4) contemporaneous and lagged 
values of exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of all policy variables. It is also significantly affected by: 
(1) lagged values of investment and dividend policies, (2) one-period 
lagged values of working capital and financing policies, (3) lagged 
values of earnings smoothing goal, (4) one-period lagged values of 
shareholder wealth goal and itself, and (5) contemporaneous level of 
interest rates. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by two-period lagged values of working capital and 
and financing policies, and lagged values of investment policy and 
itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and sales goal, 
and two-period lagged values of itself. It responds significantly, but 
negatively, to one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal and 
two-period values of financing policy. 
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Working capital policy responds significantly and negatively to: 
(1) one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, (2) lagged values 
of itself, and (3) contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous fac-
tors. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal, and one-period lagged values of sales 
goal and itself. It responds significantly, but negatively, to: (1) 
one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, (2) two-period 
lagged value of investment policy, (3) lagged values of financing policy, 
and (4) two-period lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to: (1) 
two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and dividend policy, 
(2) one-period lagged value of working capital policy, and (3) contem-
poraneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. It responds signif-
icantly, but negatively, to lagged values of itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation with the canonical variate of all goal variables. 
Sales maximization, liquidity and earnings smoothing goals have lower 
correlation coefficients in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion coefficient with the canonical variate of all variables on the 
right hand side of the preference equation. Investment policy, working 
capital policy and dividend policy have lower correlation coeffi.cients 
in a descending order. 
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VAR-EPSDD Specification 
Structure Equations. Shareholder wealth maximization goal is sig-
nificantly affected by contemporaneous dividend policy. It is also 
significantly affected by: (1) two-period lagged values of working 
capital and financing policies, (2) lagged values of itself, (3) two-
period lagged value of sales goal, (4) one-period lagged value of 
earnings smoothing goal, and (5) contemporaneous and lagged values of 
exogenous factors. 
Sales maximization goal is significantly affected by all contempora-
neous policy variables. It is also significantly affected by: (1) 
lagged values of investment and dividend policies, (2) one-period lagged 
values of working capital policy, financing policy, shareholder wealth 
goal, and itself, (3) two-period lagged value of earnings smoothing 
goal, and (4) contemporaneous level of interest rates. 
Earnings smoothing goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous 
values of investment, dividend and financing policies. It is also sig-
nificantly affected by: (1) lagged values of investment policy and 
shareholder wealth goal, (2) two-period lagged value of sales goal, and 
(3) one-period lagged value of itself. 
Liquidity goal is significantly affected by contemporaneous dividend 
policy. It is also significantly affected by lagged values of itself. 
Reaction Equations. Investment policy responds significantly and 
positively to: (1) lagged values of shareholder wealth goal and sales 
goal, (2) one-period lagged value of earnings smoothing goal, and (3) 
two-period lagged value of itself. It responds significantly, but 
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negatively, to two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal and 
financing policy. 
Working capital policy responds significantly and negatively to .. 
one-period lagged value of shareholder wealth goal, lagged values of 
itself, and contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous factors. 
Dividend policy responds significantly and positively to lagged 
values of shareholder wealth goal, and one-period lagged values of sales 
goal, earnings smoothing goal and itself. It responds significantly, 
but negatively, to two-period lagged values of earnings smoothing goal, 
investment policy and exogenous factors, and lagged values of financing 
policy. 
Financing policy responds significantly and positively to one-
period lagged value of working capital policy, two-period lagged value 
of dividend policy, and contemporaneous and lagged values of exogenous 
factors. It responds significantly, but negatively, to lagged values of 
itself. 
Preference Equation. Shareholder wealth maximization goal has the 
highest correlation coefficient with the canonical variate of all goal 
variables. Sales maximization, earnings smoothing and liquidity goals 
have lower correlations in a descending order. 
Among policy variables, financing policy has the highest correla-
tion with the canonical variate of all variables on the right hand side 
of the preference equation. Investment policy, working capital policy 
and dividend policy have lower correlation coefficients in a descending 
order. 
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Summary--Management Control Sample 
Structure, reaction, and preference equations were estimated for 
si~ different ~pecifications. Results obtained indicate that regardless 
of proxies used: 
1. Shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant goal for the 
firms in the sample. 
2. Sales maximization is the second most important goal. 
3. Earnings smoothing and liquidity goals rank third and fourth. 
4. Financing policy is the most preferred policy. 
5. Earnings smoothing goal is not significantly affected by 
exogenous factors, contemporaneous or lagged. 
6. Liquidity goal is not significantly affected by exogenous 
factors, contemporaneous or lagged. 
7. Investment policy does not respond to exogenous factors, contem-
poraneous or lagged. 
8. Dividend policy is the most effective policy. 
9. Investment policy is the second most effective policy. Financ-
ing policy and working capital policy rank third and fourth 
respectively. 
10. Investment policy is the most active policy. 
11. Dividend policy is the second most active policy. Working 
capital policy and financing policy are the two least active 
_policy variables. 
The Comparative Study 
In this section the researcher will compare the results obtained, 
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under each specification, for the three samples, to test the comparative 
hypotheses. 
BAil-gPSD Specification 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
goal for the weak owner control and management control groups. (HII and 
HUI rejected.) 
2. Dividend policy is the most effective policy for the strong 
owner control group. Investment policy is the most effective policy for 
the weak owner control group. For the management control group, contem-
poraneous dividend policy is more effective than contemporaneous invest-
ment policy, but investment policy has more long-term effects and is, 
overall, more effective. 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and weak owner control groups. For the management control group, financ-
ing policy is the most preferred policy. 
4. Dividend policy and investment policy are equally active in 
weak owner control and management control groups. For the strong owner 
control group, dividend policy is more active than other policies. 
(HVIII rejected.) 
5. Financing policy is not an active policy in the weak owner con-
trol group. However, it is active in the strong owner and management 
control groups, and it is more active in the management control group 
than in the. owner control group. (HXI not rejected.) 
BAR-EPSDD Specification 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
goal for the weak owner and management control groups. (HII and HIII 
rejected.) 
2. Financing policy is the most effective policy for the strong 
owner control group. Investment policy is the most effective policy 
for the weak owner control group. Finally, dividend policy is the 
most effective policy for the management control group. 
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3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and weak owner control groups. For the management control group, financ-
ing policy is the most preferred policy. 
4. Dividend policy is the most active policy in both strong and 
weak owner control groups. For the management control group, investment 
policy is the most active policy. (HVIII rejected.} 
5. Financing policy is not active in the strong and weak owner 
control groups. However, it is active in the management control group. 
(HXI not rejected.) 
MVAR-EPSD Specification 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
goal for the weak owner control and management control groups. (HII and 
HUI rejected.) 
2. Financing policy is the most effective policy for strong and 
weak owner control groups. For the management control group, the most 
effective policy is dividend policy. 
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3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and weak owner control groups. For the management control group, 
financing policy is the most preferred policy •. 
4. Dividend policy is the most active policy for both strong and 
weak owner control groups. Investment policy is the most active policy 
for the management control group. (HVIII rejected.) 
5. Financing policy is not active in the weak owner control group. 
However, it is active in the strong owner control and management control 
groups and is more active in the former than in the latter. (HXI 
rejected.) 
MVAR-EPSDD Specification 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
goal for the weak owner control and management control groups. (HII and 
HIII rejected.) 
2. Investment policy is the most effective policy for the weak 
owner control group. For the strong owner control group, investment 
policy and financing policy are equally effective. Dividend policy is 
the most effective policy for the management control group. 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and weak owner control groups. For the management control group, financ-
ing policy is the most preferred policy. 
4. Dividend policy is the most active policy for both strong and 
weak owner control groups. Investment policy is the most active policy 
for the management control group. (HVIII rejected.) 
5. Financing policy is active only in the strong owner control 
group. (HXI rejected.) 
VAR-EPSD Specification 
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1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
goal for the weak owner control and management control groups. (HII and 
HIII rejected.) 
2. Investment policy is the most effective policy for the weak 
owner control group. The most effective policy for the strong owner 
control group is financing policy. For the management control group, 
dividend policy is the most effective. 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and weak owner control groups. For the management control group, 
financing policy is the most preferred policy. 
4. Dividend policy is the most active policy for the strong owner 
control group. In the weak owner control group, working capital policy 
and dividend policy are equally active. Investment policy is the most 
active _policy for the management control group. (HVIII rejected.) 
5. Financing policy is not active in the weak owner control group. 
However, it is active in the strong owner control and management control 
groups, and more active in the former than in the latter. (HXI 
rejected~) 
VAR-EPSDD Specification 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control group, while shareholder wealth maximization is the dominant 
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goal for the weak owner control and management control groups. (HII and 
HUI rejected.) 
·2. Dividend policy is the most effective policy for the weak owner 
control group and management control group. For strong owner control 
group, financing policy is the most effective. 
3. Investment policy is the most preferred policy for both strong 
and,weak owner control groups. For the management control group, financ-
ing policy is the most preferred policy. 
4. Dividend policy is the most active policy for the strong and 
weak owner control groups. Investment policy is the most active policy 
for the management control group. (HVIII rejected.) 
5. Financing policy is active only in the strong owner control 
group. (HXI rejected.) 
A Selective Comparative Test 
A question one faces is: Should we compare the results across the 
three samples based on a common specification, as done above, or should 
we compare the results based on different specifications tailored 
according to the characteristics of each sample? The reseracher believes 
that .the second approach would provide more meaningful results. Thus, 
in this part, different specifications will be used, which the researcher 
feels best suits each sample, to·test the comparative hypotheses. 
It seems logical to assume that owners would be concerned with total 
ris-k, as measured by the variance; whereas managers would be more con-
cerned with the systematic risk, as measured by the beta. Furthermore, 
it seems reasonable to assume that owners would try to minimize only the 
downward deviations of EPS around the historical EPS regression line; 
whereas managers would be concerned with absolute deviations. Given 
that these assumptions are realistic, the following should be used: 
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(1) the variance adjusted return for the strong owner control sample and 
the beta adjusted return for the management control sample, and (2) down-
ward deviations from the historical EPS line for the strong owner control 
sample and absolute deviations for the management control sample. 
Insofar as the choice between annual-variance-adjusted return and 
monthly-variance-adjusted return, it is hypothesized that the choice 
will not affect the results. Thus, the researcher will carry out the 
comparative tests using VAR-EPSDD specification for the strong owner 
cpntrol sample and BAR-EPSD for the management control sample. Results 
so obtained will be compared to results obtained in aMVAR-EPSDD, BAR-
EPSD test, for a test of this hypothesis. 
VAR-EPSDD, BAR-EPSD comparision reveals that: 
1. Sales maximization is the dominant goal for the strong owner 
control sample, while shareholder wealth maximization is the 
dominant goal for the management control sample. (HII and HIII 
rejected.) 
2. Dividend policy is the most effective policy for the management 
control sample, and financing policy is the most effective 
policy for the strong owner control sample. 
3. Investment policy is the most.preferred policy for the strong 
owner control sample and financing policy is the most preferred 
policy for the management control sample. 
4. Investment policy and dividend policy are equally active in the 
management control sample, but dividend policy is the most 
active policy in the strong owner control sample. (HVIII 
rejected.) 
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5. Financing policy is more active in the management control 
sample. (HXI not rejected.) 
MVAR-EPSDD, BAR-EPSD comparison obtains exactly the same conclu 
sions. The.ref ore, the choice between annual-variance-adjusted return 
and 111.onthly-variance-adjusted return does not affect the results. 
A Digression--Some Traditional Tests 
It seems appropriate, at this point, to report some traditional 
tests performed on the data used in this work. This reporting would 
enable the researcher to compare the results of this study to those 
obtained by other authors. Much of the literature dealing with the 
effect of separation of ownership, reviewed in Chapter II, has studied 
the effect by looking for significant differences in profitability of 
owner controlled versus management controlled firms. The technique 
·used most often has been the analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVA tests 
a number of samples against each other to discover if a significant dif-
ference exists. 
The researcher used ANOVA to discover if significant differences 
exist among the three samples with respect to: (1) risk-adjusted rate 
of return, (2) rate of sales growth, (3) deviations from historical EPS 
line, (4) changes in the coverage ratio, (5) rate of growth in net fixed 
assets, i.e., investment policy, (6) percentage change in current ratio, 
i.e., w·orking capital policy, (7) percentage change in dividends per 
share, i.e., dividend policy, and (8) percentage change in debt rate, 
i.e., financing policy. Results are reported in Appendix C. Since the 
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F value for 2,3665 degrees of freedom at the five percent level is 2.99, 
the null hypotheses of no difference, among the three samples, with 
respect to (1) any form of risk-adjusted return, (2) rate of sales 
growth, (3) deviations from the historical EPS line, either absolute or 
downward, (4) change in the coverage ratio, (5) working capital policy, 
and (6) financing policy, cannot be rejected. The null hypotheses of no 
difference, among the three groups, with respect to investment policy 
and dividend policy are rejected. 
Sununary 
Six different specifications were used to test the hypotheses, using 
the model presented in Chapter III. Results can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. BAR-EPSD specification: HI, HIV, HV, HVII, HX and HXI not 
rejected; HI!, HIII, HVI, HVIII and HIX rejected. 
2. BAR-EPSDD specification: HI, HV, HVII, HX and HXI not rejected; 
HI!, HIII, HIV, HVI, HVIII and HIX rejected. 
3. MVAR-EPSD, MVAR-EPSDD, VAR-EPSD and VAR-EPSDD specifications: 
HI, HV, HVII and HX not rejected; HII, HIII, HIV, HVI, HVIII, 
HIX and HXI rejected. 
Additionally, in a selective comparative test, in which different 
specifications were used for different samples, HII, HIII and HVIII were 
rejected but HXI was not rejected. Finally, ANOVA was used to test 
whether significant differences exist among the three samples. Results 
indicate that there are no significant differences in the risk-adjusted 
return, rate of sales growth, deviations from historical EPS line, 
change in the coverage ratio, working capital policy and financing 
policy among the three samples. However, the null hypotheses of no 
difference among the three samples, with respect to investment policy 




·· The purpose of this study was to derive a dynamic model of financial 
management and carry out a positive study of: 
1. the priority scheme of firm goals, 
2. the priority scheme of firm financial policies in achievement 
of goals, 
3. the extent of activeness and effectivene~s of financial 
policies, and 
4. the effect of separation of ownership and control on 1, 2 and 3 
above. 
The objective was carried out by deriving such a model and applying it 
to pooled time.series and cross--sectional data for740 large U.S. firms 
over the period 1967 to 1975. The sample was then divided into three 
subsamples of strong owner control, weak owner control and management 
control, to carry out the comparative study of goal preference and 
policy preference of owner controlled and management controlled firms. 
The model included: (1) four goal variables (shareholder wealth 
maximization, sales growth maximization, earnings smoothing and 
liquidity), (2) four policy variables (investment policy, working 
capital policy, dividend policy and financing policy) and (3) two 
exogenous variables (level of interest rates and investment tax credit). 
Three different proxies were defined for the goal of shareholder wealth, 
115 
116 
and two different proxies were defined for earnings smoothing goal. 
This multiple proxy definition gave rise to six possible specif ica-
tions. All possible specifications were estimated for the three control 
groups as well as the entire sample. 
Regardless of the specification used, the following hypotheses 
could not be rejected: 
used: 
HI: Large U.S. firms have two important competing goals of 
profit maximization and sales maximization. 
HV: Investment policy is the most preferred policy of the firm. 
HVII: Dividend policy is an active policy. 
,HX: Financing policy is an active policy. 
The following hypotheses were rejected regardless of specification 
HII: Regardless of type of control, profit maximization is the 
dominant goal. 
HIII: The relative preference for sales maxtmization is greater 
for large management controlled firms than for large owner 
controlled firms. 
HVI: Dividend policy is an ineffective policy in attainment of 
goals. 
HVIII: Dividend policy is more active in management controlled 
firms than in owner controlled firms. 
HIX: Financing policy is an ineffective policy in attainment of 
goals. 
Reject, no-reject decision of two hypotheses were affected by the 
specification used. When the researcher used beta-adjusted return as 
a proxy for shareholder wealth maximization the following hypothesis 
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was not rejected: 
HXI: Financing policy is more active in management controlled firms 
than in owner controlled firms. 
For other specifications the hypothesis was rejected. When using beta-
adjusted return as a proxy for shareholder wealth maximization, and 
absolute deviations from the historical EPS line as a proxy for earnings 
smoothing goal, the following hypothesis was not rejected: 
~IV: Investment policy is the most effective policy of the firm. 
For all other specifications the hypothesis was rejected. 
An interesting phenomenon observed was that of the converse of HIII. 
To be specific, the researcher observed that sales maximization is the 
dominant goal for owner controlled firms and shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion is the dominant goal for management controlled firms. A possible 
explanation of this phenomenon is that while management controlled firms 
always face the. threat of a takeover, owner controlled firms are not 
under such pressure, or at least not by the same degree. Therefore, in 
order to thwart any takeover attempt, managers give shareholder wealth 
maximization goal top priority. Owner managers, on the other hand, 
being relatively immune from takeover threats, maximize sales growth 
subject to a minimum level of profits (6). 
A second interesting phenomenon observed is the fact that while 
financing policy is neither the most effective, ... nor the most active, 
in the management controlled firms, it is the most preferred policy 
variable for this group of firms. A possible explanation of this 
phenomerton is the incentive-signalling model (77) which asserts that 
managers use financing policy to transmit and validate information 
about their firms. Managers, being remote from owners, have a 
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preference for financing policy for signalling purposes. Owner managers, 
on the other hand, do not have to follow such an approach. 
Finally, it was argued, in Chapter IV, that it would be reasonable 
to assume that (1) owner managers would be concerned with total risk 
and only downward deviations from the historical EPS line, but (2) 
managers would be concerned with only the systematic risk and upward 
as well as downward deviations from the historical EPS line. When the 
researcher used different specifications, based on these assumptions, 
it was found that financing policy is more active in management con-
trolled firms than in owner controlled firms. This conclusion further 
reinforces the explanation of the second phenomenon above, i.e., 
incentive-signalling model. 
Further Discussion 
The work presented herein is a unique work in the sense that it is 
a thorough analysis and not a partial one. By constructing a general 
dynamic model of financial.management process the researcher was able 
to do a rather complete analysis of the interaction of firm goals and 
the firm's financial policies. An area was examined that had not been 
covered by previous researchers, i.e., priority ranking of firm goals 
and financial policies utilized in achieving firm goals. 
However, by no means would the researcher claim that this is the 
end of the road. Rather, it is hoped that this will be the beginning of 
studies of this kind to shed some more light on the complex issue of 
interaction of firm goals and policies, and the financial management 
process as a whole. 
This work and the testing of the hypotheses is, like any other 
empirical work, subject to one important critique that the researcher 
has; all the way, tested joint hypotheses. The hypotheses have been 
tested as stated and at the same time the researcher has implicitly 
tested the hypotheses that proxies used are efficient substitutes of 
goal, policy and exogenous variables. Therefore, there is plenty of 
room in this area to be worked on for improvements and refinements. 
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There should be comparative studies of this sort under different 
groupings of samples, e.g., by industries, by degree of regulation, by 
organizational structure, etc. There should be studies that incorporate 
further empirical refinements such as inclusion of nonfinancial firm 
goals and policies and better specification of variables to incorporate 
quality as well as quantity. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(1) Albin, Peter S. and Roger E. Alcaly. "Corporate Objectives.and 
the Economy: Systematic Shifts Between Growth and Profit· 
Goals." Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 10 (June, 1976), 
pp. 260-297. ~ 
(2) Ang, James S. "The Intertemporal Behavior of Corporate Debt 
Policy." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
Vol. 11 (November, 1976), pp. 555-566. 
(3) Ang, J. S., J. H. Chua, and C. Chastain. "A General Framework.for 
Positive Theories of Financial Management: The Interaction. 
of Financial Policies and Firm Goals." Working paper, 
Department of Administrative Sciences, Oklahoma·State 
University, 1977. 
(4) Anthony, Robert N. "The Trouble with Profit Maximizai:ion." 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. 38, No. 6 (November-December, 
1960), pp. 126-134. 
(5) Baker, Samuel H. "Executive Incomes, Profits and Revenues: A 
Comment on Functional Specification." Southern Ee.anomic. 
Journal, Vol. 35, No. 4 (April, 1969), pp. 379-383. 
(6) Baumol, W. J. Business Behavior Value and Growth. New York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1959. 
(7) Baumol, W. J., P. Heim, B. G. Malkiel, and R. E. Quandt •. 'iEarn-
ings Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm;" 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (November, 
1970), pp. 345-355. 
(8) Beedles, William L. "A Micro-Econometric Investigation of Mult~­
Objective Firms." Journal of Finance, Vol.. 32, No. 4 
(September, 1977), pp. 1217-1233. 
(9) Berle, A. A. Power Without Property. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and World, Inc., 1959. 
(10) Berle, A. A. and G. C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property. Revised Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Inc., 1968. 
(11) Boudreaux, Kenneth J. "Managerialism and Risk-Return Performance." 








Branch, Ben. "Corporate Objectives and Market Performance." 
Financial.Management, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1973), pp. 
24-29. 
121 
Breen, W. J. and E. M. Lerner. "Corporate Financial Strategies 
and'Market Measures of Risk and Return." Journal of Finan~e, 
Vol. 28, No. 2 (May, 1973), pp. 339-352. -
Burch, P.H., Jr. The Managerial Revolution Reassessed. 
Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1972. 
Chevalier, Jean-Marie. "The Problem of Control in Large American 
Corporations." Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 14 (Spring, 1969), 
pp. 163-180. 
Cohen, Kalman J. and Richard M. Cyert. Theory of the Firm. 
Second Edition. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1975. 
(17) Cox, S. R. and p, Shauger. "Executive Compensation, Firm Sales 
and Profitability." Intermountain Economic Review, Vol. 4 
(Spring, 1973), pp. 29-39. 
(18) Cyert, R. and C. Hedrick. "Theories of the Firm: Past, Present, 
and Future; an Interpretation." Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 10 (June, 1972), pp. 398-412. 
(19) Cyert, R. M. and J. G. March. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. 
Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963. 
(20) Donaldson, Gordon. "Financial Goals: Management vs. Stock-
holders." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 (May-June, 
1963), pp. 116-129. 
(21) Dyckman, Thomas R. and James C. Kinard. "The Discounted Cash Flow 
Investment Decision Model with Accounting Income Constraints." 
Decision Sciences, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July, 1973), pp. 301-313. 
(22) Edwards, Franklin R. ''Managerial Objectives in Regulated 
Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking." 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 85 (February, 1977), pp. 
147-162. 
(23) Edwards, F. R. and A. A. Heggestad. "Uncertainty, Market Structure 
and Performance: The Galbraith-Caves Hypothesis and 
Managerial Motives in Banking." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3 (August, 1973), pp. 455-473. 
(24) Elliott, J. W. "Control, Size, Growth and Financial Performance 
in the Firm." Journal of Finance and Quantitative Analysis, 
Vol. 7, No. 1 (January, 1972), pp. 1309-1320. 
122 
(25) Fama, E., L. Fisher, M. Jensen, and R. o. Roll. "The Adjustment 
of Stock Prices to New Information." International Economic 
Review, Vol. 10 (February, 1969), pp. 1-21. 
(26) Findlay, I. I., M. Chapman, and G. A. Whitmore. "Beyond Share-
holder Wealth Maximization<. 11 . Financial Management, Vol. 3, 
No. 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 25-35. 
(27) Findlay, M. and E. Williams. "Capital Allocation and the Nature 
of Ownership Equities." Financial Managemertt, Vol. l,.No. 2 
(Summer, 1972), pp. 68-76. 
(28). Friedman, Milton. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
(29) Gordon, R. A. Business Leadership in the Large Corporation. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961. 
(30) Grabowski, Henry G. and Dennis C. Mueller. ''Managerial and Stock-
holder Welfare Models of Firm Expenditures." Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 54 (February, 1972), pp:- 9-24. 
(31) Grossman, S. J. and J. E. Stiglitz. "On Value Maximization and 
Alternative Object.ives of the Firm." Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (May, 1977), pp. 389-402. ~ 
(32) Haley, Charles W. and Lawrence D. Schall. The Theory of Financial 
Decisions. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973. 
(33) Hall, Marshall and Leonard Weiss. "Firm Size and Profitability." 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 49, No. 3· (August, 
1967)' pp. 319-331. 
(34) Handbook of Cyclical Indicators. Supplement to the Business 
Conditions Digest. Washington, D. C.: U. S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economics and Analysis, 1977. 
(35) Hindley, Brian V. "Separation of Ownership and Control in the 
Modern Corporation." Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 13 
No. 1 (April, 1970), pp. 185-221.- -
(l6) Holl, Peter. "Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control 
in Large U.S. Corporations." Journal of Industrial Economics, 
Vol. 25, No. 4 (June, 1977), pp. 259-273. 
(37). Holl, Peter. "Effect of Control Type on the Performance of the 
Firm in the U.S." Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 23 
(June, 1975), pp. 257-271. 
(38) Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: 
.Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 (1976), pp. 305-360. 
123 
(39) K.amerschen, David R. "The Influence of Ownership and Control on 
Profit Rates." American Economic Review, Vol. 58 (June, 
1968), pp. 432-447. . 
(40) Kaysen, <;. "The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?" The 
Corporation in Modern Society. Ed. E. S. Mason. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1960. 
(41) Koshal, R. K., S. B. Prasad, and R. K. Jain. "Executives' 
Remuneration Maximization Behavior: Some Further Evidence." 
Atlantic Economic Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March, 1977), pp. 
65-68. 
(42) Larner, Robert J, Management Control and the Large Corporation. 
New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1970. 
(43) Larner, Robert J. "Ownership and Control in the 200 Largest 
Nonfinancial Corporations, 1929 and 1963." American Economic 
Journal, Vol. 56 (September; 1966), pp. 777-787. 
(44) Lerner, Eugene M. and Alfred Rappaport. "Limit DCF in Capital 
Budgeting." Harvard Business Review, Vol. 46, No. 5 
(September-October, 1968), pp. 133-139 .. 
(45) Lewellen, W. G. Executive Compensation in Large Industrial 
Corporations. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1968. 
(46) Lewellen, Wilbur G. "Management and Ownership in the Large 
Firm." Journal of Finance, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May, 1969), pp. 
299-322. 
(47) Lewellen,, W. G. The Own.ership Income of Management. New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1971. 
(48) Lewellen, W. and B. Huntsman. "Managerial Pay and Corporate 
Performance." American Economic Review, Vol. 60 (September, 
1970), pp. 710-720. 
(49) Little, I. M. D. "Higgledy Piggledy Growth." Oxford Institute of 
Statistics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November, 1962), pp. 387-'-412. 
(50) Mabry, Benars D. and David L. Siders. "An Empirical Test of the 
Sales Maximization Hypothesis." Southern Economic Journal, 
Vol. 33, No. 3 (January, 1967), pp. 367-377. 
(51) Machlup, F. "Theories of the Firm; Marginalist, Behavioral, 
Managerial." American Economic Review, Vol. 57 (March, 
1967), pp. 1-33. 
(52) McEachern, William A. "Corporate Control and Risk." Economic 
Inquiry, Vol. 14 (June, 1976), pp. 270-278. 
124 
(53) McGuire, J. W., J. S. Y. Chiu, and A. D. Elbing. "Executive 
Incomes, Sales and Profits." American Economic Review, Vol. 
52 (September, 1962), pp. 753-761. 
(.54) McKean, John R. and John J. Kania. "An Industry Approach to Owner-
Manager Control and Profit Performance." Journal of Business, 
Vol. 51, No. 2 (1978), pp. 327-341. 
(55) Manne, Henry. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control." 
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72 (April, 1965), pp. 110-
120. 
(56) Marris, Robin. 
New York: 
The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism. 
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 
(57) Marris, Robin and Adrian Wood. The Corporate Economy. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
(58) Mason, Edward S. "The Apologetics of Managerialism." The Journal 
of Business, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January, 1958), pp. 1-11. 
(59) Masson, Robert T. "Executive Motivations, Earnings and Consequent 
Equity Performance." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 79 
(November-December, 1971), pp."""1278-1292. 
(60) Melcher, R. W., D. F. Rush, and D. N. Winn. "Degree of Industry 
Concentration and Market Risk-Return Performance." Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 11 (November, 
1976), pp. 627-635. 
(61) Miller, M. H. and F. Modigliani. "Dividend Policy, Growth and the 
Valuation of Shares." Journal .£[ Business~ Vol. 34 (October, 
196L), pp. 411-433. 
(62) Mingo, John. "Managerial Motives, Market Structures and the 
Performance of Holding Company Ban.ks." Economic Inquiry, 
Vol. 13 (September, 1975), pp. 411-424. 
(63) Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. "Corporate Income, Taxes and the 
Cost of Capital: A Correction." American Economic Review, 
Vol. 63 (June, 1973), pp. 433-443. 
(64) Modigliani, F. and M. Miller. "Some Estimates of the Cost of 
Capital to the Electric Industry, 1954-57." American 
Economic Journal, Vol. 56 (June, 1966), pp. 333-391. 
(65) Monsen, R. J., Jr. and A. Downs. "A Theory of Large Manager 
Firms." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73 (June, 1965), 
pp. 221-236. 
(66) Monsen, R. J., J. S. Chiu, and D. E. Cooley. "The Effect of 
Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of 
the Large Firm." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 82 
(August, 1968), pp. 435-451. 
(67) Nan tell, T. J. and C. R. Carlson. "The Cost of Capital as a 
Weighted Average." Journal of Finance, Vol. 30, No. 5 
(December, 197 5), pp. 1343-1355. 
125 
(68) Nerlove, Marc. "Factors Affecting Differences Among Rates of 
Return on Investments in Individual Common Stocks." Review 
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August, 1968), 
pp. 312-331. 
(69) Osteryoung, Jerome S. "A Survey into the Goals Used by Fortune's 
500 Companies in Capital Budgeting Decisions." Akron 
Business and Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Fall, 1973), pp. 
34-35. 
(70) Palmer, John. "The Profit Variability Effects of the Managerial 
Enterprise." Western Economic Journal, Vol. 11 (June, 1973), 
pp. 228-231. 
(71) Palmer, John. "The Profit-Performance Effects of the Separation 
of Ownership from Control in Large U.S. Industrial Corpora-
tions." Bell Journal £!.. Economics and Management Science, 
Vol. 4 (Spring, 1973), pp. 293-303. 
(72) Palmer, John P. "The Separation of 
U.S. Industrial Corporations." 
and Business, Vol. 12 (Autumn, 
Ownership from Control in Large 
Quarterly Review of Economics 
1972), pp. 55-62. 
(73) Peterson, Shorey. "Corporate Control and Capitalism." Quarterly 
Journal£!._ Economics, Vol. 79, No. 1 (February, 1965), pp. 
1-24. 
(74) Pettit, R. R. "The Impact of Dividend and Earnings Announcements: 
A Reconciliation." Journal £!._ Business, Vol. 49, No. 1 
(1976), pp. 86-106 .. 
(75) Radice, H. K. "Control Type, Profitability and Growth in Large 
Firms: An Empirical Study." Economic Journal, Vol. 81, No. 
3 (September, 1971), pp. 547-562. 
(76) Rees, R. "A Reconsideration of the Expense Preference Theory of 
the Firm." Economica, Vol. 41, No. 163 (August, 1974), pp. 
295-307. 
(77) Ross, Stephen A. "Some Notes on Financial Incentive--Signalling 
Models, Activity Choice and Risk Preferences." Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 33, No. 3 (June, 1978), pp. 777-792. 
(78) Scott, David F., Jr. "Evidence on the Importance of Financial 
Structure." Financial Management, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Summer, 
1972), pp. 45-50. 
126 
(79) Sharpe, W. F. and H. B. Sossin. "Closed-End Investment Companies 
in the United States: Risk and Return." European Finance 
Association, 1974Proceedings. Ed. B. Jacqwillant. 
New York: North Holland, 1975. 
(80) Simon, H. A. "Theories of Decision Making in Economics and 
Behavioral Science." American Economic Review, Vol. 49 
(June, 1959), pp. 253-283. 
(81) Smyth, David J., W. J, Boyes, and D. E. Peseau. Size, Growth, 
Profits and Executive Compensation in the Large Corporation. 
New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975. 
(82) Sommerfeld, Ray M., H. M. Anderson, and H. R. Block. An Introduc-
tion!!?. Taxation. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1977. 
(83) Stekler, H. O. "The Variabi.lity of Profitability with Size of 
Firm, 1947-1958." American Statistical Association Journal, 
Vol. 59, No. 308 (December, 1964), pp. 1183-1193. 
(84) Stewart, Douglas and William Love. "A General Canonical Correla-
tion Index. 11 Psychological Bul-letin, Vol. 70, No .• 3 (1968), 
pp. 160-163. 
(85) Stonehill, Arthur, et al. "Financial Goals and Debt Ratio 
Determinants: A Survey of Practice in Five Countries. 11 
Financial Management, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975), pp. 
27-41. 
(86) Sullivan, Timothy G. "Market Power, Profitability, and Financial 
Leverage." Journal of Finance, Vol. 29, No. 5 (December, 
1974), pp. 1407-1414~. 
(87) Tatham, R. L. and R. J. Dornoff. 
tion of Canonical Analysis." 
(1973), pp. 343-349. 
"The Significance and Interpreta-
Decision Sciences, Vol. 4 
(88) Theil, Henri; Principles of Econometrics. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., 1971. 
(89) Turnovsky, Stephen J. "The Allocation of Corporate Profits 
Between Dividends and Retained Earnings." Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (November, 1967), pp:- 583-589. 
(90) Whittington, G. "The Profitability of Retained Earnings." Review 
of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 54, No. 2 (May, 1972), pp. 
152-160. 
(91) Williamson, John. "Pro.fit, Growth and Sales Maximization." 
Economica, Vol. 33, No. 129 (February, 1966), pp. 1-16. 
(92) Williamson, Oliver. "Corporate Control and the Theory of the 
Firm." Economic Policy and the Regulation of Securities. 
Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1968. 
(~j} Williamson, O. The Economics £!._Discretionary Behavior: 
Managerial Objectives in ~Theory £!._the Firm. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964. 
(94) Williamson, Oliver E. "Managerial Discretion and Business 
Behavior." American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (December, 
1963), pp. 1032-1057. 
127 
(95) Wong, Robert E. "Profit Maximization and Alternative Theories: A 
Dynamic Reconciliation." American Economic Review, Vol. 65, 




ESTIMATED STRUCTURE, REACTION EQUATIONS 
129 
130 
The key for the tables in this Appendix is given below. The same 
key applies to the tables in Appendix B. 
Gl: Shareholder wealth goal 
G2: Sales goal 
G3: Earnings smoothing goal 
G4: Liquidity goal 
Pl: Investment policy 
P2: Working capital policy 
P3: Dividend policy 
P4: Financing policy 
Zl: Level of interest rates 
Z2: Investment tax credit 
SS: Sum of squares 
d.f.: Degrees of freedom 
MS: Mean square 
d: Durbin-Watson statistic 
f.d.a.: First degree autocorrelation 
*: Significant at five percent level 
TABLE II 
BAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl,t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G 3,t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl = 1. 265* -0.032 -0.104* -0.024 -0.060* 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 
G2 = 0.115* 0.095* 0.040* -0.023 -0.013 -0.013* 0.015* 0.000 -0.000 
G3 >= 0.335 -0.110 0.044 0.116 0.064 0.292* 0.367* -0.004 -0.004 
G4 = 0.565 0.072 0.153 0.239 0.053 -0.001 -0.006 -0.681* -0. 318* 
Pl = 0.113* 0.101* 0.075* 0.057* 0.094 -0.010* 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
P2 = 0.325* -0.020 0.037* 0.014 0.034 0.001 -0;002 -0.001 -0 .. 000 
P3 = 0.329* 0.320* 0.059* 0.268* 0.004 -0.014* 0.018* -0.001 -0.005* 






3,t p4 t 
p 







0.050* -0.032 0.131* -0.029 -0.027 -0.007 -0.019 -0.007 -0.054* 0.042* 
0.229* 0.004 0.029* -0.045* 0.114* 0.013 0.054* 0.009 -0.038* 0.004 
-0.496* -0.119* -0.007 0.638* 0.029 0.127* -0.187* -0.143* 0.054 0.089 
- 0.343 0.048 -0. 313 +0.209 -0.231 +0.076 0.062 0.124 0.149 0 .15.7 
0.069* 0.006 0.017 0.019 -0.001 -0.002 
-0.007 -0.017 -0.318* -0.142* -0.032* -0.009 
-0.012 -0.046* +0.018 0.023 0.110* -0.056* 
0.052* 0.031* 0.082* 0.048* -0.006 0.008 
P4 t-1 p4 t-2 z 1 t 21,t-1 z l,t-2 z 2,t 22,t-1 22,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.018 0.012 -8.110* -2.450* -5.960* -40.249* -14.469* -28.830* 0.4341 2.0686 -0.0368 
0.180* 0.010 0.358* -0.123 -0.522* +0.065 +0.337 -1. 239 0.3179 1. 9973 0.0013 
0.024 0.004 -0.199 -0.344 -0.332 -1.658 -1. 629 -2.804 0.3026 2.1522 -0.0762 
0.269 -0.089 -2.749 -2.149 -2.165 -16.829 -10.040 -13.187 0.3251 2.1764 -0.0882 
-0.050* -0.059* -0.072 -0.006 -0.246 -1.156 -0.328 -1.009 0.0654 1. 9821 0.0089 
-0.027 0.021 -1.905* -0.468* -1.528* -9.373* -2.827* -7 .142* 0.1251 1.9965 0.0017 
-0.065* -0.067* -1.151 -0. 616* -2.292* -8.905* -3.051* -8.451* 0.1784 1. 9301 0.0345 




BAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3,t-l G G4,t-l G4,t-2 , _____ -- ' - --- - - __ , ____________ ,_ -- - 3,t-2 
Gl = 1.254* -0.025 -0.083* -0.025 -0.055* -0.032* -0.025* 0.001 0.001 
G2 .. 0.107* 0.097* 0.048* -0.030 -0.012 -0.007* -0.022* . -0.000 -0.000 
G3 = --0.142 0.363* 0.094 0.102 -0.282* 0.202* 0.028 0.005 0.002 
G4 = 0.572 0.080 0.150 0.245 0.050 -0.006 0.018 -0.681* -0.318* 
Pl = 0.105* 0.101* 0.075* 0.052* 0.091* 0.009 :...0.004 -0.002 . +0.001 
P2 = 0.326* -0.016 0.040* 0~016 0.034 -0.008 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
P3 = 0.309* 0.308* 0.062* 0.250* 0.005 0.016* -0.033* -0.001 -0.005* 
P4 = -0.124* -0.003 +o.016 -0.050* -0.053* 0.001 -0.002 0.001 o.ooo 
p p . p p p . p p p p p l,t 2,t 3,t 4,t l,t-1 l,t-2 2,t-1 2,t-2 3,t-1 3,t-2 
0.056* -0.036* 0.128* -0.034 -0.009 -0.008 -0.021 -0.005 -0.041* 0.051* 
0.232* 0.002 0.027* -0.047* 0.125* 0.015 0.054* 0.011 -0.033* 0.009 
0.680* 0.006 0.297* -0.815* -0.272* -0.128* 0.123 0.156* -0.053 -0.031 
-0.341 0.047 -0.309 0.207 -0.232 0.072 0.064 0.124 0.147 0.154 
0.069* 0.008 0.017 0.019 -0.002 -0.001 
-0~005 -0.019 -0.318* -0.142* -0.030 -0.009 
-0.007 -0.038* 0.017 0.023 0.112* -0.050* 
0.052* 0.032* 0.082* 0.048* -0.007 0.007 
·. 2 
P4 t~1 P4 t-2 zl t zl t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-~ R d f.d.a. 
-0.038 0.006 -8.172* -2.412* -6.059* -40.740* -14.563* -29.245* 0.4461 2 .• 0661 -0.0335 
0.169* 0.007 0.347* -0.098 -0.547* -0.071 +0.323 -1.347* 0.3257 1.9962 0.0018 
0.136 0.126 -0.002 0.162 -1.932* -3.623 0.485 -4.599 0.1373 1. 9914 0.0062 
0.267 -0.086 -2. 771 -2.179 -2.203 -17.010 -10.141 -13.345 0.3251 2.1765 -0.0882 
-0.050* -0.060* -0.044 -0.004 -0.207 -0.984 -0.282 -0.870 0.0650 1.9814 0.0093 
-0.031 0.021 . -1. 926* -0.472* -1.560* -9.526* -2.878* -7.274* 0.1256 1.9955 0.0022 
-0.066* -0.072* -1..090* -0.560* -2.199* -8.492* -2.866* -8.090* 0.1835 1. 9388 0.0302 




MVAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl = 160.378* -0.202* -0.020 6.220 -0.897* -0.475 -0.676 -0.049 0.035 
G2 '"' 0.053 0.001* o.ooo 0.001 -0.011 -0.015* 0.015* -0.000 -0.001 
G3 = 0.319 -0.001 -0.000 0.126 0.080 0.294* 0.364* -0.003 -0.004 
G4 = 0.581 0.001 o.ooo 0.277 0.074 -0.002 -0.011 -0.681* -0.318* 
Pl = 0.062 0.001* 0.001* 0.091* 0.098* -0.013* 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
P2 = 0.258* -0.001* +0.000 0.031 0.040 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 -0.000 
P3 = 0.271* 0.002* 0.001* 0.330* -0.001* -0.024* 0.022* -0.002 -0.005* 
P4 = -0.139* -0.000 +0.000 -0.046 -0.053* 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 
TABLE V 
MVAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 G 1 t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl .. 157.515* -0;199;, -0.007 6.755 -9.673* -2.722* -1. 569* -0.065 0.018 
G2 = 0.035 0.001* 0.000 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.023* -0.000 -0.001 
G3 = -0.132 0.003* 0.002* 0.124 -0.303* +0.209* 0.024 0.004 0.002 
G4 = 0.587 0.001 o.ooo 0.285 0.068 -0.002 0.022 -0.681* -0.318* 
Pl = 0.050 0.001* 0.001* 0.084* 0.095* 0.013* -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 
P2 = 0.255* 0.001* +0.000 0.034 0.040 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
P3 = 0.241* 0.002* 0.001* 0.305* -0.001 0.026* -0.039* -0.002 -0.006* 
P4 = -0.135* -0.000 0.000 -0.047* -0.053* 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
p p p p p p p p p p 
1 t 2 t 3 t 4,t l,t-1 l~t-2 2 t-1 2 t-2 3 t-1 3 t-2 
5.268 1. 755 13.938* -0.197 -2.652 -0.847 -1.260 -2.936 -3.697* 1.807 
0.247* 0.003 0.044* -0.054* 0.126* 0.011 0.052* 0.007 -0.026* 0.008 
0.706* 0.016 0.328 -'0.824* -0.269* -0.126* 0.121 0.152* -0.062 -0.045 
-0.327 0.059 -0.304 0.208 -0.217 0.071 0.067 0.120 0.159 0.157 
0.073* 0.004 0.015 0.015 0.006 -0.003 
-0.004 -0.022 -0.328* -0.145* -0.022 -0.007 
-0.005 -0.046* 0.010 0.016 0.120* -0.061* 
0.053* 0.032 0.083* 0.047* -0.006 0.007 
2 
P4 t-1 P4 t-2 zl t zl,t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 R d f .d.a. 
-1.074 -4.113 -1050.208* -325.216* -716.038* -5039.937* -1866.729* -3508.961* o.·4673 2.0795 -0.0402 
0.168* 0.003 0.667* 0.028 -0.096 1.965* 1.085* 0.480 0.3076 2.0034 -0.0018 
0.130 0.110 -0.311 0.259 -2.119* -4.674 0.519 -5.316 0.1368 1. 9908 o .. o064 
0.256 -0.093 -2.736 -2.418 -2.178 -17.551 -10.887 -13.522 0.3250 2.1746 -0.0873 
-0.054* -0.068* 0.195 0.105 0.128 0.522 0.291 0.500 0.0538 1.9802 0.0099 
-0.031 0.019 -1.563* -0.333 -1.128* -7.364* -2.088* -5.455* 0.1265 1. 9973 0.0013 
-0.072* -0.088* -0.893* -0.408* -1. 784* -6.836* -2.052* -6.444* 0.1502 1. 9931 0.0331 





VAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t,.-1 · G4 t-2 
Gl - 13.603* -0.071* 0.094* 0.326 -0.847* 0.011 -0.105 -0.003 0.002 
G2 = 0.041 0.003* 0.000 0.006 -0.011 -0.015* 0.015* -0.000 ... 0.001 
G3 = 0.317 -0.010 -0.007 0.122 0.081 0.294* 0.364* -0.003 -0.00l 
G4 = 0.468 0.004 -0.006 0.303 0.079 -0.004 -0.011 -0.681* -0.318* 
Pl . z 0.028 0.004* 0.006* 0.100* 0.099* -0.013* 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
P2 = 0. 272* -0.005* -0.001 0.028 0.042 0.000 -0.003 "'-0.001 -0.000 
P3 = 0.155* 0.015* 0.005* 0.362* 0.002 -0.025* 0.023* -0.002 -0.006* 
P4 : -0.136* -0.000 0.003 -0.047 -0.053* 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.000 
pl t p 2,t p3 t p4 t pl t-1 pl t-2 p 2 t-1 > p2 t-2 p3 t-1 
p 
3,t-2 
0.181 0.414* 0.810* 0.297 -0.324 0.133 0.210 -0.268 -0.341* -0.036 
0.245* 0.004 0.048* -0.053* 0.115* 0.007 0.05(1* 0.005 -0.030* 0.002 
-0.497* -0.120* -0.018 0.641* 0.035 0.126* -0.183* -0.143* 0.063 0.097 
-0.316 0.053 -0.294 0.202 -0.218 0.066 0.061 0.117 0.174 0.164 
0.072* -0.001 -0.013 -0.012 0.011 -0.005 
-0.005 -0.020 -0.317* -0.145* -0.025* -0.007 
-0.015 -0.065* 0.004 0.011 0.133* -0.07C* 
0.054* 0.032* 0. 082>'• 0.047* -0.006 0.008 
p4 t-1 p4 t-2 z1 t 21 t-1 21 r-2 22 t 22 t-1 z 2,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
0.023 -0.293 -85. 877* -28. 591* -62. 713* -421. 219* -157.964* -301.240* 0.3794 2.0504 -0.0257 
0.179* 0.007 0.698* -0.007 -0.043 +2.180* 1.105* 0.673* 0.3013 2.0062 -0.0032 
0.024 0.007 0 .04.6 .,-0.412 -0.132 -0.780 -1.646 -2.042 0.3026 2.1530 -0.0766 
0.260 -0.093 -2.115 -2.217 -1.388 -13.869 -9.566 -10.332 0.3250 2.1744 -0.0872 
-0.055* -0.068* 0.301 0.161 0.263 1.216 0.600 1.098 0.0535 1.9822 0.0088 
-0.027 0.020 -1.603* -0.385* -1.182* -7.681* -2.275* -5.699* 0.1259 1. 9999 -0.COOO 
-0.072* -0.083* -0.451 -0.257 -1.221* -4.087* -0.992 -4.101* 0.1284 1.9191 0.0402 





VAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--THE ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl,t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3,t-l. G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl = 13.400* -0.069* 0.013* 0.406 -0.829* -0.218* -0.047 -0.004 0.001 
G2 "' 0.023 0.003* 0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.023* -0.000 -0.001 
G3 = -0.256 0.027* 0.019* 0.155 -0.299* 0.211* 0.021 0.004 0.002 
G4 = 0.469 0.005 -0.007 0.309 0.073 0.001 0.021 -0.681* -0.318* 
Pl = 0.017 0.004* 0.006* 0.092* 0.096* 0~014* -0.006 -0.002 0.000 
P2 = 0.269* -0.005* -0.001 0.032 0.042 -0.007 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 
P3 = 0.130* 0.014* 0.005* 0.333* 0.002 0.029* -0.042* -0.002 -0.006* 
P4 = -0.131* -0.000 0.002 -0.049* .. o.053* 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
p 
l,t p2 t p3 t P4 t pl t-1 pl t-2 
p . 
2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 p3 t-2 
0.250 0.393* 0.815* 0.240 -0.227 0.103 0.192 -0.263 0.246 0.016 
0.249* 0.003 0.046* -0.055* 0.126* 0.010 0.051* 0.006 -0.024* 0.008* 
0.714* 0.015 0.345* -0.832* -0.271* -0.131* 0.111 0.144* -0.048 -0.044 
-0.313 0.053 -'0.288 0.199 -0.222 0.063 0.062 0.118 0.171 0.160 
0.073* 0.003 0.013 0.013 0.009 -0.003 
-0.003 -0.022 -0.317* -0.145* -0.023 -0.006. 
-0.009 -0.053* 0.004 0.012 0.132* -0.061* 
-0.053* 0.032* 0.083* 0.047* -0.006 0.007 
P4 t-1 P4 t-2 21 t 21,t-1 21 t-2 22 t 22,t-1 
z 2,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.110 -0.342 -85.728* -28.231* -62.642* -421.039* -157.626* -307.123* 0.3821 2.0505 -0.0208 
0.168* 0.003 0.730* 0.032 -0.013 2.306* 1.175* 0.787 0.3071 2.0050 -0.0027 
0.128 0.107 0.261 0.464 -1. 355 -1.147 1. 794 -2.266 0.1358 1.9911 0.0043 
0.261 -0.090 -2.114 -2.242 -1.387 -13.868 -0.609 -10.344 0.3250 2.1744 -0.0872 
-0.053 -0.070 0.340 0.175 0.319 1.462 0.666 1. 296 0.0533 1. 9812 0.0093 
-0.031 0.020 -1. 605* -0.381* -1.188* ..:7. 711* -2.282* -5. 724* 0.1262 1. 9991 0.0004 
-0.071* -0.089* -0.363 -0.195 -1.097* -3.531* -0.788 -3.633* 0.1374 1. 9317 0.0039 




BAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl '"' -0.967* 0.021 -0.141* +0.046 -0.150 +0.021 -0.016 0.002 0.002 
G2 z -0.007 0.103* 0.037 0.050 -0.042 -0.012 0.029* -0.000 -0.001 
G3 = 0.845* 0.104 0.114 0.029 -0.082 0.287* 0.371* -0.003 -0.001 
G4 = 4.232 0.911 -0.096 1.363 0.159 -0.354 0.127 -0.679* -0.339* 
Pl = 0.193* 0.071* 0.060* -0.014 0.101* -0.025* 0.004 -0.001 0.002 
P2 = 0.101 -0.003 0.017 0.030 0.105 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 
P3 = 0.655* 0.543 0.003 0.693* -0.355* -0.070* 0.104* 0.000 -0.007* 
P4 = -0.067 0.005 0.055* -0.091 -0.089 0.009 0.025* 0.001 0.001 
pl t p2 t P3 t P4 t pl t-1 pl t-2 P· 2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 p3 t-2 
-0.043 -0.043 0.078* 0.041 0.078 0.025 -0.044 -0.006 -0.042 0.043 
+0.136* -0.006 +0.014 0.096* 0.095* 0.051 -0.042 0.034 -0.013 -0."004 
-0.351 -0.237 0.135* +0.458* -0.063 -0.140 -0.159 -0 .237 0.068 0.013 
-1. 983 +0.842 -0.526 0.758 -0.496 o. 718 -0.310 0.915 0.227 -0.222 
0.225* 0.008 0.077* -0.013 0.006 0.002 
-0.051 0.020 -0.358* -0.296* -0.012 -0.005 
0.004 0.028 -0.219* 0.272* 0.087* -0.026 
0.080* 0.004 0.055 0.153* -0.013 +0.013 
p 
4,t-1 p4 t-2 zl t z1 t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.071 -0.008 -6.032* -1.632* -4.580* -30.440* -10.240* -22.830* 0.3359 2.0262 -0.0152 
0.098* 0.079* 1.009* 0.014 0.088 3.450 1.540 1.153 0.4025 2.0128 -0.0092 
0.175 0.066 -2.509 -1.471 -2. 719 -15.180 -5.690 -14.141 0.3380 2.0256 -0. 0130 
+0.697 -0.293 -21. 300 -16.690 -16.890 -129.860 -76.400 -91.200 0.3540 2.1568 -0.0784 
-0.039 -0.002 -.0. 547 -0.361 -0.661 -3.010 -1. 240 -2.370 0.2148 1.9349 0.0323 
0.011 -0.043 -0.934 +0.018 -0.368 -3.640 -0.495 -1.985 0.2212 1.8947 0.0521 
+0.070 -0.050 -2.749* -1.456 -3.987* -18.603* -7.016* -16.467* 0.2630 1.8759 0.0599 
























BAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
G G G G G G G G lt-1 lt-2 2t-l 2t-2 3t~l~ _____ l_,t-2 4,t-1 4,t-2 
+0.011 -0.124* +0.110 -0.132 -0.104* -0.003 +0.002 +0.002 
+0.094* +0.039* +0.037 -0.023 -0.011 -0.043* -0.000 -0.001 
0.267* 0.005 0.263 -0.128 0.242* 0.036 0.005 -0.000 
0.942 -0.135 1.042 0.144 0.336 -0.123 -0.680* -0.340* 
0.070* 0.057* -0.047 0.107* 0.030* ;...0.015 -0.001 +0.002 
0.000 0.017 0.027 0.101 0.010 0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
0.509* -0.014 0.538* ;...0.302* 0.104* -0.151* 0.000 -0.007* 
0.001 0.054* -0.088 -0.087 -(}. 008 -0.014 0.001 0.001 
p p p p p p p p p . p 


























































0.027 -0.024 0.019 -0.035 0.048 
0.051* -0.030 0.042 -0.009 0.000 
0.103 0.037 0.181 -0.020 -0.100 
0. 772 -0.262 0.928 0.207 -0. 218 
0.014 -0.076* 0.014 0.006 0.003 
0.022 -0.359* -0.296* -0.013 -0.006 
-0.021 0.232* 0.268* 0.093* -0.018 
-0.004 0.057 0.149* -0.013 0.013 
z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-30.S99* -10.210* -23.300* 0.3678 2.0327 -0.0186 
3.461 1.616* 1.266 0.4253 2.0134 -0.0097 
8.642 4.325 4.470 0.1960 2. 9118 0.0438 
-123.068 -74.939 -85.680 0.3541 2.1562 -0.0781 
-2.444 -1.129 -1.860 0.2152 1.9437 0.0278 
-3.442 -0.475 -1.853 0.2214 1. 8952 0.9519 
-17.270* -6.610* -14.990* 0.2790 1.8616 0.0674 





MVAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent . G G G 

































-13.931 0.471 -1.889 0.028 0.066 
-0.037 -0.013 +0.029* -0.001 -0.001 
-0.048 0.286* 0.370* -0.003 -0.001 
0.179 -0.360 0.127 -0.681* -0.339* 
+0.103* -0.026* 0.005 -0.001 +0.002 
0.122* -0.008 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 
-0.410* -0.084* 0.119* -0.002 -0.007* 
-0.088 0.009 0.025* 0.001 0.000 
p p p p p p p p p p 














7 .112 0.424 9.014 4.218 -3.423 -4.670 -0.722 
0.006 0.026* 0.109* 0.097* 0.051 -0.049 +o.026 
-0.221 0.140* 0.476* -0.054 -0.151 -0.153 -0.251 
0.897 -0.440 0.888 -0.482 o. 716 -0.381 0.878 
+0.230* +o.009 -0.084* +0.006 
-0.044 +O. 013 -0.356* -0.300* 
-0.013 -0.018 0.170 0.248* 
0.081* . 0.006* 0.053 0.148* 
p z z z z z z. 
4,t-2 !.~ . ____ _l_._!:.=.L ___ _L.t-2 2 t 2 t-1 2 t-2 
4.983 -691.558* .-220.039* -513 .137* -3424.909* -1225.980* -2534.793* 
+0.074* 1.140* 0.063 0.305 4.265* 1.832* 1.966 
0.061 -1. 817 -1. 281 -1.893 -11. 399 -4.490 -10.770 
-0.316 -21-.470 -17.010 -16.760 -131. 600 -77.500 -91.700 
-0.008 -0.473 -0.311 -0.522 -2.472 -1. 003 -1. 830 
-0.044 -0.668 0.059 -0.074 -2.319 -0.138 -0.799 
-0.086 -2.200 -1.049 -2.820* -13 .900 -4.600 -11. 900* 








-0. 013 0.011 
R-2--
d f.d.a. 
0.3170 1.9959 0.0020 
0.3909 2.0144 -0.0096 
0.3369 2.0285 -0.0145 
0.3547 2.1565 -0.0783 
0.2099 1.9484 +0.0254 
0.2231 1.8969 0.0521 
0.1984 1.8830 0.0566 




MVAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept G l,t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl = 108.370* +0.005 -0.006 8.095 -13.030 -8.250* 0.620 0.003 0.068 
G2 - -0.070 +0.001* o.ooo -0.070 -0.018 -0.011 -0.043* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 .. -0.463 0.003* 0.001 0.260 -0.164 0.236* 0.043 0.004 -0.000 
G4 · '"' 3.974 +o.010 -0.004 1.211 0.154 0.345 -0.114 -0.681* -0.340* 
Pl ,. 0.142 0.001* 0.001* -0.015 0.109* 0.030* -0.016 :...0.001 +0.001 
P2 = 0.052 -0.000 -0.000 +0.049 +0.118* +0.012 +0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
P3 "' 0.397 +0.003* -0.000 0.741* -0.342* 0.116* -0.177* -0.001 -0.008* 
P4 "' -0.077 -0.000 0.001* -0.074 -0.086 -0.010 -0.015 +0.001 0.000 
p 
1 1 t 
p 
2,t p3 t 
p 
4,t pl t-1 Pl,t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 p3 t-2 
-2.594 8.460 5.690* 7.160 5.170 -2.950 -2. 770 +1. 660 -3.860 3.244 
0.155* 0.012 0.024* 0.108* 0.111* 0.051 -0.036 0.034 -0.007 o.ooo 
0.486* 0.014 0.014· -0.764* -0.042 0.119 0.013 0.178 -0.033 -0.102 
-1.884 0.883 -0.446 0.849 -0.415 o. 769 -0.338 0.886 0.217 -0.211 
+0.240* 0.016 -0.082* 0.008 0.007 0.002 
-0.044 +0.016 -0.358* -0.300* -0.007 -0.005 
0.032 -0.011 0.190 0.246* 0.108* -0.025 
0.076 -0.002 0.056 0.145* -0.013 +0.012 
P4 t-1 p4 t-2 zl,t zl t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-1 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-9. 770 3.410 -688.336* -212. 712* -512.626* -3445.823* -1216.875* -2559.839* 0.3377 2.0033 -0.0017 
0.088* 0.069* 1.166* 0.127 0.368 4.379* 1.951* 2.162 0.4131 2.0158 -0.0106 
-0.123 0.010 1.354 1.234 -1.064 4.794 3.143 1.264 0.1994 1. 9153 0.0420 
0.731 -0.287 -20.260 -16.750 -15.270 -124.370 -75.900 -85.800 0.3544 2.1563 -0.0782 
-0.038 '-0.008 -0.039 -0.288 -0~384 -1.878 -0.884 -1. 300 0.2099 1. 9551 0.0220 
0.013 -0.043 -0.637 0.050 -0.035 -2.112 -0.123 -0.654 0.2235 1.8957 0.0517 
0.098 -0.079 -1. 977 -0.869 -2.330 -12.020 -4.020 -9.780 0.2195 1.8653 0.0659 




VAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl,t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 . G4 t-1 G 4 .t-2 
Gl '"' 9.395* 0.080 0.123* 0.072 -1.039 0.071 -0.305 -0.000 0,003 
G2 '"' -0.082 0.008* 0.002 0.100* -0.037 -0.012 0.030* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 "' 0.652 -0.009 -0.009 0.128 -0.035 0.283* 0.368* -0.003 -0.001 
G4 = 3.806 0.078 -0.045 1.720 0.126 -0.366 0.130 -0.683* -0.339* 
Pl = 0.118 0.003 0.007* 0.042 0.107* -0.026 0.007 -0.002 0.001 
P2 = 0.082 0.002 0.007* 0.048 0.121* -0.008 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
P3 = 0.275 0.017* -0.002 1.031* -0.416* -0.089* 0.124* -0.002 -0.007* 
P4 = -0.119 -0.004 +0.007* -0.069 -0.078 0;009 0.026* +0.001 0.000 
pl t p2 t p3 t P4 t pl t-1 pl t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 P3,t-l Pj t-2 
-0.640 0.926 0.266 0.820 0.332 -0.280 -0.197 -0 .270 -0.259 0.010 
0.154* 0.003 0.030* 0.109* 0.094* 0.048 -0.053 0.021 -0.009 -0.005 
-0.302 -0.222 0.141* 0.483* -0.060 -0.159 -0.145 -0.253 0.084 0.016 
-1. 798 0.827 -0.382 0.856 -0.573 0.659 -0.403 0.827 0.237 -0.233 
0.231* 0.008 -0.088* 0.001 0.012 0.001 
-0.044 0.012 -0.354* -0.297* -0.009 -0.004 
-0.027 -0.028 0.168 0.235* 0.110* -0.041 
0.086* 0.004 0.052 0.145* -0.009 0.012 
p4 t-1 p4 t-2 zl t zl t-1 z l,t-2 z2,t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d. a. 
-0.282 0. 280 -55.999* -18.040* -43.400* -272. 900* -97.400* -204.900* 0.2418 2.0476 -0.0244 
0.096* 0.072* 1. 276* 0.136 0.524 .5.229* 2.216* 2. 827* 0.3860 2.0105 -0.0078 
0.182 0.061 -1.418 -:1.185 -1.473 -9.352 -3.801 -8.959 0.3383 2.0326 -0.0166 
0.703 -0.345 -19.789 15.914 -14.230 -119. 700 -72.100 -81.000 0.3542 2.1581 -0.0791 
-0.044 -0.010 -0.275 -0.233 -0.227 -1.143 -0.505 -0.653 0.2062 1.9621 +0.0184 
0.012 -0.044 -0.753 0.015 -0.214 -2.986 -0.421 -1.377 0.2270 1.8955 0.0517 
0.062 -0.096 -1. 368 -0.652 -1.640 -8.420 -2.326 -7.001 0.1804 1.8815 0.0577 




VAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 .t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl "' 8.994* 0.080 0.139* 0.478 -1.012 -0.516* 0.204 -0.002 0.004 
G2 . -0.102 0.007* 0.002 0.083* -0.017 -0.011 -0.045* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 = -o. 605 0.029* 0.015 0.315 -0.156 0.237* 0.033 0.004 -0.001 
G4 = 3.575 0.082 -0.047 1.370 0.107 0.351 -0.143 -0.682* -0.339* 
Pl = 0.099 0.003 0.007* 0.003 0.114* 0.031* -0.020 -0.001 0.001 
P2 = 0.076 0.003 -0.007* 0.044 0.115* 0.013 0.010 -0.000 -0.001 
P3 = 0.240 0.015 -0.004 0.812* -0.342* 0.122* -0.191 -0.002 -0.008* 
P4 = ,-0.101 -0.004 0.007* -0.067 -0.075 -0.009 -0.016 0.001 0.000 
pl t p2 t p3 t P4 t p l,t-1 pl t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 P3 t-2 
-0.344 1.001 0.318 0.670 0.383 -0.232 -0.123 -0.121 -0.230 0.111 
0.160* 0.010 0.027* 0.109* 0.109* 0.050 -0.039 0.030 -0.005 -0.001 
0.502* 0.008 0.031 -0.765 -0.045 0.113 -0.002 0.158 -0.024 -0.105 
-1. 764 0.810 -0.395 0.806 -0.494 0. 756 -0.359 0.844 0.217 -0. 229 
0.242 0.015 -0.086* +o.003 -0.012 -0.002 
-0.045 0.015 -0.356* -0.297* -0.010 -0.005 
0.024 -0.016 0.189 0.238* 0.118* -0.029 
0.082* -0.003 0.055 0.142* -0.009 0.013 
p 
~l p4 t-2 zl t zl t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.576 0.174 -55.560* -17. 700* -43.000* -272.700* -96 .800* -205.500* 0.2491 2.0522 -0.0268 
0.089* 0.067* 1. 276* 0.187 0.554 5.177* 2.265* 2.886* 0.4107 2.0177 -0.0087 
-0.119 0.002 1. 855 1.503 -0. 218 8.459 4.590 4.572 0 .1971 1. 9187 0.0404 
0.752 -0.321 -'-18.798 -15.666 -12.914 -113.500 -70.830 -76.040 0.3539 2.1580 -0.0790 
-0.037 -0.010 -0.221 -0.215 -0.120 :-0.704 -0.436 -0.244 0.2079 1. 9674 0.0157 
0.014 -0.043 -0.721 0.007 -0.174 -2.764 -0.399 -1.225 0.2276 1.8969 0.0510 
0.106 -0.090 1.320 -0.523 -1.359 -7.520 -2.135 -5.760 0.2070 1.8611 0.0682 
-0.164* -0.004 1.099* 0.237 0.530 4.530 1. 790 2.690 0.1492 1.9368 0.0309 I-' 
"""" N 
TABLE XIV 
BAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl,t-1 G l,t-2 G 2,t-1 G2,t-2 G3 t-1 G 3,t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl "' 1.191* -0.033 -0.073 -0.078 -0.050 0.004 0.024 0.002 0.019 
G2 "' 0.091 0.076* 0.040 -0.080* -0.014 -0.020 0.013 0.001 0.003 
G3 = 0.307 -0.011 -0.021 0.320* -0.170 0.303* 0.344* 0.006 -0.040 
G4 = -0.150 -0.050 -0.030 0.180 0.062 0.090 -0.012 -0.922* -0.474* 
Pl .. 0.050 0.110* 0.052 0.102 0.120* -0.004 -0.020 -0.001 0.010 
P2 .. 0.093 -0.026 0.011 0.054 0.060 -0.009 0.029* -0.003 0.002 
P3 = 0.237 0.333* 0.060 0.220* 0;036 -0.006 0.029 -0.008 0.012 
P4 = -0.240 -0.011 -0.042 -0.020 -0.058 0.010 -0.018 0.002 0.003 
pl t p 2,t p3 t 
p 
4,t pl t-1 pl t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 P3 t-2 
0.097* -0.095 0.143* -0.056 0.001 0.011 -0.038 0.041 -0.070* 0.021 
0.330* -0.102* -0.001 -0.229* 0.153* 0.016 0.022 0.025 -0.042 -0.028 
-0.118 -0.099 -0.090 0.154 -0.240* -0.035 0.025 0.061 -0.033 -0.010 
-0.111 -0.410 -0.182 0.060 -0.140 -0.034 -0.020 0.080 0.041 0.950* 
0.064 -0.028 0.108 0.123 -0.015 -0.001 
-0.001 -0.046 -0.280* -0.058 -0.030 0.021 
0.016 -0.034 0.123* 0.048 0.124* -0.119* 
0.053 -0.036 0.255* 0;125 -0.002 -0.027 
P4,t-l p4 t-2 zl t z l,t-1 z l,t-2 z 2,t z 2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.023 0.024 -8.098* -1.588* -5.903 -40.391* -12.502* 29.450* 0.5256 2.0485 -0.0252 . 
0.204* 0.006 0.350 -0.083 -0.247 0.526 0.460 -0.410 0.6.653 1.9908 0.0038 
0.180 0.143 0.334 -0.311 -0.030 0.450 -2.417 -.2.102 0.3089 2.1542 -0.0801 
0.160 0.032 1.820 0.322 0.061 5.154 4.191 0.820 0.4782 2.0554 -0.0278 
-0.062 -0.025 +0.280 0.230 0.238 0.425 0.803 0.860 0.0567 1.9840 0.0079 
-0.032 0.070 -0.691 -0.120 -0.323 -3.243 -0.714 -2.390 0.1321 2.0378 -0.0191 
-0.096* -0.050 -0.487 -0.180 -2.308* -6.060 -1.680 -7.103* 0.2297 1.9799 0.0100 



















































BAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Gl t-1 Gl t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
-0.030 -0.050 -0.060 -0.032 -0.070* -0.060* -0.000 0.020 
0.080* 0.050 -0.080* -0.009 -0.007 -0.032* 0.001 0.002 
0.269* 0.132 -0.173 0.020 0.195* 0.080 0.007 0.024 
-0.062 -0.022 0.192 0.080 -0.054 0.005 -0.922* -0. 472* 
0.116* 0.054 0.106 0.117* -0.004 0.014 -0.002 -0.005 
0.040 0.012 0.046 0.058* 0.011 0.040* 0.003 0.001 
0.287* 0.061 0.188* 0.042 0.053* -0.075* -0.008 0.014 
-0.002 -0.039 -0.012 -0.060 -0.018 0.019 0.002 0.003 
P3,t 
p 
4,t pl t-1 pl t-2 
p 
2,t-1 p2 t-2 P3 t-1 p3 t-2 
0.141* -0.064 0.008 0.006 -0.040 0.045 -0.041 0.004 
-0.006 -0.234* 0.159* 0.020 0.02C 0.028 -0.034 -0.020 
0.361* -0.162 0.097 0.042 -0.012 0.091 -0.062 0.030 
-0.173 0.063 -0.147 -0.040 -0.02'0 0.074 0.051 0.940* 
0.064 -0.029 0.109 0.123 -0.016 -0.001 
0.003 -0.045* -0.281* -0.057 -0.027 +o .p27 
0.025 -0.030 0.111 0.053 0.119* -0.108* 
0.051 0.034 0.257* 0.125 0.001 -0.029 
z 




R2 d Ld.a. 
-8.170* -1. 550* -6.032* -41. 031* -12.703* -30.012* 0.5476 2.0575 -0.0296 
0.374 -0.041 -0.227 0.602 0.482 -0.368 0.4698 1. 9897 0.0070 
-2.040 -0.130 -3.130* -12.464 -1.170 -9.370 0.1717 2.0176 -0.0091 
1.642 0.281 -0.116 4.292 4.040 0.150 0.4775 2.0547 -0.0274 
0.291 0.227 0.244 0.452 o. 782 0.860 0.0561 1.9825 0.0086 
-0.674 -0.082 -0.274 -3.050 -0.604 -2.196 0.1357 2.0390 -0.0197 
-0.389 -0.070 -2.070* -5.088 -1.202 -6.241* 0.2449 2.0296 -0.0148 




MVAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
\ Dependent G G G 
Variable Intercept G1 t-l Gl,t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3,t-l 3 t-2 4 t-1 4 t-2 
Gl = 118.360* -0.083* -0.063 -3.200 -3.979 1.380 1.240 -0.011 0.942 
G2 = 0.036 +0.000 +o.ooo -0.062 -0.015 -0.220* 0.015 0.002 0.003 
G3 = 0.350 0.000 -0.000 0.310* -0.166 0.310* 0.342* 0.010 -0.040 
G4 = -0.160 -0.000 -0.001 0.180 0.062 0.090 -0.013 -0.922* -0.474* 
Pl = -,0.025 o.ooc 0.000 0.130 0.120* -0.010 -0.010 0.001 0.005 
P2 = 0.075 -0.000 -0.000 0.057 0.057 -0.009 0.030* -0.003 0.002 
P3 = 0.240 0.003* 0.001 0.245* 0.031 -0.014 0.030 -0.008 0.012 
P4 = -0.243 -0.000 -0.000 -0.024 -0.060 0.009 -0.020 0.001 0.003 




2,t-2 p3 t-1 
p 
3,t-2 
7 .010 -8.900 +14.910* -2.905 o. 704 1.490 -3.460 -0.324 -6.910* 1.053 
0.340* -0.110* 0.012 -0.240* 0.154* 0.013 0.020 0.021 -0.040 -0.030 
--0.122 -0.097 -0.094 0.160 -0.240* -0.033 0.030 0.064 -0.040 -0.010 
-0.113 -0.410 -0.182 0.060 -0.140 -0.034 -0.020 0.074 0.043 0.950 
0.070 -0.034 0.106 0.120 -0.002 -0.004 
-0.001 -0.046* -0.280* -0.060 -0.027 0.022 
0.026 -0.041 0.125* 0.050 0.130* -0 .. 125* 
0.050 0.035 0.253" 0.124 -0.001 -0.028 
P4 t-1 P4 t--2 z l,t zl,t-1 
z l,t-2 22 t z 2,t-1 z2,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-1. 995 -1. 263 -807.900* -177. 700* -562.700* -3950.000* -1270.000* -2839.000* 0.5225 2.0231 -0.0116 
-0.205* 0.003 0.550 0.020 0.120 2.000 1.053 1.012 0.4592 1.9994 -0.0006 
0.177 0.144 0.181 -0.391 -0.301 -0.684 -2 .. 891 -3.170 0.3089 2.1521 -0.0789 
0.161 0.033 1.930 0.323 0.641 5.681 4.280 1.260 0.4782 2.0558 -0.0280 
-0.063 -0.030 0.574 0.352 0.735 2 .. 472 1.586 2.820 0.0577 1.9821 0.0088 
-0.031 0.070* -0.583 -0.091 -0.200 -2.642 -0.540 -1.872 0.1323 2.0418 -0.0212 
-0.104* -0.053 -0.615 -0.183 -2.305* -6.500 -1. 720 -7.251* 0.2173 1.9795 0.0102 
-0.006 -0.045 1. 741 0.866 1.243 8.170 3.552 6.434 0.0442 1.9054 0.0471 I-' .p.. 
\J1 
TABLE XVII 
MVAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent G G G 
Variable Intercept G1 t-l G1 t-2 G2 t-l G2 t-2 G3,t-l 3 t-2. 4 t""l 4 t-2 
Gl = 115.190* -0.090* -0.050 -1.010 -2.162 -6.003* -4.923* -0.164 0.806 
G2 - 0.005 0.002 0.003 -0.061 -0.010 -0.001 -0.037* 0.001 0.002 
G3 = 0.021 0.002 0.001 -0.141 0.015 0.211* 0.066 0.008 0.024 
G4 .. -0.109 -0.001 -0.001 0.189 0.080 -0.060 0.007 -0.922* -0.472* 
Pl = -0.040 0.000 0.000 0.130 0.118* 0.006 0.006 ~0.001 0.006 
P2 = 0.068 -0.000 -0.000 0.050 0.060* 0.011 -0.040* -0.003 0.001 
P3 = 0.206 0.003* 0.001 0.208* 0.037 0.065* -0.Q81* -0.007 0.013 
P4 = -0.244 -0.000 -0.000 -0.014 -0.057 -0.018 0.017 .. 0.002 0.003 
Pl t p2 t p3 t P4 t Pl t-1 Pl t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 p3 t-1 P3 t-2 
7.637* 10.477* 14.887* -3.740 1.290 1.024 . -3 .sos 0.080 -4.307 2.574 
0.341* -0.116* 0.006 -0.242* 0.162* 0.013 0.015 0.024 -0.030 -0.020 
0.172 0.103 0.382* -0.180 0.108 0.037 -0.020 0.086 -0.060 0.030 
-0.119 -0.408 -0.174 0.065 -0.150 -0.040 -0.020 0.072 0.054 0.940* 
0.070 -0.034 0.105 0.118 -0.005 -0.002 
0.002 -0.044* 0.280* -0.060 -0.025 0.029 
0.035 -0.03.'i 0.111* 0.053 0.121* -0.119* 
0.048 0.033 0.255* 0.123 0.002 -0.030 
P4 t-1 P4 t-2 zl t · zl t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z z2,t-2 
R2 d f .<l. a. 
' ' 
2,t-1 
-2.876 1. 793 -807.060* -170.800* -563.392* -3959.274* -1269.118* -2846.405* 0.5398 2.0354 -0.0177 
0.200* 0.002 0.612 0.080 0.193 2.322 1.170 1.264 0.4634 1.9938 0.0023 
-0.080 0.080 -1. 804 o.oso -2.590 -10.450 '-0.240 -7.341 0.1664 2.0148 -0.0076 
0.175 0.033 1. 770 0.283 -0.008 4.871 4.131 0.625 0.4775 2.0551 -0.0276 
-0.070 -0.030 0. 613 0.369 0.787 2.691 1.643 2.980 0.0508 1.9801 0.0099 
-0.034 0.068* -0.560 -0.060 -0.154 -2.440 -0.440 -1. 682 0.1357 2.0433 -0.0219 
-0.109* -0.048 -0.488 -0.060 -2.051* -5.390 -1. 212 -6.322* 0.2378 2 .0377 -0.0189 




VAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent G G G 





























































































































































































































































VAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent G G G 
Variable Intercept Gl,t 1 Gl,t-2 G2,t-l G2,t-2 G3,t-l 3,t-2 4,t-1 4,t-2 
Gl .. 7.801* -0.041 0.001 0.218 -0.370 -0.390* -0.272* -0.008 0.029 
G2 "' -0.028 -0.001 0.003 -0.060 -0.009 0.001 -0.040* 0.001 0.002 
G3 = -0.005 0.025* 0.021 -0.126 0.007 0.212* 0.066 0.008 0.022 
G4 = -0.130 -0.009 -0.013 0.184 0.083 -0.055 0.008 -0.922* -0.471* 
Pl = -0.007 0.007 0.015* 0.132 0.114* 0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.005 
P2 = 0.082 -0.004 -0.000 0.044 0.061* 0.009 -0.038* -0.002 +0.001 
P3 = 0.124 0.029* 0.010 0.231* 0.028 0.071* -0.087* -0.008 0.012 












1 2 t-2 
p 
2 2 t-1 
p 
2 1 t-2 
p 
3 1 t-l 
p 
3,t-2 
0.505 -0.363 0.929* 0.027 -0,103 0.149 -0.369 0.170 -0.100 0.110 
0.342* -0.119* 0.010 -0.244* 0.161* 0.012 0.014 0.020 -0.024 -0.017 
0.167 0.099 0.384* -0.181 0.105 0.040 -0.023 0.082 -0.046 0.030 
-0.113 -0.408 -0.171 0.063 -0.148 -0.040 -0.020 0.070 0.055 0.941* 
0.066 -0.033 0.102 0.122 -0.010 -0.005 
0.003 -0.044* -0.278* -0.057 -0.027 0.030 
0.031 -0.038 0.101 0.050 0 .135* -0.114* 
0.050 0.033 0.254* 0.130 -0.008 -0.032 
p4 t-1 p 4 t-2 21 t 21 t-1 2 l,t-2 22 t 22 t-1 2 2,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.090 0.010 -54.293* -12.011* -38.100* -263. 924* -85.085* -190.431* 0.4768 2.0411 0.0208 
0.198* 0.000 o. 700 0.123 0.420 3.306 1.494 2.170 0.4622 1.9962 0.0011 
-0.081 0.071 -1. 725 0.098 -2. 411 -9.843 -0.013 -6.742 0.1678 2.0129 -0.0067 
0.176 0.038 1.921 0.288 0.136 5.619 4.271 1. 267 0.4777 2.0550 -0.0276 
-0.066 -0.036 0.337 0.360 0.525 1.376 1.416 1.842 0.0556 1.9790 0.0103 
-0.033 0.068* -0.615 -0.086 -0.251 -2.845 -0.600 -2.064 0.1347 2.0410 -0.0208 
-0.112* -0.054 -0.185 0.108 -1.499* -3.134 -0.293 -4.186 0.2248 2.0543 -0.0272 




BAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl,t-1 G l,t-2 G2,t-l G 2,t-2 G3 t-1 G3,t-2 G4 t-1 G4 t-2 
Gl "' 1.340* -0.055* -0.093* 0.007 -0.033 -0.006 0.006 -0.009* -0.005 
G2 '"' 0.119* 0.076* 0.022 0.059* -0.033 -0.011* 0.012* -0.001 -0.000 
G3 = 0.272 -0.167 0.082 0.082 0.120 0.278* 0.368* 0.001 -0~010 
G4 = -0.149 -0.120 0.270 0.111 -0.090 0.023 -0.019 -0. 602* -0.169* 
Pl - 0.128* 0.104* 0.087* 0.048 0.071* -0.010* 0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
P2 = 0.442* -0.032 0.033 -0.017 0.016 0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.001 
P3 = 0.204* 0.203* 0.066* 0.182* 0.043 -0.011* 0.007 0.004 0.005 
P4 = -0.110* 0.001 0.033* -0.030 -0.042* -0.003 0.008* 0.001 0.000 
pl t p2 t p3,t P4 t Pl,t-1 Pl.t-2 p2 t-1 p2 t-2 P3,t-l P3 t-2 
0.033 -0.040* 0.204* -0.162* -0.081* -0.072* -0.015 -0.029 -0.080* 0.062* 
0.273* +0.057* +0.079* 0.207* 0.035* 0.043* 0.050* 0.003 -0.069* +0.041* 
-0.736* 0.010 -0.241* 1.614* 0.252* 0.595* -0.169 -0.192* 0.102 0.177 
-0.073 -0.044 -0.540* -0.051* -0.111 0.154 -0.002 0.086 0.047 0.139 
0.028 0.052* 0.023 -0.004 0.005 -0.018 
-0.003 0.010 ·-o.330* -0.143* -0.040 -0.025 
-0.003 -0.094* -0.019 -0.003 0.140* -0.022 




4,t-2 zl t zl,t-1 
z . 
l,t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.029 -0.003 -8.470 -2.870* -6.140* -41.820* -15.880* 29.470* 0.4657 2.0943 -0.0478 
0.094* 0.007 0.183 -0.076 -0.600* -0.470 0.260 -1. 491* 0.3204 1. 9775 +0.0112 
0.077 -0.336* -0.447 -0.157 -0.495 -1.807 -1.170 -2.630 0.3331 2.1936 -0.0969 
0.091 0.128 0.778 0.800 0.650 5.953 2.950 2.443 0.2350 2.1485 -0.0743 
0.017 -0.114* -0.155 -0.049 -0.380 -1. 660 -0.682 -1. 606 0.0933 1.9706 0.0145 
-0.053 -0.011 -2.459* -0.069* -2.130* -12.383* -3.944* -9.631* 0.1290 1. 9970 0.0014 
-0.082* -0.068* -0.619* -0.352* -1.438* -5.176* -1.572* -5.158* 0.1819 1. 9575 0.0208 




BAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent G G G 




































-0.036 -0.019* -0.022* 0.010* 0.005 
-0.034 -0.007* -0.017* -0.001 -0.001 
-0.402* 0.181* 0.038 -0.010 0.004 
-0.084 -0.021 +o.018 -0.602* -0.169* 
0.067* 0.011* -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 
0.016 -0.011 0.004 0.000 0.001 
0.038 0.005 -0.017* 0.004 0.005 
-0.040* 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.000 
p p p p p p p p p p 





















-0.020 -0.030 -0.062* 0.075* 
0.050* 0.003 -0.060* 0.050* 
0.088 0.135 -0.143 0.116 
-0.005 0.085 +0.051 0.136 
0.024 -0.004 0.003 -0.016 
-0.331* -0.143* -0.034 -0.023 
-0.020 -0.004 0.143* -0.014 
0.047* 0.014 -0.005 0.034* 
2 
P4 t-1 P4 t-2 21,t 21 t-1 21 t-2 22,t 22,t-l 22 c-2 R d f.d.a. 
-0.053 -0.017 -8.541* -2.840* -6.242* -42.301* -15.970* -29.863* 0.4744 2.0915 -0.0464 
0.078* o.ooo 0.143 -0.061 -0.655* 0.754 0.200 . -1. 718* 0.3291 1.9725 0.0137 
0.090 0.304 0.749 -0.046 ~i. 266 -1.248 0.738 -2.946 0.1994 2.0235 -0.0119 
0.088 0.134 0.720 0. 778 0.574 5.620 2.840 2.163 0.2350 2.1484 -0.0742 
0.020 -0.118* -0.123 -0.037 -0.338 1.468 -0.621 -1. 450 0.0939 1. 9692 0.0152 
-0.063 -0.010 -2.498* -0.676* -2.200* -12.650* -4.031* -9.850* 0.1298 1.9959 0.0020 
-0.086* -0.079* -0.600* -0.320 -1. 415* -5.071* -1.505* -5.076* 0.1848 1.9702 0.0145 




MVAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent . - G G 
Variable Intercept G1 t~l G1 t 2 G2 t-l G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 4 t-1 4 t-2 
Gl s 183.545* -0.263* -0.020 11.811* -14.000* -0.709 -0.666 -0.645 -0.348 
G2 - 0.061 0.000 -0.000 0;078* -0.029 -0.013* 0.012* -0.001 -0.001. 
G3 = 0.345 -0.001 -0.001 0.087 0.157 0.282* 0.363* 0.001 -0.010 
G4 - -0.145 -0.000 0.001 0.129 -0.053 0.027 -0.025 -0.603* -0.168* 
Pl = 0.090* 0.001* 0.001* 0.078* 0.082* -0.013* 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
P2 z 0.372* -0.001* 0.000 -0.006 0.022 0.003 -0.006 0.000 0.001 
P3 = 0.185* 0.001* 0.001* 0.218* 0.047 -0.016* 0.008 0.005 0.004 
P4 == -0.115* 0.000 0.000 -0.026 -0.038 -0.003 +0.007* 0.001 0.000 
p p 




1,t 2,t 2,t-1 2,t-2 3,t-2 ' . 
5.302 0.809 26.050* -7.266 -9.880* -1.231 1.955 -4.830 -7 •. 039* 2.113 
0.289* 0.057* -0.096* -0.205* 0.032 0.036* 0.047* -0.002 -0.061* 0.036* 
-0.741* 0.016 -0.258* 1.637* 0.274* 0.586* -0.165 -0.193* 0.115 0.194 
-0.067 -0.037 -0.550* -0.031 -0.082 0.148 0.003 0.079 0.059 0.146 
0.030 +o.045* 0.020 -0.007 0.017 -0.028 
-0.003 0.004 -0.330* -0.145* -0.032 -0.023 
-0;006 -0.099* -0.023 -0.006 0.149* -0.041 
0.003 0.019 0.046* 0.012 -0.001 0.036* 
p4 t-1 p4 t-2 zl,t zl t-1 zl t-2 z z2 t-1 z 
R2 d f.d.a. 
' 
2,t 2,t-2 
-0.273 -8.514 -1206.868* -403.461* -801. 710* -5721.873* -2219.122* -3913.829* 0.5118 2.1002 -0.0509 
0.088* 0.006 o.463* +0.022 -0.225 1.261 0.899 0.015 0.3090 1.9809 0.0094 
0.082 -0.337* -0.624 -0.589 -0.735 -3.843 -2.619 -4.010 0.3323 2.1931 -0.0967 
0.086 0.110 0.801 0.734 0.592 5.620 2.563 2.219 0.2344 2.1457 -0.0729 
0.006 -0.128* 0.023 0.019 -0.147 -0.598 -0.292 -0.643 0.0741 1.9580 0.0209 
-0.053 -0.010 -2.101* -0.496 -1. 725* -10.194* -3.075* -7.867* 0.1307 1.9957 0.0021 
-0.099* -0.085* -0.573* -0.306 -1.325* -4.762* -1.350 -4. 700* 0.1624 1. 9620 0.0285 




MVAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL S.Affi>LE 
Dependent . G G , 
Variable Intercept G1 t-l G1 t-2 G2 t-1 G2 t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 4 t-1 4 t-2 
Gl - 187.416* -0.260* -0.010 11.630* -14.550* -1.697* -1.048 -0.682 -0.394 
G2 = 0.050 0.000 -0.000 0.069* -0.030 -0.004 -0.018* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 = -0.240 0.002* 0.002* 0.153 0.433* 0.191* 0.031 -0.010 0.003 
G4 "' -0.129 -0.000 0.001 0.150 -0.048 -0.023 0.027 -0.602* -0.168* 
Pl '"' 0.080 0.001* 0.001* 0.070* 0.077* 0.015* -0.007* -0.002 -0.003 
P2 = 0.371* -0.001* 0.000 .;.Q,001 0.022 -0.010 0.004 -0.000 0.001 
P3 = 0.166* 0.001* 0.001* 0.204* 0.041 0.011* -0.019* 0.004 0.004 
P4 "' ··0.112* 0.000 0.000 -0.029 -0.037 0.005 -0.002 o·.001 0.000 














3 1 t-1 
p 
3!t-2 
6.375 0.666 26.120* -7. 723 -8.346* -2.313 1.499 -5.050 -5.272 3.507 
0.294* 0.057* 0.095* 0.208* 0.045* 0.036* 0.046* 0.001 -0.052* 0.042* 
1.019* -0.145 0.852* 2.002* -0.631* -0.654* 0.082 0.131 -0.147 0.078 
-0.065 -0.039 -0.548* -0.036 -0.088 0.132 o.ooo 0.078 0.062 0.141 
0.028 0.053* 0.021 -0.007 0.013 -0.025 
0.001 -0.004 -0.331* -0.145* -0.026 -0.022 
-0.001 -0.090* -0.023 -0.007 0.151* -0.031 
0.003 0.022 0.047* 0.013 -0.004 -0.034* 
p4 t-1 p4 t-2 z1 t z 1, t-1 z1 t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z 2,t-2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-3.035 -10.054 -1205. 770* -398.281* -801.623* -5720.902* -2213.836* -3912.116* 0. 5131 2.0985 -0.0500 
0.073 -0.003 0.474* 0.054 -0.220 1.278 0.942* 0.042 0.3147 1.9762 0.0118 
0.066 0.279 1.012 0.451 -0.850 1.431 2.452 -0. 794 0.1969 2.0265 -0.0134 
0.084 0.116 0.730 0. 702 0.504 5.225 2.423 1.889 0.2344 2.1454 -0.0727 
0.010 -0.132* 0.071 0.032 -0.083 -0.313 -0.209 -0.414 0.0751 1.9557 0.0220 
-0.064 -0.011 -2 .119* -0.493 -1. 751* -10.317* -3.109* -7. 968* 0.1313 1. 9947 0.0026 
-0.101* -0.098* -0.514 -0.265 -1. 252* -4.430* -1.219 -4.428* 0.1646 1.9549 0.0220 ........ 
-0.043* -0.042* 1.153* 0.279* 0.576* 4.685* 1. 671* 3.023* 0.1213 1.9548 0.0223 l.11 
"" 
TABLE XX.IV 
VAR-EPSD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent 
Variable Intercept Gl t-1 Gl,t-2 G 2,t-1 G 2,t-2 G3 t-1 G3 t-2 G4 t-1 G4. t-2 
Gl - 16.583* -0.097* +0.094* +0.453 -0.938* -0.007 -0.084 -0.040 -0.007 
G2 - 0.063 0.002* -0.001 0.078* -0.029 -0.013* 0.012* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 .. 0.352 -0.007 -0.007 0.082 0.153 0.282* 0.363* 0.001 -0.010 
G4 "' -0.198 -0.008 0.009 0.146 -0.036 0.027 -0.027 -0.603* -0.169* 
Pl z 0.055 0.005* 0.004* 0.087* 0.086* -0.013* 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
P2 = 0.386* -0.006* 0.000 -0.008 0.024 0.003 -0.007 0.000 0.001 
P3 = 0.123* 0.011* 0.004* 0.233* 0.053 -0.016* 0.008 0.004 0.004 
P4 = -0.107* 0.001 0.001 -0.025 -0.036 -0.003 0.007* 0.001 o.ooo 
pl t p2 t P3 t P4 t Pl,t-1 pl t-2 p2 .t-1 p2 t-2 P3,t-l P3 t-2 
0.065 +o.200 1.674* -0.408 -0.680 0.082 0.253 -0.493* -0.637* 0.049 
0.289* o .. 057* 0.096* 0.204* 0.032* 0.036* 0.047* 0.002 -0.061* 0.036* 
·-0.742* 0.015 -0.258* 1.637* 0.273* 0.587* -0.164 -0.192* 0.113 +0.195 
-0.058 -0.035 -0.537* -0.022 -0.081 0.136 0.002 0.076 0.070 0.150 
0.029 0.041* 0.018 -0.008 0.021 -0.028 
-0.001 0.003 -0.329* -0.145* -0.032 -0.022 
-0.007 -0.106* -0.027 -0.006 0.158* -0.042 
0.004 0.018 0.045* 0.012 -0.000 0.037* 
P4 t-1 
p 
4 t-2 zl t zl t-1 zl t-2 z2 t 
z 2,t-1 22 t~2 
R2 d f.d.a. 
-0.212 -1.089* -103.830* -36. 710* -75.330* -511.686* -199.070* -362.070* 0.4281 2.0428 -0.0221 
0.088* 0.006 0.453* 0.010 -0.239 1.175 0.857 -0.058 0.3096 2.9810 0.0093 
-0.084 -0.340* -0.656 -0.573 -0. 775 -3.961 -2.627 -4.194 0.3324 2.1934 -0.0968 
0.082 0.110 1.125 0.727 1.020 7 .340 2.961 3.825 0.2342 2.1453 -0.0727 
0.004 -0.125* -0.201 0.077 0.067 0.452 0.088 0.234 0.0703 1.9561 0.0218 
-0.054 -0.012 -2.159* -0.543* -1. 787* -10.590* -3.280* -8.150* 0.1306 1.9974 0. 0013 
-0.101* -0.079* -0.262 -0.206 -0.954* -2.944 -0.683 -3 .195* 0.1551 1.9368 0.0311 
-0.048* -0.045* 1.120* 0.250* 0.540* 4.424* 1.533* 2.828* 0.1223 1. 9580 0.0207 f'l. 
·~· 
TABLE XXV 
VAR-EPSDD SPECIFICATION--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Dependent G G G 
Variable Intercept G1 t-l G1 t-2 G2,t-l G2 t-2 . G3,t-l . 3 t-2 _ 4 t-1 4.t-2 
Gl - l6.435* -0.095* 0.101 0.484 -0.960* -0.163* -0.030 -0.040 -0.011 
G2 .. 0.052 0.002* -0.000 0.070* -0.030 -0.004 -0.018* -0.001 -0.001 
G3 "" -0.355 0.019* 0.017* 0.178 -0.421* +0.193* 0.030 -0.010 0.003 
G4 =· -0.186 -0.008 0.009 0.167 -0.032 -0.021 0.028 -0.603* -0.169* 
Pl - 0.046 0.004* 0.004* 0.078* 0.080* 0.015* -0.008* -0.002 -0.003 P2 = 0.383* -0.006* 0.001 -0.001 +0 .. 024 -0.010 0.005 -0.000 0.001 
P3 .. 0.107* 0.011* 0.005* 0.219* 0.047 0.013* -0.020* 0.004 0.004 
P4 = ·-n.103* 0.001 0.001 -0.028 -0.035 0.005 -0.002 0.001 o.ooo 
p p p p p p p p p p 




























1.690* -0.445* -0.580 -0.030 0.214 -0.510* -0.500* 0.137 
0.094* 0.207* 0.046* 0.036* 0.046* 0.002 -0.052* 0.042* 
0.867* -2.008* -0.634* -0.665* 0.075 0.129 -0.135 0.080 
-0.534* -0.028 -0.089 0.120 -0.002 0.075 0.073 0.145 
0.027 -0.050* 0.019 -0.008 0.017 -0.025 
0.001 -0.005 -0.331* -0.146* -0.026 -0.021 
-0.003 -0.096* -0.027 -0.007 0.159* -0.031 
0.003 0.022 0.050* 0.013 -0.004 0.034* 
zl t zl,t-1 zl t-2 z2 t z2 t-1 z2 t-2 - R2 d f.d.a. 
-103.740* -36.390* -75.300* -511. 578* -198.736* -361. 920* 0.4295 2.0436 -0.0225 
0.464* 0.040 -0.232 1.192 0.896 -0.028 0.3154 1.9767 0.0115 
1.616 0.629 -0.111 4.962 3.694 2.180 0.1959 2.0280 -0.0142 
1.081 0. 703 0.967 .7 .117 2.878 3.634 0.2342 2.1450 -0.0725 
0.239 0.087 0.119 0.678 0.149 0.414 0.0719 1. 9542 +0.0228 
-2.165* -0.540* -1.800* -10.644* -3.288* -8.200* 0.1312 1.9965 0.0017 
-0.212 -0.171 -0.891* -2.666 -0.580 -2.970* 0.1579 1.9505 0.0243 




ESTIMATED PREFERENCE EQUATIONS 
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TABLE XXVI 
ESTIMATED PREFERENCE EQUATIONS--THE ENTIRE SAl-fPLE 
Specification Gl,t C G3,t G 
p p2 t p P4,t Pl,t-1 
p p p 
2,t 4,t l,t • 3,t l,t-2 2,t-1 2,t-2 
BAR-EPSD 0.825 -0.520 0.166 0.014 -0.291 0.140 -0.050 -0.208 -0.278 -0.037 0.040 -0.141 
BAR-EPSDD 0.842 -0.503 -0.171 0.015 -0.278 0.146 -0.079 .;..0.203 -0.255 -0.035 0.046 -0.138 
MVAR-EPSD 0.874 -0.479 0.086 0.016 -0.255 0.191 -0.064 -0.208 -0.230 -0.025 0.060 -0.151 
MVAR-EPSDD 0.878 -0.467 -0.155 0.015 -0.248 0.191 -0.086 -0.199 -0.213 -0.020 0.062 -0.150 
VAR-EPSD 0.819 -0.575 0.098 0.016 -0.303 0.195 -0.091 -0. 215 -0.285 -0.017 0.064 -0.157 
VAR-EPSDD 0.824 -0.573 -0.153 0.018 -0.298 0.199 -0.109 -0.214 -0.275 -0.Cl7 0.067 -0.155 
Specification p P3,t-2 
p p 
Gl,t-1 Gl t-2 G G 
G · G .· G4,t-l G 3,t-1 4, t-1 4,t-2 ' 
2,t-1 2,t-2 3,t-1 .. 3,t-2 4,t-2 
BAR-EPSD .;,0 •. 042 0.074 -0.183 0.114 -0~275 -0.535 -0.088 -0.005 0.228 0.118 -0.017 0.021 
BAR-EPSDD -0.051 0.082 -0.174 0.101 -0.279 -0.532 -0.105 -0.001 -0.190 -0.006 '-0.017 0.022 
MVAR-EPSD -0.029 0.058 -0.159 0.097 -0.353 -0.397 -0.041 0.000 0.148 0.018 -0.012 0.014 
MVAR-EPSDD ..,o.036 0.062 -0.151 0.089 -0.359 -0.397 -0.051 0.005 -0.136 0.051 -0.011 0.015 
VAR-EPSD -0.011 -0.051 -0.216 . 0.106 -0.275 -0.260 -0.058 -0.005 0.167 0.006 -0.008 0.014 
VAR-£PSDD -0.016 0.055 -0.215 0.097 -0.276 -0.258 -0.069 -0.002 -Ci.108 0.097 -0.008 0.015 
Specification z z z z z2 t-1 z 
Canonical Correlation 
l,t l,t-1 l,t-2 2,t ' 
2,t-2 
BAR-EPSD -0.530 0.406 0.492 0.351 -0.017 -0.505 o. 729 
BAR-EPSDD -0.542 0.412 0.519 0.355 -0.021 -0.514 0.729 
MVAR-EPSD -0.529 0.409 0.497 0.335 -0.038 -0.484 0.730 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.534 0.409 0.510 0.336 -0.042 -0.488 0.733 
VAR-EPSD -0.525 0.387 0.504 0.332 -0.040 -0.477 0.673 





ESTIMATED PREFERENCE EQUATIONS--STRONG OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 

















BAR-EPSD -0.622 0.761 0.008 0.032 0.388 -0.180 0.143 0.281 0.298 0.085 -0.107 0.079 
BAR-EPSDD -0.631 0.752 0.205 0.034 0.392 -0.173 0.140 0.266 0.299 0.089 -0.103 0.081 
MVAR-EPSD -0.621 o. 796 0.076 0.025 0.387 -0.237 0.196 0.308 0.300 0.094 -0.115 0.095 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.623 0.800 0.200 0.031 0.403 -0.226 0.185 0.290 0.314 0.110 -0.111 0.104 
VAR-EPSD -0.462 0.877 0.250 0.052 0.378 -0.240 0.279 0.343 0.305 0.079 -0.172 0.072 
VAR-EPSDD -0.441 0.914 0.121 0.060 0.421 -0.227 0.243 0.333 0.352 0.121 -0.168 0.094-







G l,t-1 G l,t-2 
G 2,t-1 G 2,t-2 G 3,t-1 
G 3,t-2 G 4,t-1 
G 4,t-2 
BAR-EPSD 0.072 -0.085 0.165 0.051 0.317 0.562 0.239 0.008 -0.106 -0.148 -0.012 -0.052 
BAR-EPSDD 0.076 -0.087 0.160 0.048 0.317 0.566 0.242 0.014 0.105 -0.242 -0.012 -0.052 
MVAR-EPSD 0.072 -0.075 0.178 0.027 0.293 0.455 0.249 -0.007 -0.039 0.219 -0.015 -0.042 
MVAR-EPSDD 0.072 -0.074 0.171 0.021 0.301 0.466 0.250 0.005 0.058 -0.293 -0.019 -0.043 
VAR-EPSD 0.041 -0.059 0.220 0.071 0.220 0.259 0.293 -0.034 -0.073 0.376 -0.052 -0.035 
VAR-EPSDD 0.031 -0.048 0.209 0.060 0.248 0.292 0.28G -0.013 -0.065 -0.412 -0.056 -0.036 
Specification zl,t z zl t-2 z z z Canonical Correlation l,t-1 ' 
2,t 2,t-1 2,t-2 
BAR EPSD 0.514 -0.437 -0.518 -0.356 0.080 0.502 0. 743 
BAR EPSDD 0.518 -0.430 -0.520 -0.362 0.073 0.503 0.746 
MVAR EPSD 0.519 -0.421 -0.532 -0.335 0.086 0.473 0.718 
MVAR EPSDD 0.523 -0.416 -0.526 -0.345 0.079 0.482 o. 720 
VAR EPSD 0.457 -0.392 -0.479 -0.263 0.115 0.368 0.669 





ESTIMATED PREFERENCE EQUATIONS--WEAK OWNER CONTROL SAMPLE 













BAR-EPSD 0.801 -0.545 0.250 -0.101 -0.205 0.116 -0.027 -0.084 -0.419 -0.027 0.076 -0.153 
BAR-EPSDD 0.855 -0.482 -0.155 -0.107 -0.173 0.111 -0.071 -0.078 -0.364 :..o.o4o 0.070 -0.143 
MVAR-EPSD 0.815 -0.550 0.236 -0.086 -0.206 0.108. -0.023 -0.078 -0.406 -0.010 0.092 -0.168 
MVAR-EPSDD 0.863 -0.502 -0.139 -0.092 -0.181 0.105 -0.050 -0.076 -0.359 -0.019 0.090 -0.161 
VAR-EPSD 0.743 -0.638 0.261 -0.151 . -o. 215 0.119 -0.022 -0.056 -0.472 0.023 0.086 -0.162 
VAR-EPSDD o. 771 -0.642 -0.116 -0.157 -0.209 0.120 -·0.027 -0.063 -0.472 0.015 0.096 -0.157 
Specification 1"3,t-1 
p p p G Gl t-2 G G G G G G 3,t-2 4,t-1 4,t-2 1, t-1 ' 
2,t-1 2,t-2 3,t-1 3,t-2 4,t-1 4,t-2 
BAR-EPSD -0.031 0.060 -0.320 0.140 -0.232 -0.578 -0.088 -0.038 0.283 0.164 0.124 0.003 
BAR-EPSDD -0.039 0.078 -0.279 0'. 099 -0.230 -0.583 -0.115 -0.018 -0.276 -0.034 0.125 0.015 
MVAR-EPSD -0.032 0.058 -0.323 0.126 -0.223 -0.557 -0.065 -0.020 0.280 0.132 0.107 -0.008 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.033 0.075 -0.298 0.090 -0.223 -0.560 -0.085 -0.001 -0.239 -0.005 0.107 0.002 
VAR-EPSO -0.012 0.037 -0.393 0.165 -0.208 -0.473 -0.030 -0.045 0.284 0.129 0.170 -0.022 
VAR-EPSDD 0.005 0.060 -0.418 0.130 -0.197 -0.46S -0.049 -0.024 -0.183 0.024 0.167 -0.010 
Specif ica::ion z l,t z 1,t-1 z l,t-2 z 2,t z 2,t-1 z 2,t-2 Canonical Correlation 
BAR-EPSD -0.48S 0.414 0.43S o.363 0.016 O.S29 0. 789 
BAR-EPSDD -0.S08 0.437 0.491 0.368 0.010 -0.SS3 0.790 
MVAR-EPSD -O.S06 0.407 0.448 0.376 0.017 -O.S36 0. 777 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.52S 0.426 0.492 0.376 0.014 -0.SS2 o. 774 
VAR-EPSD -0.503 0.361 0.416 0.372 0.030 -a.sos 0.744 





ESTIMATED PREFERENCE EQUATIONS--MANAGEMENT CONTROL SAMPLE 
Specification G G2 t G G p p p p p p p p 1,t 
' 
3,t 4,t 1,t 2,t 3,t 4,t 1,t-1 1,t-2 2,t-1 2,t-2 
BAR-EPSD 0.861 -0.488 0.062 0.049 -0.347 0.163 -0.103 -0.421 -0.120 -0.061 0.030 -0.140 
BAR-EPSDD C.865 -0.475 -0.115 0.047 -Q.341 0.166 -0.124 -0.408 -0.107 -0.047 O.G36 -0.142 
MVAR-EPSD 0.907 -0.418 -0.012 0.034 -0.275 0.206 -0.095 -0.391 -0.079 -0.036 0.049 -0.140 
MVAR-EPSDD 0.9'06 -0.412 -0.106 0.033 -0.278 0.204 -0.115 -0.373 -0.067 -0.017 0.051 -0.142 
VAR-EPSD 0.863 -0.511 -0.034 0.042 -0.334 0.208 -0.127 -0.425 -0.097 -0.042 0.045 -0.141 
VAR-EPSDD 0.861 -0. 511 -0.101 0.041 -0.339 0.206 -0.144 -0.410 -0.087 -0.025 0.045 -0.144 




4,t-2 G 1,t-1 
G 1,t-2 G 2,t-1 G 2,t-2 
G 3,t-1 G 3,t-2 G4,t-l G4,t-2 
BAR-EPSD -0.041 0.047 0.002 0.157 -0.293 -0.462 -0.063 0.007 0.167 0.073 -0.041 0.008 
BAR-EPSDD -0.048 0.052 -0.001 0.154 -0.300 -0.461 -0.070 0.014 -0.153 -0.020 "-0.037 0.008 
MVAR-EPSD -0.017 0.036 0.017 0.122 -0.390 -0.313 0.000 0.001 0.080 -0.037 -0.021 0.013 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.022 0.039 0.018 0.123 -0.399 -0.317 -0.003 0.012 -0.097 0.051 -0.017 0.012 
VAR-EPSD -0.010 0.033 -0.008 0.119 -0.285 -0.192 -0.039 0.002 0.078 -0.072 -0.024 0.021 
VAR-EPSDD -0.014 0.035 -0.006 0.120 -0.292 -0.197 -0.042 0.011 -0.079 0.092 -0.021 0.020 
Specification zl,t 21 t-1 zl t-2 22,t z2,t-1 z2,t-2 
Canonical Correlation 
' . ' 
BAR-EPSD -0.539 0.394 0.507 0.321 -0.034 -0.463 0.736 
BAR-EPSDD -0.546 0.398 0.520 0.325 -0.038 -0.469 0.739 
MVAR-EPSD -0.517 0.402 0.497 0.297 -0.062 -0.439 0.753 
MVAR-EPSDD -0.519 0.404 0.503 0.301 -0.066 -0.443 0.754 
VAR-EPSD -0.508 0.391 0.529 0.292 -0.070 -0.444 0.701 









RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
SS d. f. MS F Ratio 
Beta-Adjusted Return 
Between Groups .0621 2 .0310 . 2213 
Within Groups 514.1167 3665 .1403 
Total 514.1787 3667 
Monthly-Variance-Adjusted Return 
Between Groups 1918.0745 2 990.5371 .4683 
Within Groups 77 51376. 0000 3665 2114.9729 
Total 77 53357. 0000 3667 
Annual-Variance-Adjusted Return 
Between Groups 49.5549 2 24. 77'7 5 1. 8377 
Within Groups 49414.1992 3665 13.4827 
Total 49463.7539 3667 
Rate of Sales Growth 
Between Groups .0288 2 .0144 .4082 
Within Groups 129.4899 3665 .0353 
Total 129.5187 3667 
Absolute Deviations from Historical EPS Line 
Between Groups 3.2897 2 1.6448 1.2600 
Within Groups 4793.0780 3665 1.3078 
Total 4796.3677 3667 
Downward Deviations from Historical EPS Line 
Between Groups 1.3659 2 .6829 .6600 
Within Groups 3782.0360 3665 1.0319 
Total 3783.4019 3667 
Change in the Coverage Ratio 
Between Groups 0.1523 2 .0761 .0000 
Within Groups 57562.9870 3665 15.7061 
Total 57563.1393 3667 
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TABLE XXX (Continued) 
SS d. f. MS F Ratio 
Investment Policy 
Between Groups .4203 2 .2102 3.3000 
Within Groups 233.3250 3665 .0637 
Total 233.7453 3667 
Working Capital Policy 
Between Groups .5237 2 .2618 2.8600 
Within Groups 336.1089 3665 .0917 
Total . 336. 6326 3667 
Dividend Policy 
Between Groups 2. 7010 2 1.3505 12.1500 
Within Groups 407.3489 3665 .1111 
Total 410.0498 3667 
Financing Policy 
Between Groups .1120 2 .0560 .9600 
· Within Groups 214.3449 3665 .0584 
Total 214.4569 '3667 
. ' 
TABLE XXXI 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Strong Owner Weak Owner 
Control Control 
Beta-Adjusted Return 
Mean 0.0041 0.0345 
Standard Deviation 0.4101 0.4178 
Monthly-Variance-Adjusted Return 
Mean 5.9562 4.5437 
Standard Deviation 38.9970 40.1243 
Annual-Variance-Adjusted Return 
Mean 0.6401 0.3588 
Standard Deviation 3.2547 2.7472 
I 
Rate of Sales Growth 
Mean 0.1268 0.1356 
Standard Deviation 0.1670 0.2555 
Absolute Deviations from Historical EPS Line 
Mean 0.6618 0.5635 
Standard Deviation 0.9214 0.7944 


















































TABLE XXXI (Continued) 
Strong Owner Weak Owner Management 
Control Control Control 
Dividend Policy 
Mean 0.1127 0.0472 0.0373 
Standard Deviation 0.5612 0.3503 0.2325 
Financing Policy 
Mean 0.0279 0.0386 0.0248 
Standard Deviation 0.2028 0.4258 0.1431 
APPENDIX D 
LIST OF THE FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
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TABLE XXXII 
THE STRONG OWNER CONTROL GROUP 
Texasgulf Inc. 
Cominco Ltd. 
Hudson Bay Mining and Smelt-A 
Campbell Rec. Lake Mines 
North American Coal 
Superior Oil Co. 
Kellogg Co. 
Hormel (Gee. A.) and Co. 
Carnation Co. 
Campbell Soup Co. 
Staley (A.E.) Mfg. Co. 
American Bakeries Co. 
Michigan Sugar 
Hershey Foods Corp. 
Tootsie Roll Inds. Inc. 
Anderson, Clayton and Co. 
Schlitz (Jos.) Brewing 
Heublein Inc. 
Seagram Co. Ltd. 
Chelsea Inds. Inc. 
Cone Mills Corp. 
Reeves Brothers Inc. 
Riegel Textile Corp. 
Brown Co. 
Kroehler Mfg. Co. 
American Seating Co. 
Times Mirror Co. 
Prentice-Hall Inc. 
Donnelley (R.R.) and Sons Co. 
American Greetings Corp. 
Airco .Inc. 
Lilly (Eli) and Co. 
Marion Laboratories 
Searle (G.D.) and Co. 
Alberto-Culver Co. 
Standex Int'l. Corp. 
Imperial Oil Ltd-Cl A 
Getty Oil Co. 
Murphy Oil Corp. 
Shell Oil Co. 
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio) 
Crown Cork and Seal Co. Inc. 
Norton Co. 
Vulcan Materials Co. 
Copperweld Corp. 
Keystone Cons. Inds. Inc. 
Northwestern Steel and Wire Co. 
Penn-Dixie Inds. 
Revere Copper and Brass Inc. 
Kennametal Inc. 
Copeland Corp. 
Standard Pressed Steel Co. 
Keller Inds. Inc. 
Omark Inds. Inc. 
Roper Corp. 
Parker-Hannifin Corp. 
Thomas and Betts Corp. 
Spartan Corp. 
Int' 1 Rectifier Corp. 
Ford Motor Co. 




SOO Line Railroad 
Cooper-Jarrett Inc. 
Leaseway Trans. Corp. 
Yellow Freight System 
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone 
Zayre Corp. 
Caldor Inc. 
Fisher Foods Inc. 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 
National Tea Co. 
Pueblo Intl. Inc. 
Mays (JW) Inc. 
Cunningham Drug Stores Inc. 
Drug Fair Inc. 
Gordon Jewelry Corp. 
Resorts Int' 1. 
Sonesta Int'l. Hotels Corp. 
Burns Int'l. Security Service 
Rollins Inc. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. 




THE WEAK OWNER CONTROL GROUP 
Eastern Gas and Fuel Ass9c. 
Dome Petroleum Ltd. 
Helmerich and Payne 
Greyhound Corp. 
Fairmont Foods Co. 
Amalgamated Sugar Co. 
Wdgley (Wm.) Jr~ Co. 
Anheuser-Busch Inc. 
Southdown Inc. 
American Distilling Co. 
Coca-Cola Co. 
Chock Full 0 Nuts Corp. 
Bayuk Cigars Inc. 
Collins and Aikman Corp. 
Hanes Corp. 
Jonathan Logan Inc. 
Manhattan Ind. Inc. 
Masonite Corp. 
Federal Paper Board Co. 
Inland Container Corp. 




Hall (W.F.) Printing Co. 
Stauffer Chemical Co. 
Witco Chemical Corp. 
Syntex Corp. 
Richardson-Merrell Inc. 
Baxter Travenol Laboratories 
Becton, Dickinson and Co. 
Avon Products 
Faberge Inc. 
Husky Oil Ltd. 
Armstrong Rubber 
Cooper Tire and Rubber 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. 
Monogram Inds. Inc. 
U.S. Shoe Corp. 
Wolverine World Wide 
PPG Inds. 
Brockway Glass Co. 
Ideal Basic Inds. Inc. 
Lone Star Inds. 
General Refractories Co. 
Florida Steel Corp. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. 
Wylain Inc. 
Ceco Corp. 
Hoover Ball and Bearing Co. 
Signode Corp. 
Massey Ferguson Ltd. 
Gearhart Owen Inds. 
Brown and Sharpe Manufacturing Co. 
Dover Corp. 
Outboard Marine Corp. 
Mesta Machine Co. 






Fairchild Camera and Instrument 
Burntly Corp. 
CTS Corp. 
Mallory (P.R.) and Co. 





Beech Aircraft Corp. 
American Ship Building Co. 
United Industrial Corp. 
Polaroid Corp. 
Coleman Co. Inc. 
Norfolk and Western Railway 
St. Louis-San Francisco Railway 
McLean Trucking Co. 
Transcon Lines 
National Airlines Inc. 
Emery Air Freight Corp. 
Metromedia Inc. 
Duke Power Co. 
Missouri Public Service Co. 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas 
AFL Corp. 
Standard Brands Paint Co. 
Mercantile Stores Co. Inc. 
Vornado Inc. 
Kings Dept. Stores 
Borman' s Inc. 
TABLE XXXIII (Continued) 
Colonial Stores Inc. 
Cook United Inc. 
Stop and Shop Cos. 
Supermarkets General Corp. 
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc. 
Melville Corp. 
Host Int'l Inc. 
Howard Johnson Co. 
McDonald's Corp. 
Thrifty Drug Stores 
Macke Co. 
Tandy Corp. 
American Investment Co. 
Dial Financial Corp. 
Automatic Data Processing 
CLC of America 
Ryder System Inc. 





THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL GROUP 
ASARCO Inc. 




Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. 
· McDermott (J. Ray) and Co. 
Santa Fe Int'l 
Quaker Oats Co. 
Esmark Inc. 
General Host Corp. 
Iowa Beef Processors 
Castle and Cooke Inc. 
CPC Int'l Inc. 
Holly Sugar Corp. 
Peter Paul Inc. 
Heileman (G.) Brewing Inc. 
Walker (Hiram) Goodrhm and Wort 
Royal Crown Cola Co. 
American Brands Inc. 
Philip Morris Inc~ 
Reynolds (R.J.) Inds. 
U.S. Tobacco Co. 







Hammermill Paper Co. 
l_nt'l Paper Co. 
Kimberly-Clark Corp. 
St. Regis Paper Co. 
Scott Paper Co. 
Union Camp Corp. 
Westvaco Corp. 
piamond Int'l Corp. 
Fibreboard Corp. 
Simplicity Pattern Co. 
Western Publishing 
Allied Chemical Corp. 
·Celanese Corp. 
Dow Chemical 




Merck and Co. 
Pfizer Inc. 
Bristol-Myers Co. 
Sterling Drug Inc. 
American Hospital Supply 
Unilever N. V. 
Chesebrough-Pond's Inc. 
Int'l Minerals and Chemical 
Purex Corp. 
Gulf Oil of Canada 
Tesoro Petroleum Corp. 
Cities Service Co. 
Continental Oil Co. 
Kerr-McGee Corp. 
Marathon Oil Co. 
Standard Oil qo. (Indiana) 
Union Oil Co. of California 
Exxon Corp. 
Gulf Oil Corp. 
Standard Oil Co. of California 
Texaco Inc.· 
Goodrich (B.F.) Co. 
Mohawk Rubber Co. 
Uniroyal Inc. 
Richardson Co. 
Brown Group Inc. 
Continental Group 
National Can Corp. 
Owens-Illinois Inc. 
General Portland Inc. 
Kaiser Cement and Gypsum Corp. 
Ameron Inc. 
U.S. Gypsum Co. 
Armco Steel Co. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp. 
Inland Steel Co. 
Republic Steel Corp. 
U.S. Steel Corp. 
Allegheny Ludlum Inds. 
National Standard Co. 
Washington Steel Corp. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
Phelps Dodge Corp. 
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. 
Aluminum Co. of America 
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp. 
170 
TABLE XXXIV (Continued) 
ddtttinental Copper and Steel Ind. 
General Cable Corp. 
Fedders Corp. 
Trane Co. 
Babcock and Wilcox Co. 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. 
Euoyrus-Erie Co. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. 
FMC Gorp. 
Dresser Inds. Inc. 
Halliburton Co. 
Cincinnati Milacron Inc. 
Kearney and Trecker Corp. 
Warner and Swasey 
Black and Decker Mfg. Co. 
Emhart Corp. 
Ex-Cell-O Corp. 
Joy Mfg. Co. 
Leesona Corp. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
Peabody Galion Corp. 
Eurroughs Corp. 
Int'l Business Machines Corp. 
NCR Corp. 
Fitney-Bowes Inc. 
Memorex Corp • 
. General Electric Co. 
. RCA Corp. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
Emerson Electric Co. 




White Consolidated Inds. Inc. 
Zenith Radio Corp. 
E-Systems Inc. 
Harris Corp. 
Gulton Inds. Inc. 
High Voltage Engineering 
Raytheon Co. 
Sanders Assoc. Inc. Del. 
Microwave Assoc. Inc. 
American Motors Corp. 
White Motor Corp. 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. 
Boeing Co. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 
Martin Marietta Corp. 
United Technologies ·Corp. 
















Canadian Pacific Ltd. 
Kansas City Southern Inds. 
Southern Pacific Co. 
National City Lines 
American Airlines Inc. 
Braniff Int'l Corp. 
Continental Air Lines Inc. 
Delta Air Lines Inc. 
Eastern Air Lines · 
Northwest Airlines Inc • 
Pan American World Airways 
Trans World Airlines 
Western Air Lines Inc. 
American Telephone and Telegraph 
General Telephone and Electronics 
American Broadcasting 
Capital Cities Conununication 
Allegheny Power System 
American Electric Power 
Arizona Public Service Co. 
Baltimore Gas and Electric 
Central Hudson Gas and Electric 
Central Maine Power Co. 
Cincinnati Gas and Electric 
Cleveland Electric Illum. 
Columbus and Southern Ohio 
Consolidated Edison of New York 
Dayton Power and Light 
Delmarva Power and Light 
Duquesne Light Co. 
General Public Utilities 
Long Island Lighting 
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TABLE XXXIV (Continued) 
Nevada Power Co. 
New ft:trk State E.lectric and Gas 
Niagara Mohawk Power 
Northeast Utilities 
Ohio Edison Co. 
Orange and Rockland Utilities 
Pacific Gas and Electric 
Pacif_ic Power and Light 
Pennsylvania Power and Light 
Portland General Electric Co .• 
Potomac Electric Power 
Public Service Co. of N. H. 
Public Service Gas and Electric 
Rochester Gas and Electric 
Southern California Edison Co. 
Tucson Gas and Electric 
Union Electric Co. 
United Illuminating Co. 
Utah Power and.Light 
Virginia Electric and Power 
Washington Water Power 
Atlantic City Electric 
Boston Edison Co. 
Erascan Ltd.-Cl A 
Carolina·Power and Light 
Central and South West Corp. 
Central Illinois Light 
Central Illinois Public. Service 
Central Louisiana Electric 
Commonwealth Edison 
Consumers Power Co. 
Detroit Edison Co. 
Eastern Utilities Assoc. 
El Paso Electric Co. 
Empire District Electric Co. 
Florida Power and Light 
Florida Power Corp. 
Gulf. States Utilities Co. 
Hawaiian Electric Co. 
tdaho Power Co. 
Illinois Power Co. 
Indianapolis Power and Light 
Interstate Power Co. · 
Iowa Electric Light and FWR 
Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric 
Iowa Power and Light 
Iowa Public Service Co. 
Iowa Southern Utilities Co .• 
K81lsas City Power and Light 
Kansas Gas and Electric 
Kansas Power and Light 
Kentucky Utilities Co. 
Louisville Gas and Electric 
Middle South Utilities 
Minnesota Power and Light 
Montana-Dakota Utilities 
Montana Power Co. 
New England Electric System 
New England Gas and Electric 
Northern Indiana Public Service 
Northern States Power 
Otter Tail Power Co. 
Philadelphia Electric Co. 
Public Service Co. of Indiana 
St. Joseph Light and Power 
Savannah Electric and Power 
Sierra Pacific Power Co. 
South Carolin' Electric and Gas 
Southern Co. 
Southern Indiana Gas and Electric 
Southwestern Public Service Co. 
Tampa Electric Co. 
Texas Utilities Co. 
Wisconsin Electric Power 
Wisconsin Power and Light 
Wisconsin Public Service 
El Paso Co. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line 
Texas Eastern Transmission 
Texas Gas Transmission 
Texas Oil and Gas Corp. 
Alabama Gas Corp. 
American Natural Resources 
Atlanta Gas Light Co. 
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. 
Columbia Gas System 
Consolidated Natural Gas Co. 
Enserch Corp. 
Equitable Gas Co. 
Houston Nat.ural Gas Corp. 
Indiana Gas Co. 
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. 
Laclede Gas Co. 
Michigan Gas Utilities Co. 
Nicor Inc. 
Northwest Natural Gas Co. 
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 
Peoples Gas Co. 
Pioneer Corp. 
South Jersey Inds. 
LGI Corp. 
Federal Signal Corp. 
Unilever Ltd.-Amer. Shrs. 
Allied Stores 
Carter Hawley Hale Stores 
Macy (R.H.) and Co. 
May Department Stores Co. 
Penney (J.C.) Co. 
Murphy (G.C.) Co. 
Woolworth (F.W.) Co. 
Allied. Supermarkets 
Jewel Cos. Inc. 
Kroger Co. 
Lucky Stores Inc. 
TABLE XXXIV (Continued) 
Safeway Stores Inc. 
Walgreen Co. 
Servomation Corp. 
Gibraltar Financial Corp. 
Great Western Financial 
Imperial Corp. of America 
United Financial of California 
C.I.T. Financial Corp. 
Aristar Inc. 
Liberty Loan Corp. 
XTRA Inc. 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film 
Gulf and Western Inds. Inc. 
Int'l Telephone and Telegraph 
Kidde (Walter) and Co. 
LTV Corp. 
Litton Inds. Inc. 
trans Union Corp. 
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